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ABSTRACT 
 
This dissertation examines the multifaceted interactions between China and the global 
Internet in the past three decades, especially China’s outward cyber expansion, or the “going out” 
program that has gained momentum since the mid-2000s, and explores the changing social class 
relations that accompany and shape this evolution. It offers a political economic analysis of how 
units of Internet capital and state agencies in China are impinging on the international Internet 
system. It also investigates both the structure and agency of Chinese Internet capital by 
examining the rise of an Internet capitalist class fraction in China and its intricate relationships 
with both the state and other transnational capitalists.   
Based on intensive research into both primary and secondary data sources, this 
dissertation shows that instead of being confined to a repressive inward-looking national 
“intranet,” China in fact has actively engaged with the political economy of the global Internet 
since the 1980s – and is now increasingly projecting power outward in this sphere. 
Conceptualizing the Chinese Internet industry as an expansive sector that encompasses hardware 
and equipment vendors, network operators, web services and applications providers, as well as 
major government and corporate network users, this dissertation unpacks the complex and 
dynamic state-capital interactions that characterize these different industrial subsectors. It argues 
that, although the state has retained some critical maneuvering room over its internet capital in 
the construction of an International Internet “with Chinese characteristics,” the complex and 
often contradictory interplay between the territorial logic of the state and the expansive logic of 
capitalist accumulation, and between the structure and agency of Chinese Internet capital, 
continue to create tensions and conflicts.  
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1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
With the world’s largest online population, some 710 million,1 and a thriving information 
and communication industry, China has progressively become a vital player in the global Internet 
landscape. It stands to become an even more important actor going forward. In mid-2010, 
China’s new leadership, the Xi Jinping-Li Keqiang administration, announced that the country 
has adopted two landmark policies – “Internet Plus” and “One Belt One Road” – which not only 
plan to deepen links between the Internet and almost all the sectors of the Chinese economy, but 
also commit the Government to active support for Chinese Internet companies as they expand 
their reach in global cyberspace – in the name of building a “Digital/Information Silk Road”.2 
China’s engagement with the international Internet indeed now captures the attention of the 
country’s topmost leadership – much like it also does in the United States.  
To add to our knowledge of China's changing role within the transnational capitalist 
system, this dissertation offers a political economic analysis of how Chinese businesses and state 
entities are impinging on the global Internet. It takes an integrative perspective in studying the 
“global Internet,” which not only foregrounds policymaking and geopolitical conflicts between 
states, but also highlights the transnationalization of business and investment. It also adopts a 
comprehensive approach in investigating China’s increasingly visible participation in this 
globalized system, which covers both the elements of class structure and the elements of class 
                                                
1 China Internet Network Information Center (CNNIC), “2016 Statistical Report on Internet Development 
in China,” 2016, https://cnnic.com.cn/IDR/ReportDownloads/201611/P020161114573409551742.pdf. 
2 Xinhua News Agency, “Internet Plus Set to Push China’s Economy to Higher Level,” March 15, 2015, 
Xinhua Net, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2015- 03/15/c_134067831.htm; National Development 
and Reform Commission, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of 
Commerce, “Vision and Actions on Jointly Building Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st-Century 
Maritime Silk Road,” March 2015, http://en.ndrc.gov.cn/newsrelease/201503/t20150330_669367.html.  
 
	
 
2 
agency as they evolve with the “going out” of China’s Internet industry. This dissertation strives 
to explicate, both historically and theoretically, the relationship between the state and capital in 
shaping and responding to the ongoing expansion of China’s role in global cyberspace, across 
the period from China’s first Internet interconnection in 1987 to the more recently minted 
“Internet Plus” and “One Belt One Road” initiatives in 2015. This stretch of time enables us to 
capture the major rhythms of China’s interaction with this dynamic infrastructure.  
In connection with China’s rise as a global economic powerhouse, the relationship 
between China and the Internet has gained much scholarly and journalistic attention, most of 
which is preoccupied exclusively with China’s domestic network.3 It is striking, by contrast, how 
little attention has been paid to China’s role in the international Internet. This dissertation seeks 
to remedy this research deficit by clarifying the political economy of China’s growing 
involvement with the global Internet. As the Internet has become a multifunctional and pervasive 
communication system and as China has become an ever-more-important player in this system, 
to understand the interplay between China and the global Internet holds critical importance for 
the field of communications.  
 
                                                
3 Randolph Kluver and Chen Yang, “The Internet in China: A Meta-Review of Research,” The 
Information Society 21, no. 4 (2005): 301–8; Jack Linchuan Qiu and Joseph Man Chan, “China Internet 
Studies: A Review of the Field,” in The Academy & the Internet, ed. Helen Fay Nissenbaum and Monroe 
E. Price (New York: Peter Lang, 2004), 275–307; David Kurt Herold and Gabriele de Seta. “Through the 
Looking Glass: Twenty Years of Chinese Internet Research,” The Information Society 31 (2015): 68–82. 
 
	
 
3 
China and the Global Internet: A Political-economic Study  
The structure and policy of global communications continue to evolve and to mutate. 
This is not merely a technological change, but also a political economic change. China is 
increasingly central to it.  
Much of China’s rapid economic expansion has been predicated on foreign investment in 
the country – initially on the East Coast and then beyond. Starting from the late 1990s, however, 
China entered a new stage of incorporation into global capitalism, i.e., by expanding from 
“attracting-in,” or drawing inward foreign direct investment (FDI) 4 into its territory, to “going-
out,” or promoting China’s outward capital flow.5  During this transition, the Chinese state 
formulated a series of policies to encourage indigenous firms to engage in international 
investment. However, this policy shift should not be viewed purely as a natural byproduct of a 
growing Chinese economy. Rather, it is an indication of weakness as well as of strength. On the 
government level, recognizing the vulnerabilities of its export- and inward FDI-driven 
developmental path of the 1980s and 1990s, the Chinese leadership hoped that pushing domestic 
companies to go international would help China lift its low position as a point of assembly in the 
global production chain by bringing in advanced technologies and management skills. On the 
enterprise level, the state’s strategies of introducing inward FDI to jumpstart domestic markets 
have also, to a certain extent, resulted in market saturation and foreign control in a few industries 
and thus “forced” some domestic companies to venture out. For example, by the end of 1990s, 
                                                
4 There are two types of foreign direct investment (FDI): Inward foreign direct investment (IFDI), when 
other countries put capital into China; and outward foreign direct investment (OFDI), when China exports 
capital into other countries.  
5 Lutao Ning, “China’s Leadership in the World ICT Industry: A Successful Story of Its ‘attracting-in’ 
and ‘Walking-Out’ strategy for the Development of High-Tech Industries?” Pacific Affairs 82, no. 1 
(2009): 67–91; David Shambaugh, China Goes Global: The Partial Power (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2013). 
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the foreign domination in China’s Global System for Mobile Communications (GSM) mobile 
market induced Huawei and ZTE to enter foreign markets – sometimes, to avoid direct 
confrontation with the giant and powerful transnational companies at home.6  
With the “going-out” strategies taking off, the scale of China’s outward FDI increased 
rapidly. According to the 2015 World Investment Report released by the United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), from 2000 to 2014, total Chinese-based 
outward FDI stock surged from $27 billion to $729 billion.7 In 2014, China’s outward FDI 
ranked 3rd in the world, after the US and Japan, while China outward FDI stock ranked 8th, after 
the US, UK, Germany, Japan, France, Switzerland and Netherlands. It is also estimated that in 
the next few years, China’s outward FDI will surpass inward FDI, shifting the country’s role 
from a net FDI recipient to a net FDI supplier.8  
How are we to understand China’s growing participation in the political economy of 
transnational capitalism? To address this fundamental question, many scholars have 
foregrounded China’s outward expansion in traditional areas such as extractive industries and 
agriculture.9 Other scholars raise more comprehensive questions. In Is China buying the world? 
Peter Nolan develops an extensive account by examining the internationalization of China’s 
“national champion” corporations in various industries such as banking, metals, mining, oil, 
                                                
6 Yu Hong, Francois Bar, and Zheng An, “Chinese Telecommunications on the Threshold of 
Convergence: Contexts, Possibilities, and Limitations of Forging a Domestic Demand-Based Growth 
Model,” Telecommunications Policy 36 (2012): 914–28. 
7 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), World Investment Report 2015, 
http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/wir2015_en.pdf, A8.  
8 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), World Investment Report 2014,  
http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/wir2014_en.pdf, 47.  
9 Deborah Brautigam, The Dragon’s Gift: The Real Story of China in Africa (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2009); Deborah Brautigam, Will Africa Feed China? (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015); 
Ching Kwan Lee, “The Spectre of Global China,” New Left Review 89, no. September-October (2014): 
29–65. 
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power, construction and telecommunications. He argues that despite their rapid growth, those 
firms have a very limited presence in developed countries, while multinational giants from high-
income countries have already achieved significant – if not dominant – influence in the Chinese 
market and in the world market more generally.10 
This dissertation project intervenes in the ongoing debate by choosing to focus on the 
Internet industry, as a strategic industry that occupies a key area of profit making and a critically 
relevant part of China’s international engagement. The aim is two-fold: On the one hand, it 
moves beyond the well-documented extractive and agricultural industries to the high-tech 
industry in order to compile and assess new evidence about China’s growing participation in 
transnational capitalism. On the other hand, it assesses Peter Nolan’s proposition that 
transnational corporations of the developed world already dominate the global political economy 
across its range. Whether China is cultivating a significant role in this high-profit and strategic 
industry – rather than remaining a secondary player – will also test the conception of the 
structure of today’s transnational capitalism.  
China’s growing interpenetration with the global Internet stands out at a time when China 
and Information and Communications Technology (ICT) have constituted two of today’s rare 
poles of economic growth.11 Not only has China maintained an impressive growth rate even 
throughout a protracted global crisis, it has also turned the Internet industry into the “dragonhead” 
of its economy. A recent report released by the McKinsey Global Institute showed that China’s 
Internet economy amounted to 4.4% of its 2013 GDP – a higher proportion than in the United 
                                                
10 Peter Nolan, Is China Buying the World? (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2012). 
11 Dan Schiller, Digital Depression: Information Technology and Economic Crisis (Urbana: University of 
Illinois Press, 2014). 
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States; and it forecast that, by 2025, this figure might increase to 22%.12 Other scholars provide 
valuable insights into the political-economic transformation of Chinese domestic society in this 
context, especially the changing labor conditions and class relations in the ICT sector in China.13 
This dissertation takes the discussion further by delving into what is happening as Chinese 
capital and the Chinese state contribute to and are shaped by digital capitalism on a global level.  
It also provides a different benchmark for investigating the complex relationships 
between states in an increasingly fraught power struggle to help their domestic units of capital to 
capture more of the Internet’s growth potential. For a long time, the global Internet was 
constructed and dominated by US-based entities. However, with the emergence of substantial 
capitalist players based in the Global South, a point I will elaborate more later, and the changing 
geopolitics of a post-Snowden cyberspace, an Internet that was mostly set out by US government 
and business actors for the wider world came into question. The rise of China as a potential state 
power and the emergence of Chinese Internet corporations as significant corporate forces on the 
international stage may be set in this context. For example, both the China Internet Network 
Information Center (CNNIC), a non-profit organization supervised by China’s Ministry of 
Industry and Information Technology (MIIT), and Huawei, China’s telecommunications giant, 
have started to play an increasingly vita role in the Internet standardization community. Is there 
evidence of growing conflict between the US and China over whose interests will structure the 
global Internet? Or is there a possibility of a shared global Internet policy vision between the US 
                                                
12 Jonathan Woetzel et al. “China’s Digital Transformation: The Internet's Impact on Productivity and 
Growth,” McKinsey Global Institute (MGI), July 2014, 
http://www.mckinsey.com/insights/high_tech_telecoms_internet/chinas_digital_transformation.  
13 Yu Hong, Labor, Class Formation and China’s Informationized Policy of Economic Development 
(Lanham: Lexington Books, 2011).  
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and China in some areas? What China will do, and how various internal and external forces 
interact with China’s multifaceted strategies, will have profound impacts on global 
communications and political economy in the decades to come.  
Finally, this dissertation also tries to shed new light on the ongoing debate on the social 
class ramifications of the transnationalization of capital accumulation. The character and 
complexity of class structures require continuing attention.14 Some would dispute the existence 
of a Chinese capitalist class. I will argue that this class does exist, and that one may study it by 
documenting and investigating several key factors (e.g., education, political affiliation, 
transnational linkage), in addition to ownership of productive assets and accumulated wealth, in 
forging class consciousness. Without exhausting all the possible social formations in 
contemporary Chinese society, this dissertation looks specifically at the class fraction that is 
growing in China around network technologies and applications, and at its transnational 
interlocks. By doing so, it offers a new window onto the international Internet “with Chinese 
characteristics”, and likewise contributes to our understanding of the complex transnational class 
relations that animate contemporary digital capitalism.  
 
Theoretical Approach and Concerns 
This dissertation draws on the intellectual contributions of critical political economy of 
communication, which places the mutual constitution of social relations, especially power 
                                                
14 William K. Carroll, The Making of a Transnational Capitalist Class: Corporate Power in the 21st 
Century (London: Zed Books, 2010); William G. Domhoff, Who Rules America?: Challenges to 
Corporate and Class Dominance, 6th ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2009); William I. Robinson, A 
Theory of Global Capitalism: Production Class, and State in a Transnational World (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 2004); Leslie Sklair, The Transnational Capitalist Class (Oxford: Blackwell, 
2001). 
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relations, and the “production, distribution and consumption of resources, including 
communication resources” at the forefront.15 The political economy of communication works to 
contextualize the role of communication within the larger and historically evolving political 
economy by focusing on issues such as media ownership and commodification, the international 
division of labor and the transnationalization of capital.  
More specifically, this dissertation situates itself within the theoretical framework of the 
political economy of the Internet, which positions the relationship between the development of 
the Internet and the reconfiguration of the global capitalist political economy at the center of 
analysis.16 Dan Schiller, in particularly, foregrounds the crucial role of the state and capital, and 
their complex interactions – encompassing both conflict and cooperation – in structuring and 
restructuring the international Internet system.17 Invoking David Harvey’s conceptualization of 
the contradiction between the territorial logic of the state and the expansive logic of capitalist 
accumulation in the operation of power,18 Yuezhi Zhao further argues that the tensions between 
capital and the state have been especially prominent in China’s information industries, “a sector 
over which the state exerts a high degree of control”.19 This dissertation aims to contribute to this 
theoretical tradition by foregrounding, and further clarifying, the interlocking relationship 
between capital and the state, and their respective roles, in defining and responding to the 
                                                
15 Vincent Mosco, The Political Economy of Communication: 2nd Edition (New York: SAGE 
Publications, 2009), 2. 
16 Robert W. McChesney, Digital Disconnect: How Capitalism is Turning the Internet against 
Democracy (New York: The New Press, 2013); Dan Schiller, Digital Capitalism: Networking the Global 
Market System (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1999). 
17 Dan Schiller, “Rosa Luxemburg’s Internet? For a Political Economy of State Mobilization and the 
Movement of Accumulation in Cyberspace,” International Journal of Communication, no. 8 (2014): 355–
75. 
18 David Harvey, The New Imperialism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003). 
19 Zhao, “China’s Pursuits of Indigenous Innovations in Information Technology Developments: Hopes, 
Follies and Uncertainties,” 276.  
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emergence of China, as an increasingly powerful force – albeit, a complex one – in shaping the 
global Internet.  
I aim broadly to unpack the multifaceted dynamics of China’s outward expansion in 
cyberspace. Often perceived only as a repressive authoritarian regime that aims at building an 
inward-looking national “intranet,” China in fact is now increasingly projecting power outward 
in this sphere. This process has made China increasingly ready to assume the role of a major 
participant, or even a definer, in the policy debates that accompany today’s reshaping of the 
international communication order. The “going-out” strategy, however, is not only about policy 
but also about capital; it is not only political, but also economic. This dissertation attempts to 
document the historical and structural conditions of this “going-out” of the Chinese Internet, on 
both the policy and business fronts, by clarifying how state strategies and capital’s imperatives 
on a transnational level cooperate (or not) with each other (Chapter 1 to 3), and provides a case 
study to exemplify the dynamics and complex state-capital relations in concrete and specific 
historical contexts (Chapter 4).  
Chapter 5 begins by recognizing that political economy understands “society” as a 
complex totality of social relations. 20  In their conceptualization, Graham Murdock and 
Peter Golding identify class relations that capital generates as the pivot of social stratification.21 
In a similar vein, Dan Schiller argues that “capital” is not a thing – as money or investment – but 
                                                
20 Mosco, The Political Economy of Communication; Dan Schiller, Theorizing Communication: A History, 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1996); Janet Wasco, Graham Murdock, and Helena Sousa, eds., 
The Handbook of Political Economy of Communications (Hoboken: Wiley-Blackwell, 2011). 
21 Peter Golding and Graham Murdock, “Theories of Communication and Theories of Society,” 
Communication Research 5, no. 3 (1978): 339–56. 
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a two-sided, contradictory social relation that is built around wage labor.22 Labor and social class 
relations thus provide an essential lens to understanding social totality. This point is directly 
relevant to China, as Yuezhi Zhao argues that in contemporary China, “market reforms have not 
only accentuated preexisting political, economic, and social inequalities, but have also created 
new forms of social inclusion and exclusion, engendering rapid processes of social stratification 
and class polarization.”23 
Building upon this framework, a group of communication scholars have taken labor as a 
starting point and foregrounded one pole of class relations by studying how China’s working 
class articulates with the Internet.24 This dissertation builds on and contributes to this emerging 
body of work by granting attention to the other pole – the capitalist class. Chapter 5 asks: How 
have Chinese Internet corporate elites interlocked with and differentiated from the transnational 
capitalist class – and how has this process interacted with the Chinese party-state? Is there a 
fraction of the transnational capitalist class growing around Internet-based accumulation 
strategies in China? Admittedly, the process of capitalist development in China is by no means 
contained by the specific class segment investigated here. This dissertation hopes, however, that 
by focusing on the Internet capitalist class fraction, it will open up a different window onto the 
movements of Chinese capital in a core industry. 
 
                                                
22 Schiller, “Rosa Luxemburg’s Internet? For a Political Economy of State Mobilization and the 
Movement of Accumulation in Cyberspace.” 
23 Zhao, Communication in China, 7. 
24 Hong, Labor, Class Formation and China’s Informationized Policy of Economic Development; Jack 
Linchuan Qiu, Working-Class Network Society: Communication Technology and the Information Have-
Less in Urban China (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2009); Jack Linchuan Qiu, Goodbye iSlave: A 
Manifesto for Digital Abolition (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2017).  
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The Political Economy of the Internet 
As pointed out by Dan Schiller, 20 years after the popularization of the World Wide Web, 
the political economy of the Internet remains "chronically undernourished” in communication 
studies and to rectify this research void is “one of our greatest intellectual challenges”.25 Instead 
of foregrounding networked cultural practices of end users or digital activism on social 
networking sites, a political economy of the Internet raises fundamental questions about power 
relations in global cyberspace: Who (which social actors) are exercising dominant power over 
various levels of the network system, from access devices to backbone infrastructure to online 
services and applications? How have these power-holders interacted with each other?  And how 
has their complex interplay affected the development of the international Internet system? These 
questions constitute one of the bases of this dissertation project.  
A group of scholars strives to engage some related questions by situating the historical 
development of the Internet within a broader political-economic context. Robert McChesney 
focuses specifically on the context of the United States and provides a detailed political 
economic analysis of the development of the Internet system in its home country. In Digital 
Disconnect, he argues that political economy offers valuable analytical tools for understanding 
the current colonization of the Internet by large corporations in the United States.  For him, the 
“unnatural marriage” between the Internet and monopoly capitalism has transformed the Web 
from a government-funded research project into a fully commercialized surveillance apparatus, 
which has dire ramifications for democracy.26   
                                                
25 Schiller, “Rosa Luxemburg’s Internet? For a Political Economy of State Mobilization and the 
Movement of Accumulation in Cyberspace”, 355.  
26 McChesney, Digital Disconnect. 
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Dan Schiller extends this focus to the international stage. In studying network 
technologies and their relationship with contemporary capitalism, he introduces the theoretical 
framework of “digital capitalism” to foreground the centrality of information and communication 
technologies (ICT) in reconstructing the global capitalist political economy. He demonstrates 
that as capitalist powers entered into a new stage of globalization beginning in the late 1970s, not 
only have digital technologies significantly advanced the global expansion of transnational 
corporations, but the manufacturing and provision of network products and services has also 
become a leading area of profit making. For China, this global political economic trend has in 
many ways proceeded in concert with its early efforts at network building and interconnection.27  
With the continuing penetration of the Internet into almost every aspect of human life, 
scholars in the PEC tradition have also begun to develop specific studies to illustrate certain 
important or emergent aspects of the Internet economy. For example, Vincent Mosco’s recent 
study of “cloud computing” – To the Cloud – provides an insightful assessment of the 
burgeoning data-center based industry. He outlines some of the “dark clouds” of cloud 
computing, such as environmental damage, privacy and security threats, and the reconstruction 
of IT labor force. He also warns us that, building upon cloud computing, the “surveillance 
capitalism” that “market(s) information about subscribers and customers to advertisers” and the 
“surveillance state” – as exemplified by the NSA scandal – are accruing their power over 
citizens.28  
Critical scholarship has made important advances in understanding the political economy 
of the Internet. These advances, however, have been situated almost exclusively in or in regard to 
                                                
27 Schiller, Digital Capitalism. 
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the United States. This is understandable, as the Internet for most of its existence was broadly a 
US-centric creation. The predominance of US-based corporations in the global Internet economy 
further contributes to this geographic focus. However, with the emergence of substantial players 
from the Global South – especially, China – this focus must be widened and partly redirected. 
This dissertation aims to fill this gap by offering a political-economic examination of the 
complex relationship between China and the global Internet. This is important for clarifying the 
changing structure of transnational capitalism.  
Another important scholarly work on the political economy of the Internet pays attention 
to issues related to labor and class relations, as a lens for comprehending the character of the 
social totality in the Internet age.  
In Labor in the Global Digital Economy, Ursula Huws conceptualizes the role of labor in 
global cyberspace by intervening into the current debates on “digital labor”. Instead of viewing 
“digital labor” performed online as a unique type of labor that can be separated from “material 
labor,” Huws understands “digital labor” as integrative to the global capitalist political economy. 
She argues that “digital labor” actually builds upon the global connected network infrastructure 
that is both highly material and involves the physical labor of millions of working class people 
all over the world, especially in developing countries.29 In other words, the performance of 
“digital labor” largely depends on common capitalist relations of production.  
Focusing on the political economy of search, Shinjoung Yeo adds to this analysis by 
specifically examining the labor structure and labor management behind the global search engine 
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industry.30 Instead of isolating “digital labor” and positing a dichotomy between “mental” and 
“manual” labor, she proposes three distinctive categories of work – high-skilled/paid, low-waged 
and unwaged labor – and examines how the search industry has employed not only high-skilled 
and relatively high-paid engineers but also a large number of low-paid contingent workers and 
even unwaged workers that are often referred as “Internet users”. She also shows that, far from 
exceeding or going against capital’s logic of labor exploitation, the current labor management 
techniques at the search giant Google are actually evolved from an earlier era of US industrial 
capitalism.  
Working in the Chinese context, a number of scholars have further expanded this 
research focus. For them, the category of labor – and, relatedly, of class relations – offers an 
essential angle to apprehend the highly complex and fluid co-evolution of Internet and 
contemporary Chinese society.  
Moving beyond the binary distinction of “haves” or “have-nots” behind the “digital 
divide” thesis, Jack Linchuan Qiu, in Working-Class Network Society, delves into the more 
nuanced social formation of the “information have-less” and of a “working class network society” 
in contemporary China.31 He asks, how China’s evolving political-economic and social reform 
has shaped the working-class ICTs usage and how the use of ICTs has affected working-class 
practices and resistance? While Qiu’s work pays more attention to technology consumption of 
Chinese working class, Yu Hong’s work Labor, Class Formation and China’s Informationized 
Policy of Economic Development anchors analysis in production. Based on a critical examination 
of both transnational capital and Chinese state policies, Hong’s work explores the labor relations 
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and class formation of industrial workers – as wage earners rather than end users – in China’s 
ICT industry.32 
This emerging strand of scholarship places the role of labor and the working class at the 
forefront of its analysis and raises important questions on the social/class dimension of the rise of 
the “information society” in China. Extending their work of understanding China’s network 
society through the lens of social class – yet distinct from their focus on the working class – this 
dissertation strives to illuminate the complex dynamics of China’s incorporation into the global 
Internet by problematizing and investigating another side of the capital-labor relation – the 
Internet capitalist class fraction in China.  
 
The Geopolitics of Internet Policymaking 
The geopolitics of Internet policymaking is a vital, controversial, and contested field, 
encompassing many issues and engaged by a body of work on the emerging field of “global 
Internet governance”.  
Internet governance, usually refers to “policy and technical coordination issues related to 
the exchange of information over the Internet”.33  There are several different taxonomies of 
Internet governance. 34 Laura DeNardis broadly identifies five themes: control of critical Internet 
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33 Laura DeNardis, Protocol Politics: The Globalization of Internet Governance (Cambridge: MIT Press, 
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also proposes an Internet governance taxonomy that includes: (1) Issues relating to infrastructure and the 
management of critical Internet resources, (2) Issues relating to the use of the Internet, including spam, 
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resources, Internet protocol design, Internet governance-related intellectual property rights, 
Internet security and infrastructure management, and Internet governance-related communication 
rights.35 There exist different views toward the governing process of such a complex set of issues. 
Rather than assuming the existence of a consensus among different participants, Jill Hills argues 
that there are complex power relations that actually underpin the construction of international 
communication and information policies.36 Hills’ arguments echo other scholars’ observations 
that policymaking is a site of power contestation. 37  Following this critical tradition, this 
dissertation studies the formation and formulation of global Internet polices as a potentially 
conflicted process that expresses rival, deep-seated political-economic interests.  
One of the pioneers in the study of global Internet governance is Milton Mueller. In 
Ruling the Root, he provides an important historical account of the struggle over the management 
of the domain name system, which he considers as the major point of control over the Internet. 
He demonstrates that through the Domain Name System, i.e., the “root,” the Internet has been far 
more extensively managed – governed – than is often recognized, and that this critical 
governance function was institutionalized by the United States in the 1990s.38 In Networks and 
States, Mueller shifts his attention to a series of international conflict points in Internet 
policymaking, including the World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS) and the 
                                                                                                                                                       
network security and cybercrime, (3) Issues that are relevant to the Internet but have an impact much 
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35 Laura DeNardis, “The Emerging Field of Internet Governance,” in The Oxford Handbook of Internet 
Studies, ed. W Dutton (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 1890–1905. 
36 Jill Hills, Telecommunications and Empire (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2007). 
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formation of the Internet Governance Forum (IGF).39 He argues that, the rise of the Internet as an 
unprecedented transnational communication medium has posed new issues and challenges to the 
traditional state-centric model of communication policymaking. During this process, novel 
transnational institutions have been invented, notably, multi-stakeholder-based institutions like 
ICANN and the IGF. In this context, multi-stakeholderism has become a pervasive concept in 
discussions of Internet governance. In principle, it compels governments, businesses and civil 
society groups to participate in the policymaking process on an equal basis. However, as Mueller 
points out, although this model identifies governments, private actors, and civil society 
organizations as the primary players in Internet governance, it “does not determine how power is 
distributed among these groups or how much weight they are given in decision-making 
processes”.40  Therefore, it is not surprising that multi-stakeholderism itself is a contentious 
practice, since it downgrades all states, except the United States, from meaningful participation. 
While Mueller focuses his analytical attention mainly on nation-states as “some of the 
biggest threats to the global character and freedom of networked communications,”41  Laura 
DeNardis provides a more comprehensive picture of Internet governance by taking into account 
the role of private corporate power, in addition to states and international treaties. In The Global 
War for Internet Governance, she aptly notices the greater privatization of cyberspace and how 
private actors, such as the US-based domain name registrar VeriSign, are actually exercising 
critical governing power over network infrastructure.42  
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Anchored in a political-economic framework, Shawn Powers and Michael Jablonski 
understand the geopolitics of Internet governance – or the “real cyber war” – as a state-centered 
battle over information resources.43 They put power relations among states in the international 
system at the center of their analysis, in contrast to approaches that foreground the democratic 
potentials of network technologies. More specifically, drawing upon Herbert Schiller’s studies 
on the “free flow of information,” they document how the prevalent policy discourse of “Internet 
freedom” has been driven historically by geopolitical-economic motivations of the United States 
rather than by democratic ideals. Since this book is primarily concerned with the “Internet 
freedom” policies that have been promoted and projected by the United States into global 
cyberspace, it pays relatively little attention to other countries. For example, when talking about 
China, the authors choose to focus on how the Chinese state regulates its domestic network, 
rather than explicating what is China’s complex and historically evolving approaches toward the 
management of the international Internet. 
Recently, with the apparently rising economic influence of some Global South countries, 
welcome attention has also begun to be directed to their role in the international Internet system.  
Taking a historical perspective, in From NWICO to WSIS: 30 Years of Communication 
Geopolitics, a group of scholars has made an attempt to bring together the two highpoints in 
international communication policymaking, i.e., debates centering on the United Nations 
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) during the 1970s-80s in the 
context of the movement for the New World Information and Economic Order (NWICO) , and 
the International Telecommunications Union (ITU)-sponsored debates at the World Summit of 
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Information Society (WSIS) in 2003-05.44  Spearheaded by the Non-Aligned Movement and 
supported by the often-newly independent “Third World countries,” the NWICO movement 
made a clear demand for a more equitable distribution of the world’s resources, including 
communication resources. The recent WSIS discussions, on the other hand, focused more 
specifically on the issues of “information society” and global Internet governance, especially the 
management of the Internet Domain Name System. Looking into those two benchmark debates, 
scholars in this book provide an assessment of the continuities and discontinuities between them. 
Although writing from different viewpoints, most of them agree that the uneven international 
information flow between the South and the North that characterized the NWICO movement 
remains intact, if not reinforced, with the diffusion of network technologies. Mustapha 
Masmoudi, a former member of the MacBride Commission,45 suggests in his chapter that the 
South countries need to continue to challenge such imbalances and find new solutions.46 
Abu Bhuiyan details the struggles of the Global South to find such new solutions during 
the WSIS process. In Internet Governance and the Global South: Demand for a New Framework, 
he provides a wide-ranging analysis of how the South countries negotiated Internet-related issues 
at the WSIS, including issues related to the digital divide, multilingualism, intellectual property 
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rights and cyber security.47 He argues that, although during the WSIS process, these states jointly 
called for a more internationalized framework to manage the international Internet, they did not 
oppose the neoliberal basis of the existing governance scheme. Therefore, compared with the 
NWICO movement in the 1970s, their quest for a more equitable Internet governing scheme has 
demonstrated deep ambiguities.  
Bhuiyan’s analysis resonates with South Asian scholar Vijay Prashad’s broader historical 
account of the rise of the Global South in a neoliberal capitalist context. In The Poorer Nations: 
A possible history of the Global South, Prashad argues that although as the “locomotives of the 
South,” the formation of the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) has brought 
some fresh air into “the stagnant world of neoliberal imperialism,” these states do not challenge 
the neoliberal agenda in general. 48  This BRICS formulation, in some sense, is itself an 
objectification, rather than a concrete reality, as the initial term “BRIC” was actually coined in 
2001 by an investment banker of Goldman Sachs. Prashad further argues that performing 
“neoliberalism with southern characteristics,” the ruling elites in those leading states of the South 
aim at participating in the existing system to further their own political-economic interests, 
despite the increasing social conflicts within each society.  
Among these leading Global South states, China stands out as a critical case. It not only 
has the world’s largest online population; Chinese Internet corporations are also progressively 
expanding their territories into global cyberspace. How are we to understand China’s role in the 
geopolitics of Internet governance, a key field in transnational capitalism?  
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Based on a normative liberal position, many have sought to posit variants of what may be 
called the “cyber-sovereignty” framework. Largely concerned with China’s repressive Internet 
control domestically, this conventional framework foregrounds the role of the authoritarian 
Chinese state in attempting to govern the international Internet. This position is then often 
counterpoised to the preference of US-centric policy for a borderless Internet that should remain 
as free from government control as possible. In short, the debate centers on Chinese “Internet 
sovereignty” versus American “Internet freedom”.49  While the policy discourse of “Internet 
freedom” has been debunked by a group of scholars,50  “Internet sovereignty” remains as a 
prevailing formula in interpreting China’s position.  
Although it offers important insight into one aspect of China’s motivation, the “cyber-
sovereignty” framework focuses primarily on political control and generally tends to reduce 
China’s complex and contradictory position to that of a heavy-handed state motivated to elevate 
governments and intergovernmental organizations as the only legitimate governors of the global 
Internet. Sometimes, they are caught in a problematic dichotomy of states versus markets – “that 
the state controls but the market sets free”.51 In contrast, a number of critical scholars emphasize 
the complex interactions between state agencies and corporate players in issues related with 
Internet governance. For example, Dan Schiller provides a historical overview of the 
construction of international networks in the expansion of capitalism and argues for the need to 
situate US-China disputes over cyberspace within this historical framework. He points out, the 
construction and management of international networks has been a “richly complex and 
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conflicted process” and has involved various power-holders, among which both government 
agencies and major corporate users and suppliers have been especially significant.52  
Informed by the latter strand of critical observations, this dissertation adds to the 
scholarship on the geopolitics of Internet governance by explicating an evolving Chinese 
approach to global Internet management both historically and analytically and attempting to 
clarify the complexity of the actual process of Internet governance. It also differs from the 
existing literature by foregrounding the interlocking roles of the state and capital in the Chinese 
context, therefore moving beyond the state-market dichotomy in Internet policy discourse. 
 
Chinese Internet Research 
Using content analysis to examine Chinese Internet studies from the 1990s to 2005, 
scholars have found that the majority of early academic research on the Internet in China “seeks 
to answer just two questions: Can China build an Internet, and if so, can China control it?”53 
Although the development of the Internet in China remains as an unfinished process, during the 
past decade, these questions have been partly answered. In 2008, China surpassed the United 
States as the world’s largest Internet population, with 253 million users. In the mid of 2016, this 
number increased to 710 million.54 The .cn domain name system also topped the list of the 
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world’s largest national domain name systems in 2008.55 In 2010, the total market value of 
China’s three Internet giants, Baidu, Tencent, and Alibaba (only business to business, or B2B 
sector) reached a far-from insubstantial $77.4 billion.56 With all these developments, the Chinese 
Internet seems to be still under the control of the Chinese government.57 However, as Peter 
Nolan reminds us, since transnational Internet corporations (e.g. IBM) have already occupied the 
commanding heights of some of China’s most important strategic industries (e.g., the banking 
industry), the extent to which the Chinese state holds full control over its domestic network 
actually needs careful qualification.58 
 Foregrounding the democratic and political implications of network technologies, one of 
the primary concerns underlying many researchers is the repressive web censorship regime in 
China. As a result, the coercive role of the Chinese party-state receives significant attention in 
Chinese Internet research.59 While these studies provide valuable insights into the complex state 
censorship apparatus and also into online activism in China, the analyses oftentimes collapse 
down to one dimension – the authoritarian state. Some critical pieces are still missing from the 
puzzle. As Zhao points out, the evolution of the Internet in China has been shaped not only by 
the state, but also by corporate power.60 Therefore, to create a fuller understanding of the myriad 
                                                
55 China Internet Network Information Center (CNNIC), “The Internet Timeline of China, 2008,” 
http://www1.cnnic.cn/IDR/hlwfzdsj/201209/t20120904_36019.htm. 
56 Qiang Xiaoji, “Baidu, Tencent, Alibaba Forming Oligopoly on Chinese Internet,” China Daily, 
February 18, 2011, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2011-02/18/content_12042514.htm. 
57 Rebecca MacKinnon, Consent of the Networked: The World-Wide Struggle for Internet Freedom (New 
York: Basic Books, 2012). 
58 Nolan, Is China Buying the World?, 118-119.  
59 See review articles, Kluver and Yang, “The Internet in China: A Meta-Review of Research,”; Qiu and 
Chan, “China Internet Studies: A Review of the Field,”; Herold and Seta. “Through the Looking Glass: 
Twenty Years of Chinese Internet Research”. 
60 Zhao, “China’s Pursuits of Indigenous Innovations in Information Technology Developments: Hopes, 
Follies and Uncertainties.” 
	
 
24 
aspects of an Internet with “Chinese characteristics,” we need to consider the Internet not only as 
a site of political control or state-centered geopolitics, but also as a site of capitalist construction.  
Compared with the vast number of studies focusing on issues of Internet censorship and 
surveillance, scholarly works on the political economy of the Chinese Internet have so far been 
rather underdeveloped. Recently, however, some critical scholars have blazed a trail.  
Looking at China’s ongoing pursuits of “indigenous innovations” in next-generation 
network systems, Yuezhi Zhao paints a multifaceted picture of China’s development of Internet 
technologies. As she argues, China’s developmental strategies for network infrastructure have 
been influenced by both state and corporate power. However, perhaps neither the “Chinese state” 
nor “corporate China” is monolithic. Moreover, with China’s accelerated integration into the 
global marketplace, the relationship between state and business actors in China has been further 
complicated by geopolitical factors. There are both growing conflicts and ambiguities in China’s 
quest to rebalance the power structure of global cyberspace.61 
With a broader focus on the global level, Dan Schiller foregrounds the international 
dimensions of the political economy of the Chinese Internet. He situates China’s ICT 
development in the context of the rise of global digital capitalism.  He points out that since the 
1970s, ICT products and service have played a vital role in restructuring the world capitalist 
economy, both as an important economic growth point and as an instrumental tool for big 
corporations to reorganize their transnational production and operation. Meanwhile, China’s 
much-contested reintegration into global capitalism since the open-door policy has created a vast 
supply of cheap labor and products, especially in the ICT industry, which have both contributed 
to and been conditioned by the concurrent worldwide transformation. It is in this sense that 
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China and ICTs, and later the Internet, came to form “two poles of growth” in contemporary 
capitalism. Conflicts and struggles among different power-holders and social classes, however, 
have accompanied the transforming political economy of global communications and the growth 
of China’s digital media and networks.62 
More recently, Hong Yu contributes to this literature by critically evaluating China’s 
Internet-centric policies in the country’s post-2008 restructuring. As she shows in her recent 
work Network China: The Digial Transformation of the Chinese Economy, a developmental 
strategy of “informatization” has been instrumental in China’s global rise and domestic 
transformation since the late 1970s. If in the 1980-1990s, ICT manufacturing was considered as a 
“pillar industry” that spearheaded China’s FDI-driven, export-oriented, and labor-intensive 
development, in the 2000s, especially after the global economic crisis, network connectivity and 
online applications have gained growing centrality, as they were perceived by the ruling elites as 
critical in helping the country to move up the global production chain and to transform into a 
more domestic-oriented economy. However, as she warns, hindered by internal contradictions 
and external constraints, these newly articulated state policies will unlikely solve China’s long-
standing problems of overproduction and under consumption, since – at least so far – they have 
not directly addressed the country’s fundamental labor-exploitative model in capital 
accumulation that is highly dependent on the consumer markets of the Global North and thus is 
exposed to the vicissitudes of global capitalism.63 
While these studies provide a convincing and critical evaluation of the complex 
interactions between and among a group of power-holders in shaping the political economy of 
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the Chinese Internet, their focus is largely on the domestic network. This dissertation looks at 
China’s increasingly pivotal role in the international Internet by critically examining its growing 
impact in several areas, including economic investment, Internet resource management, technical 
standardization and public policy disputes. As I will show, Chinese engineers from the private 
sector have been increasingly prominent in Internet standardization. The Chinese state also took 
a vociferous stand at the 2012 World Conference on International Telecommunications (WCIT-
12), an international telecommunications conference organized by a United Nations (UN) 
affiliate, the International Telecommunications Union (ITU). The evidence of China’s growing 
influence can be observed in the economic area as well. For example, China’s e-commerce 
company, Alibaba, following a record of $25 billion IPO last year, announced its plan to invest 
$575 million into the Indian online marketplace.64 Baidu, China’s search engine giant, similarly, 
confirmed its recent investment in Uber, the US-based taxi sharing company, with some estimate 
the figure to be around $600 million.65 
 Building upon and systematically clarifying previous insights, this dissertation shifts the 
research focus from the previous concerns with “how the Internet will change China” to “how 
China will change the global Internet” and strives to explicate an international Internet system 
with “Chinese characteristics.” By doing so, it looks toward the following big questions:  How 
has China strived to (re) develop the US-centric international Internet system? What are the flash 
points of conflict? Is China still mostly marginalized? Or is China beginning to join the existing 
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scheme and try to alter it to suit its own interests? If so, to serve which interests? Indeed, what 
are China’s interests in global cyberspace and what are the “Chinese characteristics” of its 
international Internet system constitute the central questions of this dissertation. Sociologist and 
China scholar Ching Kwan Lee raises similar questions when studying China’s investments in 
Africa: After all, what is the nature of China’s outward expansion? Is “global China” the 
“imperialist hegemon feared and condemned by the West” or the “egalitarian partner of win-win 
development trumpeted by Beijing”? 66 In other words, what is the “Chinese model”?  Are the 
“socialist characteristics” fundamental or secondary? Those questions remain critical not only for 
investigating the relation between “global China” and the international Internet, but also for 
studying china’s outbound expansion in the global political economy. 
Rather than attempting to find a mechanical or static formula, this dissertation looks into 
these questions based on concrete historical evidence and situates China’s strategies within a 
contingent historical process. It strives to understand how such an international Internet system 
with “Chinese characteristics” has been shaped and reshaped by a variety of political and 
economic forces, both in and out of China, over the past three decades.  
 
Methods 
China’s intersection with the global Internet in fact denotes a rapidly shifting and 
complex process. A variety of socio-political-economic forces are influencing its nature and 
direction. The primary goal of this dissertation is to clarify the political-economic dimensions of 
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this evolution, and to foreground the development of a capitalist class fraction in the process – as 
one important aspect to understand the transformation of contemporary Chinese society. 
To tackle this task, this project employed a mix of research methods.  
First of all, to offers a panoramic account of the multifaceted trajectory of China’s 
engagement with the global Internet, historical approach – the cornerstone methodology of the 
critical political economy of communication – was undertaken to set the stage. 67 This process 
drew on a systematic and intensive document research on a wide range of primary and secondary 
sources collected on both the state and capital side. On the state side, government policies, white 
papers, conference documents and policy proposals issued by a variety of agencies both in and 
out of China are critical for peeking into the complex and highly opaque Internet policymaking 
process. Data were collected from the official websites and publications of domestic state 
agencies such as China’s Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT), the State 
Council of Information Office (SCIO) and the China Internet Network Information Center 
(CNNIC), as well as international institutions like the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), 
the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN), and the United Nation 
International Telecommunications Union (ITU).  
On the capital side, archival trade press, company financial filings, industrial annual 
reports, national and international statistical compendia were investigated to help piece together 
an overall picture of the historical development and structural characteristics of China’s Internet 
industry and its interactions with the international internet. Critical data in this step were 
obtained through both official publications and online archives and databases. I paid particular 
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attention to the Statistical Bulletin of China’s Outward Foreign Direct Investment issued by the 
MOFCOM and the World Investment Report compiled by the UNCTAD to trace the picture of 
China’s outward FDI activities in general and its Internet OFDI in particular. Moreover, archival 
trade press related to Chinese Internet industry such as China Internet Weekly (Hulianwang 
Zhoukan) and People's Posts and Telecommunications News (Renmin Youdian), studies and 
reports from marketing and consulting firms, such as those from Mckinsey & Company, were 
also examined to offer additional information.   
Apart from extensive archival research, this project also employed case study to 
investigate a particular Chinese Internet company (Alibaba) to further analyze state-capital 
relationships (Chapter 4). For the case study, I primarily relied upon documentary research and 
media analysis. First and foremost, the company’s two IPO documents, especially prospectuses, 
were studied carefully to obtain fundamental but also highly convoluted information on revenues, 
ownership and corporate structure, market share and financial flows of the firm. In addition, I 
studied Alibaba’s annual reports in order to get a historical perspective on its business strategies. 
Government policies and initiatives related to e-commerce development in China were also 
examined to provide insights into the intersection between Alibaba and state agencies. Related 
secondary sources, such as media coverage, press releases, and especially several Chinese 
publications, including books on Alibaba’s developmental history and biographies of and 
speeches by its founder, Jack Ma, were also examined to provide supplemental information.  
Finally, to understand the range of the “going-out” of China’s Internet industry (Chapter 
3) and to investigate the structural role of China’s Internet capitalist class fraction (Chapter 5) in 
this process, two datasets were compiled for this dissertation. While detailed accounts of the data 
are presented later in each chapter, the construction process deserves some discussion here.  
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Based on the “China Global Investment Tracker (2005-2015)” compiled by the American 
Enterprise Institute-Heritage Foundation, 68  and supplemented by knowledge gained from 
financial and business newspapers and company’s annual reports, the first dataset documents 
firm-level outbound capital projections of China’s Internet companies that reach or exceed $100 
million (Appendix A). Categorizing Chinese enterprises based on three different industrial 
subsectors – hardware and equipment makers, network operator, and web services and 
applications providers, and examining their individual overseas FDI activities in the past 10 
years, this dataset constituted the foundation for Chapter 3 and enabled a detailed and 
disaggregate investigation of the outward expansion of China’s now large and diverse Internet 
industry.   
The second dataset, used in Chapter 5, was constructed by studying the biographies of all 
the mainland-based board members and senior managers of 20 major Internet companies in 
China (Appendix B). The 20 major Internet companies were selected according to both their 
market capitalization and revenue in fiscal year 2015. The biographical data of their executives 
were obtained through reading those companies’ annual reports, which were then coded binarily 
according to four measurements: transnational board connections, overseas schooling, 
government occupation, and political affiliation. Complemented by discursive evidences 
collected from media reports, this dataset permitted us to study Chinese Internet elites as a group 
and offered a closer look at their interactions with both state agencies and other transnational 
capitalists.  
 
                                                
68 For an introduction of this dataset, see https://www.aei.org/china-global-investment-tracker.  
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Chapter Outline 
This dissertation is organized as follows:  
Chapter 1 provides a historical overview of China’s multifaceted interactions with the 
global Internet, from its first international email in 1987 to the more recently minted “Internet 
Plus” and “One Belt One Road” initiatives in 2015. Conceptualizing the Internet sector as three 
different but interpenetrating cyber domains – equipment manufacturing, network operating, and 
web services and applications, this chapter shows a large and diversified Internet industry has 
been built out in China in the past three decades, in the context of its strategic engagement, and 
uneven encounters, with global digital capitalism. Tracing this historical development as a matrix 
of transnational trends, geopolitical struggles and domestic political-economic transitions, it 
demonstrates the conventional perception of China's Internet as a "giant cage" is misleading as it 
overlooks the long and complex interactions between China and the global Internet political 
economy. Indeed, foreign government agencies and transnational capital have been heavily 
involved in building a digital economy in China, and China’s Internet industry is at the pivot of 
the restructuring of global capitalism.  
While Chapter 1 offers a brief overview of the historical formation and transformation of 
China’s relationship with the global Internet, Chapter 2 goes deeper to explicate the evolving 
government policies toward the management of this vital international infrastructure. Examining 
China’s efforts to edge its way into the existing governing scheme in three critical areas – 
technical standardization, resource allocation and assignment, and public policy – this chapter 
demonstrates that China’s approach is both built upon and differentiable from the US-centric, 
market-oriented approach to Internet governance. In addition, this chapter builds a historically 
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grounded theoretical framework to engage the complex dynamics of China’s Internet 
policymaking process, by foregrounding the enduring interaction between and among a limited 
group of power-holders, including different state agencies and business units, in both domestic 
and transnational contexts. Each of these power-holders – in collaboration or conflict with others 
– attempts to leverage its access to the state in order to further a preferred vision of global 
Internet management.  
Looking specifically into Outward Foreign Direct Investment (OFDI) activities of 
China’s native IT enterprises, Chapter 3 shifts attention to the “going-out” strategy of China’s 
Internet industry, as some leading businesses that provide network equipment, operation, 
services and applications for China’s domestic Internet have also set their sights on the 
international market. Relying on a dataset that documents all the large overseas capital 
projections of $100 million or above, this chapter situates the outward expansion of China’s 
Internet companies within a broader picture of the PRC’s continuing reinsertion into the world 
market economy and delineates the landscape of the transnationalization of China’s Internet 
industry across three industrial subsectors. By doing so, it moves beyond simplistic labels like 
“state capitalism” or “China Inc.” and elucidates the convoluted interactions between capitals 
and states in this ongoing process. This chapter also raises open questions regarding China's 
developmental path: How important are these companies and their market segments in the global 
digital ecosystem? Is China heading toward a position of creating its own group of globally 
competitive Internet corporations? Does it stand a chance of leapfrogging into advanced 
capitalism by altering the political economy of transnational digital capitalism?  
To try to give greater clarity to questions covered in the second and the third chapters, 
Chapter 4 offer a detailed case study of the internationalization of a particularly important unit of 
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Chinese Internet capital, the e-commerce giant, Alibaba. How has Alibaba’s international 
journey – from its founding in 1999 to its New York IPO in 2014 – interlocked with both the 
transformation of China’s political economy and the structural development of the global 
Internet? Taking a comprehensive approach toward “internationalization”, which not only 
includes physical expansion beyond home base, but also various complex forms of interactions 
with transnational capital within the Chinese border, this chapter shows that the intricate 
trajectory of Alibaba’s business development presents a specific pattern of state-capital 
relationships that encompasses both conflict and cooperation.  
Finally, Chapter 5 foregrounds a social class dimension in China’s engagement with the 
global Internet. Using a sample of all the mainland-based executives from the major 20 Chinese 
Internet companies, this chapter investigates the rise of China’s Internet capitalist class fraction 
in the context of the industry’s increasing transnational expansion, looking specifically into their 
complex interactions with both Chinese state entities and their transnational counterparts. 
Drawing both from biographical data gained from companies’ annual reports and discursive 
traces collected from media sources, this chapter demonstrates that deep entanglement with other 
transnational elites notwithstanding, China’s corporate leaders in its Internet sector have not yet 
actually successfully joined the transnational capitalist class. The territorial logic of the Chinese 
state has still held considerable influence in curbing and interfering with the formation of an 
Internet-based transnational capitalist class fraction in China. The unfinished nature of China’s 
reintegration into the global economy and its unsettled position in the world capitalist system has 
further complicated this picture, which requires continuing attention. 
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CHAPTER 1 	
		
REPOSITIONING THE CHINESE INTERNET IN GLOBAL DIGITAL CAPITALISM 
	
	
In April 2013, the Economist released a special report on China and the Internet. The title 
was simple: “China’s Internet: A giant cage.”  As the article continued:   
“If this special report were about the Internet in any Western country, it would 
have little to say about the role of the government; instead, it would focus on the 
companies thriving on the Internet…. Such things are of interest in China too, 
but this report concentrates on the part played by the government because that is 
the most extraordinary thing about the Internet there.... The party has achieved 
something few had thought possible, the construction of a distinct national 
Internet. The Chinese Internet resembles a fenced-off playground with 
paternalistic guards.”69  
 
This “giant cage” metaphor, which characterized the Chinese Internet as both a “national 
Internet” unplugged from the international network and a digital empire dominated by a single-
minded authoritarian party-state, seems to have become increasingly inadequate – even 
misleading – in the face of the growing expansion of China’s Internet companies in global 
cyberspace. For example, in April 2016, Alibaba, China’s e-commerce behemoth, completed its 
largest overseas deal so far – spending $1 billion for a controlling stake of Lazada, an e-
commerce company that operates across six countries in Southeast Asia, including Singapore, 
Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand, and Vietnam.70 In the mid of 2016, Tencent, 
                                                
69 Gady Epstein, “China’s Internet: A Giant Cage,” The Economist, April 6, 2013, 
http://www.economist.com/news/special-report/21574628-internet-was-expected-help-democratise-china-
instead-it-has-enabled.  
70 Newley Purnell and Alyssa Abkowitz, “Alibaba Thinks Outside the China Box,” The Wall Street 
Journal, August 12, 2016, http://www.wsj.com/articles/alibaba-thinks-outside-the-china-box-
1470995037?cx_navSource=cx_picks&cx_tag=contextual&cx_artPos=5#cxrecs_s. 
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another China-based social media and mobile gaming giant, led an investment group to purchase 
84% percent of Finnish mobile games maker Supercell for $8.6 billion.71  
How are we to understand this recent but highly visible phenomenon? Previous literature 
on the Chinese Internet has foregrounded the democratic and political implications of network 
technologies in contemporary Chinese society. 72 While these studies provide valuable insights 
into the complex state censorship apparatus and also into online activism in China, the role of 
Internet corporate power has received rather limited attention. Scholars of China’s 
communication and information industry, on the other hand, have offered well-documented 
accounts of network construction in China, with attention largely devoted to the domestic 
dimension.73 What remains little examined is the important role of the Internet industry in China 
and how has this vital sector interacted with the international Internet system. What are the chief 
attributes and political-economic contours of China’s Internet industry? Where do its origins lie 
– what accounts for its formation and outward expansion? What are its strengths and weaknesses?  
And finally, what the political economy of China’s Internet embraces and how it operates?  
To shed light on these questions, this chapter maps out and historicizes the evolution of 
China’s Internet industry, foregrounding its multifaceted interactions with the external Internet. 
                                                
71 Lulu Yilun Chen, Pavel Alpeyev and Yuji Nakamura, “Tencent Leads $8.6 Billion Deal for Clash of 
Clans Studio,” Bloomberg, June 22, http://washpost.bloomberg.com/Story?docId=1376-
O949KV6KLVR701-44DR9M9STL12JECOAD2GQOLPSP.  
72 Rebecca MacKinnon, Consent of the Networked: The World-Wide Struggle for Internet Freedom (New 
York: Basic Books, 2012); Guobin Yang, The Power of the Internet in China: Citizen Activism Online 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 2009); Yongmin Zhou, Historicizing Online Politics: Telegraphy, 
the Internet, and Political Participation in China (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005); Yongnian 
Zheng, Technological Empowerment: The Internet, State, and Society in China (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 2007). 
73 Milton Mueller and Zixiang Tan, China in the Information Age: Telecommunications and the 
Dilemmas of Reform (Washington: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1996); Irene S Wu, 
From Iron Fist to Invisible Hand: The Uneven Path of Telecommunications Reform in China (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 2009); Paul S N Lee, Telecommunications and Development in China 
(Cresskill: Hampton Press, 1997). 
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It shows that a large and diversified Internet industry has been built out in China in the past three 
decades, in the context of its strategic engagement, and uneven encounters, with global digital 
capitalism. It joined the growing literature on the political economy of the Chinese Internet by 
bringing to the forefront the intricate interactions between capital and the state in endowing the 
global Internet system with “Chinese characteristics.”74 This was achieved by a systematic and 
intensive document research on a wide range of scholarly works, as well as primary and 
secondary sources, both on the state and on the capital side. On the state side, I reviewed 
government policies, white papers, conference documents and policy proposals issued by a 
variety of state agencies both in and out of China. On the capital side, archival trade press, 
company financial filings, industrial annual reports, national and international statistical 
compendia were also examined. This collection of sources and documents helped to set up an 
overall picture of the rise of China’s Internet industry in global digital capitalism.  
The structure of the chapter is organized as follows. The next section sets the stage by 
presenting a comprehensive approach to conceptualize the “Internet industry” in China, which 
not only includes web services and applications providers like Alibaba, but also network 
operators like China Mobile, equipment and hardware manufacturers like Huawei, as well as 
major government and corporate network users. Section Three to Five delineate, document and 
assess the historical evolution of this vital sector in the past three decades while situating its 
                                                
74 Yu Hong, Networking China: The Digital Transformation of the Chinese Economy (Urbana: University 
of Illinois Press, 2017); Min Tang, “Tencent as a Nexus: The Political Economy of China’s Internet 
Industry” (PhD dissertation, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 2017); Yun Wen, “The 
Transnationalization of Chinese ICT Corporations: A Case Study of Huawei,” Paper presented at the 
International Communication Association Annual Convention, Seattle, 2014; Christian Fuchs, “Baidu, 
Weibo and Renren: The Global Political Economy of Social Media in China,” Asian Journal of 
Communication 26, no. 1 (2015): 14–41; Dan Schiller, Digital Depression: Information Technology and 
Economic Crisis (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2014); Yuezhi Zhao, “China’s Pursuits of 
Indigenous Innovations in Information Technology Developments: Hopes, Follies and Uncertainties,” 
Chinese Journal of Communication 3, no. 3 (2010): 266–89. 
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development in the interplay between the transformation of China’s developmental path and the 
changing dynamics of global digital capitalism.  
The last section concludes by countering the popular perception of the Chinese Internet 
as a “giant cage” that is sealed by the “Great Firewall” and that is dominated merely by a 
monolithic authoritarian party-state. Indeed, by repositioning the evolution of China’s Internet 
industry in the political economy of the International Internet, this chapter demonstrates two 
things. First, without taking into account the intricate and uneven engagement between China 
and the changing political economy of the global Internet, the puzzle of the Chinese Internet 
remains incomplete. Indeed, as will be shown in the following discussion, foreign government 
agencies and transnational capital have been heavily involved in the construction of the digital 
economy in China, and China’s Internet sector is pivotal in the restructuring of global digital 
capitalism. Second, the Chinese Internet is not only political, but also economic. Moreover, 
although the building of an Internet industry in China has been a joint effort of both the state and 
capital, their interests and objectives have not always aligned with each other. On the one hand, 
the Chinese state, as a territorially defined entity, aims to both cultivate and control its 
homegrown Internet companies in order to keep them in line with the state’s developmental and 
diplomatic agenda. On the other hand, Chinese Internet companies, propelled by the borderless 
logic of capital accumulation, have coordinated an increasingly powerful and expansive 
transnational capital network with an overarching aim of profit-maximization, along with their 
increasingly outward expansion in global cyberspace. To add on to the complexity, neither the 
state nor capital is a unified monolithic force. Offering a historical perspective, this chapter 
sketches out these efforts on both the policy and business fronts, by clarifying how state 
strategies and capital's imperatives on a transnational level cooperate (or not) with each other.  
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China’s Internet industry: An Inclusive Approach 
In the past three decades, a large and diversified internet industry has been built out in 
China. To better understand the range of this expansive sector, its segmentation, and especially 
its complex interactions with the political economy of the global Internet, this section sets the 
stage by developing a distinct conceptualization of the “Internet Industry” in China.  
Some might argue that the category of “Internet companies” should exclude firms whose 
main businesses are not Internet-based. Instead, I try to be inclusive. This inclusive approach 
builds on the argument of Dan Schiller in his book Digital Depression, which contends that 
today’s Internet is constituted by multiple transnational commodity chains, including not only 
software and applications, but also networks and access devices. An inclusive analysis of these 
“Web communications commodity chains” helps reveal “how a global division of labor evolves 
and mutates in the historical context of an ever-reconfiguring process of capital accumulation”.75 
In addition, my conceptualization also extends and modifies previous scholarly work on China’s 
telecommunications industry. For example, Eric Harwit points out that in order to fully grasp 
China’s telecommunications revolution, the definition of the telecommunications needs to go 
beyond the service sector to include equipment manufacturing.76 Roselyn Hsueh adds to the 
picture and argues that an analysis of China’s telecommunications policy should pay attention to 
both equipment (network and consumer) and service (basic and value-added), and should clarify 
significant differences among these industrial subsectors, as they hold different strategic values 
                                                
75 Schiller, Digital Depression, 6-9, 83-114.  
76 Eric Harwit, China’s Telecommunications Revolution (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 17. 
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to the state.77 Drawing on these previous insights into China’s telecommunications sector – a 
sector that has increasingly impinged on the Internet – I take an unusually comprehensive 
approach toward studying the Internet industry in China. My definition of China’s Internet 
industry includes not only web services and applications providers such as Alibaba and Tencent, 
but also equipment and hardware manufacturers like Huawei and Lenovo, network operators 
such as China Mobile, Telecom and Unicom,78 as well as major government and corporate 
network users (see Figure 1.1).  
It is important to point out that big government and business users also constitute a 
crucial component of China’s digital sector, for the structural profile of the Internet political 
economy not only encompasses the supply side but also the demand side.79 These institutional 
users are studied only occasionally in this dissertation, but they do fall in this inclusive 
conceptualization. Indeed, with the continuing incorporation of network technologies into the 
Chinese economy, government and corporate IT expenditures have risen significantly. It is 
reported that, even in the economic downturn, China’s government and businesses together spent 
$147 billion in ICT equipment and services in 2015, up from $124 billion in 2014.80 China’s oil 
                                                
77 Roselyn Hsueh, China’s Regulatory State: A New Strategy for Globalization (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 2011), 49-51. 
78 It is worth noting that in May 2016, another state-owned player, China Broadcasting Network (CBN), 
was granted a basic telecom services license, becoming the fourth domestic operator, after China Telecom, 
Unicom, and Mobile. However, since the license only allowed CBN to offer fixed broadband service, it 
was considered as a “half license” and CBN has so far remained very marginal in this strategic industrial 
subsector. See, “Huo bange paizhao, zhongguo guangdian cheng disida yunyingshang,”Ƣ“pŚŖ”, 
Öŧòžǒƣ[obtaining “half license”, China Broadcasting Network becomes the fourth 
network operator], Xinhua Net, May 6, 2016,  http://news.xinhuanet.com/fortune/2016-
05/06/c_128962083.htm.  
79 Schiller, Digital Depression. 
80 Brian Spegele and Alyssa Abkowitz, “China’s Tech Leaders Try Teaching Dinosaurs to Dance,” The 
Wall Street Journal, April 24, 2016, http://www.wsj.com/articles/chinas-tech-leaders-try-teaching-
dinosaurs-to-dance-1461526201. 
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giant Sinopec, for example, has recently recruited Alibaba’s help on big data analysis and 
information security.81  
Given the fact that the Internet industry in China is a volatile field, trying to be more 
inclusive helps to cover the largest, most powerful, and most important elements, which may 
alter rapidly, even in the near future. For example, traditional web services and applications 
providers have recently entered the realm of hardware manufacturing. Search engine Baidu’s 
new project “Baidu Inside” has allowed the company to penetrate into the smart home devices 
market.82 Established network operators have also deepened their reach into the web applications 
sector. The “Big Three” network operators – China Mobile, Telecom and Unicom – for instance, 
have all taken strategic steps toward the booming mobile gaming market in China. 83  The 
inclusive approach, as proposed in this dissertation, therefore allows us to take into account these 
recent developments, which will likely become more prominent in the next a few years with the 
further promulgation of the “Internet Plus” and “One Belt One Road” initiatives both in and 
outside of China.  
                                                
81 Ibid. 
82 Michael Kan, “With ‘Baidu Inside” the Chinese firm takes aim at hardware market,” PC World, April 
22, 2014,  http://www.pcworld.com/article/2146620/with-baidu-inside-the-chinese-firm-takes-aim-at-
hardware-market.html.  
83 Chi Youlei ǖħǵ, “Fenshi yidongyouxi shichang, sanda dianxinyunyingshang mang buju,” _ȆŹk
ŎñÍ, ŧAǒƣåÎÃ [Three telecom operators are busy dividing China’s mobile gaming 
market], The Economic ObserverƆŇƭ¼þ, August 4, 2012, 
http://tech.qq.com/a/20120804/000036.htm.  
	
 
41 
 
Figure 1.1: An inclusive approach toward China’s Internet industry.  
 
 
1990s: Market integration, informatization and Global Internet Connection  
“Across the Great Wall we can reach every corner in the world” – this was the first email 
sent through an indigenous Chinese server to the global Internet, in September 1987.84 This 
contrasted the assumptions of many Western observers that the only aim of China’s early 
network construction was to build a nationwide “intranet” that would be sealed from the external 
                                                
84 Werner Zorn, “How China Was Connected to the International Computer Networks,” The Amateur 
Computerist 15, no. 2 (2007): 36–49. 
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network by the “Great Firewall”.85 It should also be noted that the political concerns of the US 
government partly delayed China’s full connection to the global Internet until 1994.86 China’s 
initial encounter with the international network was indeed shaped by these two interconnected 
forces: the strong will of reform-minded state leaders to re-enter the international system and a 
complex and swiftly altering geopolitical-economic power structure.  
Why did China want to be connected to the International Internet in the first place? Two 
domestic trends were at play. On the one hand, it is important to note that the construction of the 
modern Internet system in China was concurrent with the country “opening and reform” 
process.87 In order to solve the economic stagnation and political instability that afflicted the 
party-state in the post-1989 crisis, the top leadership adopted new hardline policies to interact 
with transnational capital.88 Deng Xiaoping’s “southern tour” in 1992 has further opened up 
China’s domestic market and brought in a swath of foreign corporations, which pressed for 
modernized telecommunications services and advanced information networks for their 
transnational market operation.89 In other words, an internationally linked Internet system was a 
key infrastructure for China’s global market reintegration. Indeed, reform-minded leaders were 
well aware of this situation. For example, in 1993, the State Council initiated the “Golden Gate 
Project” (also known as the “Golden Customs project”), as one of its first government-funded 
                                                
85 Geremie R. Barme and Sang Ye, “The Great Firewall of China,” Wired, June 1, 1997, 
https://www.wired.com/1997/06/china-3. 
86 China Internet Network Information Center (CNNIC), “The Internet Timeline of China 1986-2003,” 
http://www1.cnnic.cn/IDR/hlwfzdsj/201306/t20130628_40563.htm.  
87 Hu Qiheng ƛê, “Hulianwang de yuanqi jiqi zai zhongguo de zaoqifazhan” !ƖƎŭƍǋ{S
ŭěĩ|Å [The origin of the Internet and its early development in China], China Education and 
Research Network ĐƙŷŴƱſĭƎ, December 12, 2008, 
http://www.edu.cn/li_lun_yj_1652/20081202/t20081202_344154.shtml. 
88 Hui Wang, China’s New Order: Society, Politics, and Economy in Transition (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 2003), 141-142.  
89 Yu Hong, “Repurposing Telecoms for Capital in China,” Asian Survey 5, no. 2 (2013): 319–47. 
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national information infrastructures, to develop electronic customs clearance services and 
facilitate international trade, given that China’s major trading partners were already going digital 
at the moment.90 
On the other hand, strong nationalist development agenda also structured China’s early 
response to network technology. Motivated by long-standing nationalist sentiments to catch up 
with the technologically advanced West, the development and application of information 
technologies – informatization (xinxi hua, %) – soon became the buzzword in China’s 
policy discourse, with later the Internet occupying a more visible position. In 1997, the Ninth 
Five-Year Plan for State informatization and the Long-range Objective of the Year 2010 was 
published, prioritizing the role of the Internet in national economic informatization.91  As Yuezhi 
Zhao argues, from Premier Zhou Enlai’s “four modernizations” in the 1970s to President Jiang 
Zemin’s “none of the four modernizations would be possible without informatization” in the 
1990s, the development of a modern information industry – under the influence of the flashy 
international branding of the Internet as the “information superhighway” – was regarded by the 
Chinese leadership as a critical opportunity to reclaim the country’s historical position in the 
international system.92  
Concurrent with China’s global market integration and nationalist development agenda 
was the reconstitution of the transnational digital economy. As Dan Schiller points out, since the 
late 1970s, global capitalism had undergone a systemic transformation that was both organized 
around digital technologies and simultaneously turned this sector into a leading pole of economic 
                                                
90 Hong, Networking China, 54. 
91 State Council Information Office (SCIO), “The Internet in China”, Xinhua Net, June 8, 2010. 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/china/2010-06/08/c_13339232_7.htm. 
92 Yuezhi Zhao, “After Mobile Phones, What? Re-Embedding the Social in China’s ‘Digital Revolution,’” 
International Journal of Communication 1, no. 1 (2007): 92–120. 
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growth.93 As transnational corporate powers have increasingly pursued an unparalleled 
globalization project through network technologies, integrating China into this newly 
constructed digital system seemed to have also become a preference for the West. Indeed, even 
with strong political and national security concerns, in 1994, the US government finally 
officially approved China’s full-functional Internet connection, seven years after the country’s 
first international email.94 American equipment makers and network operators soon rushed in to 
grab this emerging market. For example, one of China’s early backbone networks, CHINAPAC, 
was built on the equipment supplied by Cisco and Sun Microsystem.95 Even the “Golden Shield” 
project – the notorious nationwide surveillance program that has been characterized by the 
popular media as the poster child for authoritarian Internet control – was also built up by US 
multinational conglomerates including Sun Microsystem, Cisco and Compaq.96 
In sum, by the mid-1990s, an elite consensus had been reached that to incorporate into 
global digital capitalism through the Internet was the primary strategy for China’s future 
development.97 Correspondingly, a variety of substantial measures were taken to reorganize 
China’s digital economy. Despite cross-sector variance, throughout the 1990s, China heavily 
relied on transnational capital – in particular, US capital – in both jumping start its domestic 
Internet sector and realizing technology transfer, which resulted in an industrial structure highly 
dependent on transnational capital and a domestic market dominated by foreign players.  
                                                
93 Dan Schiller, Digital Capitalism: Networking the Global Market System (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1999).  
94 China Internet Network Information Center (CNNIC), “The Internet Timeline of China 1986-2003”. 
95 Harwit, China’s Telecommunications Revolution, 85.  
96 Greg Walton, “China’s Golden Shield: Corporations and the Development of Surveillance Technology 
in the People’s Republic of China,” Rights & Democracy, 2001, 
http://publications.gc.ca/collections/Collection/E84-7-2001E.pdf. 
97 Zhao, “After Mobile Phones, What? Re-Embedding the Social in China’s ‘Digital Revolution.’” 
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As the most technology-intensive segment of the Internet industry in China, hardware 
manufacturing was initially wide open to transnational forces in the early days of the country’s 
digital revolution. On the one hand, as a latecomer to the global Internet industry, China lacked 
both the necessary capital and technology to modernize the basis of its network infrastructure. 
Despite a national computer industry started to emerge in the 1980s largely from state-owned or 
military-controlled research institutions – for example, Lenovo was launched in 1984, as a spin-
off from the Chinese Academy of Science (CAS) and Founder was established in 1986, as a 
spin-off from the Peking University – China still lacked the key capacity to produce core 
network equipment such as routers or micro-computer chips.98 Therefore, it was imperative for 
the state to heavily rely on foreign capital and technology to build its basic network foundation. 
For example, the country’s 1994 global Internet interconnection was realized based on Cisco’s 
TCP/IP router, which arrived in Beijing only after the US Department of Commerce’s 
exportation approval.99 On the other hand, as Roselyn Hsueh points out, high-tech nature 
notwithstanding, equipment manufacturing is generally considered as of medium strategic 
importance by the state, as all the cables, routers and digital devices still need to “plug into” the 
network infrastructure through state-owned telecommunications carriers.100  
Under the interplay of both domestic and transnational trends, an “exchanging market for 
technology” strategy was applied in China’s ICT manufacturing industry, as Hong Yu has 
                                                
98 “Gaigekaifang 30nian IT ye: Fengyun tuqi,” čǻÜĎ 30Õ IT: Ȅ żǋ [IT industry after three 
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shown.101 China opened up its domestic equipment market widely for transnational capital, with 
a hope that it would both help provide necessary capital resources to modernize the basic 
backbone infrastructure and to realize technology transfer. A series of measurements were 
carried out in the early 1990s to support this strategy, such as facilitating key component imports 
through lowering tariffs, introducing foreign investment through preferential tax treatment and 
encouraging joint ventures between foreign firms and local governments.102 Transnational capital 
soon took this opportunity. It is reported that from 1990 to 2002, the total FDI in China’s ICT 
industry was more than twice that of government investment.103  
Although this industrial strategy had, admittedly, helped China construct its network base 
in a staggering rate, it also caused undesirable results – a high degree of technological 
dependence and a domestic market increasingly dominated by foreign companies.104 In the 
computer industry, for example, after the state significantly lowered the tariffs and ended its 
computer import approval system, the market shares of China’s domestic computer makers 
dropped from 67% in 1989 to 22% in 1992.105 This resulted in a situation that in the early 1990s, 
the Chinese PC market was almost entirely dominated by a group of transnational, especially US 
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companies, such as IBM and Compaq.106 This pattern was consistent for carrier equipment sector 
as well. By the end of the 1990s, 17 joint ventures and wholly foreign-owned network equipment 
makers were responsible for producing almost 94 percent of China’s telecommunications 
equipment; domestic firms only accounted for 6.4 percent.107  
China’s indigenous network gear suppliers were therefore struggling in this unfavorable 
domestic market and had to seek for other methods or channels for their development. In the late 
1990s, a few homegrown PC makers such as Lenovo and Founder survived in the face of fierce 
foreign competition by significantly lowering their prices and competing with transnational 
giants through bloody price wars.108 Other companies were forced to exit the more lucrative 
urban market into rural areas or even turn to overseas markets for opportunities.  For example, 
Huawei, founded in 1987 by Ren Zhengfei in Shenzhen, unable to compete head to head with 
transnational companies and their joint ventures in the city area, started building its business 
capacity in small towns and rural places. To avoid the over-saturated domestic market, it also 
tapped into overseas markets from early on. As Yun Wen has shown in her case study, in the 
mid-late 1990s and before the state officially implementing its “going out” initiative in 2003, 
Huawei had already extended its business to Hong Kong and Russia, and this international 
strategy was soon applied to other Asian, African and Latin America countries.109  
Compared with equipment vendors, China’s network operators had been tightly 
controlled by the state throughout the 1990s and were largely shielded from direct foreign 
participation. Indeed, in the majority of the 1990s, China’s network operating sector was 
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dominated by three major carriers, China Telecom, China Unicom and Jitong Communications, 
all of which were state-owned and were backed by different government entities.110 However, it 
does not mean that this industrial segment was entirely cut off from the external market. 
Transnational capital was still able to find a way to participate and shared a limited portion of the 
operating revenue, as will be discussed shortly.  
Why did China keep such a tight control of its network operation sector? On the one hand, 
there were political and security concerns. As aforementioned, network operators have controlled 
the “entry point” of China’s network system and equipment makers are dependent on the 
operators for access to the Chinese market. Keeping the operators in the hands of the state, 
therefore, can help the state exercise indirect control over its equipment makers. On the other 
hand, there were economic considerations as well. As Eric Harwit argues, as a large and 
emerging market with huge potential profits, the Chinese state wanted to reserve the domestic 
market for its native players, and in particular, the state-owned players.111 Based on these 
concerns, in 1992, China issued the “Re-statement on Forbidding Joint Operation of Postal and 
Telecommunications Business with Foreign Companies,” prohibiting foreign investors in owning 
or operating any telecommunications network. This ban was later included in the “Catalogue of 
Industries for Guiding Foreign-funded Investment” promulgated by the State Council in 1995.112 
Despite its strong will to keep a tight rein over domestic network operating sector, in the 
early 1990s, to follow the international “norm,” the leadership started to cultivate a major 
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corporate reform, introducing competition and separating direct government management from 
state-owned enterprises.113 For the first part, in 1994, both China Unicom and Jitong 
Communication were introduced to compete with the incumbent China Telecom. For the second 
part, China Telecom was split from the industry regulator, the Ministry of Posts and 
Telecommunications (MPT), to become a profit-oriented “modern” corporation. To add more 
complexity to the picture, as will be discussed in Chapter 2, China’s Internet governance 
apparatus is a deeply conflicted system, with different state agencies and various levels of 
governments fighting with each other to advance their own interests, sometimes even at the 
expense of the overall state strategy. The three major carriers also represented two different 
camps of bureaucratic actors: China Telecom was affiliated with the Ministry of Posts and 
Telecommunications (MPT), the existing industry regulator, while China Unicom and Jitong 
were backed by the Ministry of Electronic Industry (MEI), the government agency that was 
responsible for regulating equipment manufacturing in China.  
Fierce competition between these companies developed along with the construction of 
the Internet system in China, with each operating a different commercial network: ChinaNET 
managed by China Telecom, ChinaGBN under the purview of Jitong, and Uninet operated by 
China Unicom. As latecomers to the game, China Unicom and Jitong faced special obstacles in 
obtaining capital to build its network. To fund its network expansion and to fight with the more 
powerful China Telecom, China Unicom, in particular, introduced a specific and complex 
business structure to court foreign capital – the Chinese-Chinese-Foreign, or CCF – despite the 
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state’s official prohibition of foreign participation in China’s network operation, as mentioned 
above.  
Constituted by China Unicom, a Chinese intermediary company (usually a satellite 
company of Unicom’s regional shareholders), and a foreign company, the CCF was a specific 
investment mechanism to operate experimentally in the policy gray area. In this arrangement, 
both the satellite company of China Unicom and the foreign investor injected a certain amount of 
capital to form a joint venture, with the foreign investor taking a controlling stake. The joint 
venture then signed a contract with Unicom in order to participate in network construction and 
operation efforts. As a return for its previous capital investment in the joint venture, the foreign 
company received a portion of Unicom’s operating revenue and thus indirectly participated in 
China’s network operating market (see Figure 1.2).  
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Figure 1.2: The CCF structure.  
Source: Author's own compilation, based on Harwit, China Telecommunication Revolution, 54-55; Zhang 
Chenshuang ÞġǷ, Da Kuayue: Zhongguo Dianxinye Sanshi Chunqiu 	: 
 
[Great Leap Forward: Thirty Years of Chinese Telecommunications] (Beijing, China: , 2008), 
355.   
 
The CCF arrangement contributed significantly to China Unicom’s development. From 
April 1995 to December 1997, up to 46 CCF ventures were created, which contributed about $10 
billion to Unicom’s total funding.114 About 32 foreign companies participated in the game, 
including Ameritech, AIG and Nextel from USA, Bell and Telesystem from Canada, Deutsche 
Telecom from Germany, France Telecom, and Stet from Italy.115  
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Furthermore, the level of foreign involvement in China’s early network construction and 
operation went much further than merely capital contribution. Lack of necessary technological 
knowhow and eager to adopt “modern” corporate practices, these Chinese carriers heavily relied 
on its transnational partners for advice. For example, through its local joint ventures, China 
Unicom often turned to its foreign partners for suggestions on its “equipment procurement, 
network design, and related management matters”.116 Even China Telecom, the more powerful 
incumbent that didn’t participate in the CCF scheme, co-designed its early Internet backbone 
with American company Sprint.117  
The CCF story ended before China’ WTO accession. In 1998, the newly consolidated 
Ministry of Information Industry (MII), which combined both the MEI and MPT, officially 
banned this scheme and dissolved these contracts, with Unicom paying back up to RMB 15 
billion to its foreign collaborators.118 The cancelation of the CCF was later interpreted as a way 
to prepare for Unicom’s public offering on the Hong Kong and New York Stock Exchange, as 
the Chinese officials started to realize the global stock market might be an easier way to absorb 
foreign capital without giving out controlling stake.119  
When transnational capital was forced to leave the network operating sector, China’s web 
services and applications providers, in contrast, flourished with foreign investments. The first 
generation of China’s web companies – notably, the three biggest portals, Sohu, Sina, NetEase – 
all emerged in the late 1990s with venture capital funding raised overseas. For example, in 1996, 
Charles Zhang, an MIT graduate, raised $225,000 from his professors Nicolas NegroPonte and 
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Edward Robert, went back to China and founded Sohu, a Chinese version of Yahoo.120 As we 
will see, China’s web services and application sector were indeed built from scratch with the 
heavy involvement of transnational capital. 
 Why did the state reinforce its regulation to ban foreign capital in its network operation 
sector but at the same time, turned a blind eye to similar – and literally more aggressive – 
practices in its web applications sector? One possible reason is the relatively less sensitive nature 
of telecommunications value-added services in terms of national security threats, as previous 
scholars has pointed out.121 On the other hand, because the state in the late 1990s only perceived 
web applications as “an extension of telecom services,” companies in this sector had a low 
priority in terms of receiving state funding.122 This meant that they had to seek other forms of 
investment. Meanwhile, the rise of the dot.com bubble in the US also prompted many 
transnational financial firms to look into emerging Internet markets for opportunities, especially 
China. As a result, a large amount of transnational capital poured into Chinese online market in 
the late 1990s and early 2000s. Due to the highly speculative and short-term nature of venture 
capital investments,123 these firms rushed to list shares on foreign stock markets in order to find 
exit channels for their early investors. The listing procedure further deepened their interactions 
with the global capital market.  
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The process, however, was by no means a smooth one. Indeed, in the eve before Sina’s 
Nasdaq IPO in 1999, the then MII minister Wu Jichuan publicly reinstated that foreign 
investment in China’s Internet content providers was “illegal”.124 In order to both satisfy their 
transnational investors – who controlled the money, and the state authorities – who controlled 
their business license, a complex investment vehicle called “Variable Interest Entity” (VIE) was 
invented by Sina and got a tacit approval from the authorities.125 The VIE structure, therefore, is 
also known as the “Sina model”.  
The essence of the VIE structure is to separate – at least partially – the Chinese company 
that is allowed to operate in the domestic market from its foreign investors, which partially 
satisfies the authorities’ will to keep control over its domestic network. To remit part of its 
revenue to its foreign investors for their capital contribution, however, the Chinese firm needs to 
link itself back. This is achieved through a middle man, a third foreign-owned enterprise 
registered in China. Therefore, under a VIE structure, the Chinese firm and its foreign investors 
first set up an offshore holding company, called a Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV). This SPV then 
establishes a wholly foreign-owned enterprise (WFOE) in China, which nominates the Chinese 
partner to get license and operate in China (see Figure 1.3).  
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Figure 1.3: The VIE structure.  
Source: Author's own compilation, based on Shen, “Deconstructing the Myth of Alipay Drama—
Repoliticizing Foreign Investment in the Telecommunications Sector in China”.  
Note: The solid lines indicate equity investment. The dotted lines indicate contractual agreements.  
 
In this way, foreign companies are able to have a stake in a market that they otherwise 
wouldn’t be able to easily get access, while their Chinese partners are also able to retain their 
licenses by claiming their “Chineseness”. As the CCFs in the case of China Unicom, the 
establishment of these VIEs was hardly a secret, and the state would conduct several efforts in 
the coming years to curb its growing influence, as will be discussed in the next section.  
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2000s: WTO, “Indigenous Innovation” and the Entanglement between China and the 
Global Internet 
Entering the 21st century, China experienced a series of political-economic changes that 
molded its emergent relationship with the global Internet.  
To begin with, China’s 2001 WTO accession had – to a certain extent – brought the 
country into a new phase in its integration with global capitalism. On the one side was 
accelerated market opening. In the Internet sector, China agreed to let foreign firms take up to 50 
percent ownership of value-added services in its domestic market in two years, which included a 
broad range of Internet service and applications, such as e-mail, databases and e-commerce.126 
For reasons stated above, basic telecommunications services were more tightly regulated, as only 
up to 49 percent foreign ownership in mobile and fixed-line services was allowed in three and 
five years, respectively.127  
The coin of China’s WTO accession has another side. In addition to an accelerated and 
calculated domestic market opening, China also officially inaugurated its “going-out” initiative 
to complement its FDI friendly policies introduced in the 1980s and 1990s, with an aim to 
cultivate a group of national and international competitive firms in face of the anticipated 
competition along with its WTO accession. A series of policies were carried out under this 
banner, including deregulating China’s FDI regime, streamlining the approval process, signing 
bilateral and regional investment treaties and offering financial support through state policy 
banks. China’s relationship with the global economy therefore entered a new phase, i.e., by 
expanding from “attracting-in,” or drawing in FDI investment into its territory, to “going-out,” or 
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promoting China’s outward capital flow.128 China’s Internet firms have increasingly taken a 
leading role in this new phase, as will be shown in greater detail in Chapter 3.  
Apart from its WTO accession, China also had its leadership transition in 2003 – from 
Jiang Zemin-Zhu Rongji to the Hu Jintao-Wen Jiaobao administration. Recognizing the pitfalls 
of its export- and FDI-driven path of the 1980s and 1990s and fearing that China would continue 
to occupy a low position in the global production chain, the Hu-Wen leadership initiated a 
handful of policies to depart from the previous single-minded pursuit of marketization to 
emphasizing more on the role and the capacity of the state in resource redistribution in its 
domestic market.129 In the field of the Internet industry, the overall policy focus started to shift 
from accentuating informatization in all fields to boosting the development of proprietary 
technology and standards, or “indigenous innovation,” in key areas.130 As Hong Yu points out, 
the 2000s witnessed “a drastic shift from technological and industrial dependence on foreign 
inputs to a systematic and purposeful buildup of domestic innovation and production capacities 
by building and leveraging China’s domestic demand”. 131 
Concurrent with China’s policy reorientation was the turbulent transformation of the 
global Internet. Due to over speculation on Internet based stocks and overcapacity in the related 
telecommunications sector introduced by the neoliberal deregulation policy, the dot.com bubble 
                                                
128 Ning, “China’s Leadership in the World ICT Industry: A Successful Story of Its ‘attracting-in’ and 
‘Walking-Out’ strategy for the Development of High-Tech Industries?” 
129 Barry Naughton, “China’s Economic Policy Today: The New State Activism,” Eurasian Geography 
and Economics 52, no. 3 (2011): 313–29. 
130 Zhao, “China’s Pursuits of Indigenous Innovations in Information Technology Developments: Hopes, 
Follies and Uncertainties.” 
131 Hong, Bar, and An, “Chinese Telecommunications on the Threshold of Convergence: Contexts, 
Possibilities, and Limitations of Forging a Domestic Demand-Based Growth Model,” 924.  
	
 
58 
burst in 2001 and plunged the center of global digital capitalism into a digital crisis.132 To dig 
them out of the slump and to look for fresh investment opportunities, transnational capital 
increasingly turned their sights to the newly emergent – and relatively less damaged – Chinese 
market. As both a manifestation and a propellant of this reorientation, in 2004, Mary Meeker, a 
former Morgan Stanley Internet analyst once dubbed “Queen of the Net,” for the first time, 
published a 217-page long investment report on the Chinese digital market.133 “It is an irony that 
a few years ago some folks thought the Internet was over,” said Meeker, “well, it has just started, 
and it is not all made in America.”134  
Probably as a result of all these domestic and global trends, China’s digital industry in the 
2000s presented some unique attributes in terms of its relationship with the international Internet. 
On the one hand, along with the WTO process and the rise and fall of the Internet bubble in the 
early 2000s, there was growing interpenetration between Chinese Internet capital and 
transnational capital. On the other hand, the developmental and nationalistic agenda of the state, 
under the Hu-Wen leadership, also exerted substantial influence over this increasingly 
interconnected relationship. In sum, the 2000s witnessed a growing contradictory relationship 
between China and the global Internet, across the three industrial subsectors.   
As discussed above, during the majority of the 1990s, the Chinese network 
manufacturing sector remained largely open for transnational companies, which resulted in a 
high degree of foreign domination and technological dependence. This situation started to 
change at the end of the 1990s. Realizing both the pitfalls of its early FDI-driven developmental 
                                                
132 Crain, “Financial Markets and Online Advertising: Reevaluating the Dotcom Investment Bubble”.  
133 Geoffrey A. Fowler and Susanne Craig, “Meeker Opines on China,” The Wall Street Journal, April 16, 
2004, http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB108205207415283875. 
134 Ibid.  
	
 
59 
model and probably also in preparation for the anticipated fierce competition along with the 
WTO deal, the state initiated a series of import substitution policies, including setting up 
research funds, offered policy loans and strategically leveraging the procurement power of its 
network operators. 135 A group of competitive domestic players started to emerge and to expand 
their reach overseas.  
One highly visible example of this policy reorientation was China’s efforts in developing 
its “indigenous innovation,” in particular native technical standards, across a wide range of 
different network systems, including the "third generation" (3G) mobile communication standard 
TD-SCDMA, wireless local area network (WLAN) standard WAPI and Internet Protocol (IP) 
version 9.136 Technical standards are important for both political and economic reasons. 
Politically, they influence the design of the backbone of the Internet and therefore bear national 
security implications. Economically, because of the economies of scale of the Internet, 
proprietary network standards, once become “de facto,” will both generate considerable royalties 
and help related equipment makers gain future market share.137  
Commanding the procurement power of its network operators through tight ownership 
control, the state was able to use various policy mechanisms to support its preferred homegrown 
standards, with a hope to upgrade its native equipment industry. For example, in order to give a 
significant commercial boost to its indigenous 3G standard TD-SCDMA (Time Division 
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Synchronous Code Division Multiple Access), the Chinese state postponed the country’s 3G 
adoption to 2008, reorganized its operating sector and ordered its most powerful mobile operator, 
China Mobile, to build a TD-SCDMA network.138 At the same time, it is also worth noting that 
despite its weak global performance, TD-SCDMA was designed not as a national standard, but 
as an international standard, and the state actively promoted its deployment in other countries. 
For example, in 2006, the high-level National Development and Reform Committee (NDRC) 
successfully signed a memorandum of understanding with South Korea’s SK Telecom to build 
trial TD networks in Korea’s Bundang.139 Indeed, Zhao Houlin, the first Chinese Secretary-
General of ITU was once quoted saying that “promoting TD in only the domestic market is not 
enough to succeed, it must expand overseas”.140 
In parallel with its efforts to help domestic firms build up production capacity based on 
domestic market, the state also started to offer significant help for its equipment makers to go out. 
For example, in 2004 and 2009, Huawei were granted a $10 billion and a $30 billion line of 
credit by China’s Development Bank, respectively. ZTE, in 2009 alone, received $10 billion 
credit line from China Exim bank and $15 billion from China’s Development Bank. In 2012, the 
latter increased ZTE’s credit line to $20 billion.141   
By the end of 2000s, China’s equipment makers started to gain a visible presence on the 
global stage. Lenovo’s 2005 purchase of IBM’s PC business constituted probably the most 
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visible example. Huawei and ZET, the two domestic champions and the forerunners of this 
outbound tactic achieved considerable success. In 2008, the Huawei’s overseas sales reached 75 
percent of its total revenue while that of ZTE’s reached 60 percent.142 The growing weight of the 
overseas market in their profit strategies, however, also pushed these firms to –  in some cases – 
readjust their relationship with the Chinese state. For example, due to the dominance of non-
Chinese standards in the global 3G market, both Huawei and ZTE showed limited support for the 
government-backed TD-SCDMA standard, given its restricted adoption in the international 
mobile market.143 By pushing its domestic gear makers to “go global,” therefore, the Chinese 
state has also weakened – to a certain extent – its capacity in coordinating nationalistic and 
developmental projects.  
Compared with liberalized equipment manufacturing sector, throughout the 2000s, 
China’s network operators – through a series of industrial reshuffles and complex institutional 
setups – remained in the hands of the central state, despite China’s WTO commitment to allow 
up to 49 percent foreign ownership in this strategic sector. This process, however, was 
accompanied by the deep integration of these operators into the global stock market, which 
resulted in an unusually high degree of foreign involvement.  
On the one hand, the Hu-Wen administration, through the dual institutional setup of the 
State-Owned Asset Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC) in 2003 and the 
Ministry of Information and Industry Technology (MIIT) in 2008, strengthened both its 
ownership control and regulatory power over its domestic network operators. The repeated 
restructuring of China’s telecom sector and management rotations demonstrated this state power. 
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For example, in 2004, all the top leaders of China Telecom, China Mobile and China Unicom 
switched their positions overnight, per requested by the state.144 
On the other hand, this strengthened role of the state in China’s network operating sector 
should not be mistaken as an indication of a complete “nationalization” of China’s network 
infrastructure. What was concurrent with the enlarged state power was a further and strategic 
integration of this sector into the global digital economy. As aforementioned, at the eve of 
China’s WTO accession, China officially banned the CCF businesses and forced foreign 
companies to divest their early investment in China Unicom, largely in preparation for the 
company’s upcoming IPO. Indeed, to absorb foreign capital and to cultivate a group of global 
competitive players in face of the upcoming WTO, China actually allowed all its state-owned 
operators to list – at least part of – their assets on foreign stock exchanges to generate capital 
inflows. It is reported that by the end of 2004, all of the four carriers at the time – China Telecom, 
China Mobile, China Unicom and China Netcom – were listed overseas.145 
This “plugging” of these network operators into transnational financial networks had two 
major implications. On the one hand, as Dariusz Wojcik and James Camilleri have shown, since 
the listing process itself heavy relied on global business services firms as auditors, legal advisors 
and IPO underwriters, it also resulted in an extremely high degree of involvement of 
transnational financial institutions – including investment banks such as Goldman Sachs and law 
and accountant firms like Linklaters & Paines – into the financial design and corporate 
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restructuring of China’s network operating sector.146 On the other hand, enmeshed deeply into 
the structure of transnational stock market, China’s carriers were no longer merely defined by 
state orders or domestic market conditions; they were also subjected to the pressure of 
international capital markets. Moreover, Riding the tide of the “going-out” policy, Chinese 
carriers also started to expand their reach overseas. In 2007, China Mobile completed its first 
successful overseas acquisition, purchasing 88.86 percent of Paktel, the fifth largest mobile 
operator in Pakistan, through Luxembourg-based Milicom.147 In sum, in the 2000s, despite their 
status as state-owned, Chinese network operators deepened their integration with the external 
digital market both through intensive interactions with transnational financial institutions as well 
as their growing global footprint.  
As with the situation in the equipment manufacturing and network operating sectors, 
China’s web services and applications sector experienced similar contradictions in its 
relationship with the state and transnational digital capitalism. As aforementioned, during the 
WTO negotiation, China promised to open up a good portion of its web market for foreign 
players to enter. Admittedly, this period witnessed a few foreign Internet firms localizing their 
service in China. For instance, Yahoo opened Yisou.com for Chinese language search and 
Google launched its Chinese service in 2005. In practice, however, a license was still required 
for any web company that wanted to operate in the Chinese market. This was a particularly 
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troublesome process for foreign companies. It is reported that until 2008, the state had granted 
22,000 operating licenses but only 7 of them were granted to foreign invested companies.148  
This does not mean, however, that China closed its web applications sector to 
transnational capital. The aforementioned VIE structure, as one of the founding blocks of 
China’s web sector, was still allowed and indeed was prevalent in China’s quickly growing 
digital market. In other words, although the state controlled China’s domestic Internet through 
various regulatory measures, it exhibited an unusually high degree of tolerance toward foreign 
capital as portfolio investment. For example, Baidu, Tencent and Alibaba – the three most 
powerful domestic Internet companies, the BATs – were all founded in the late 1990s and early 
2000s based on the VIE model and were jump-started by transnational capital: Tencent in 1998 
with $2.2 million from Hong Kong’s PCCW and Boston-based IDG, Baidu in 2000 with $1.2 
million from Silicon Valley-based venture capital firms Integrity Partners and Peninsula Capital, 
and Alibaba with $5 million from a Goldman Sacks-led foreign investment team. According to 
an estimate, as of April 2011, 42 percent of Chinese Internet application companies listed in the 
US have used this structure and thousands of unlisted companies continue to operate through 
it.149  
Moreover, probably both encouraged by the acquiescence of Chinese authorities and 
propelled by the continuing development and restructuring of the digital capitalism in the West, 
foreign investors didn’t stop after the seed round of fundraising; they kept rushing in. Along with 
their enormous capital contribution, some even took controlling stakes – as well as corporate 
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board membership – in some largest Chinese web conglomerates. In other words, the corporate 
nationality of these firms started to become a vexing issue. For example, it is reported that due to 
their early capital contribution, in 2013, foreign investors controlled some major shares of the 
BATs: South African company Naspers controlled 34% of Tencent, US investment firm DFJ 
Venture Capital controlled 25.8% of Baidu and Softbank of Japan owned 31.9% of Alibaba.150 
It is worth noting that the state was well aware of this aggressive penetration of foreign 
capital into its web market. Different government entities – for example, both the Ministry of 
Commerce and the State Administration of Foreign Exchange – had issued related documents, 
trying to put the VIE structure under their own regulatory territory. 151 The central government, in 
contrast, deployed few resources to support these efforts and in general turned a blind eye to 
these FDI activities at this moment. After all, the web sector – at least in the majority of the 
2000s – presented little concerns in terms of national security or strategic economic 
considerations for the central government.  
Concurrent with the continuing infiltration of foreign capital into the Chinese digital 
market, China’s web services and application providers also set their sights overseas, along with 
the state’s “going out” initiative. On the one hand, partly pushed by their early investors’ need to 
cash out, the mid-2000s witnessed an “overseas IPO tide of Chinese Internet firms” – a group of 
major homegrown companies, including Baidu, Tencent, Alibaba’s Business-to-Business sector, 
Shanda, 51job and eLong, all pushed their way into international stock markets in Hong Kong 
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and the US.152 On the other hand, they also started expanding their reach to foreign markets. For 
example, in 2007, Baidu opened its first international search service in Japan, with a partnership 
with Japanese e-commerce giant Rakuten. In 2008, e-commerce company Alibaba also entered 
Japanese market by founding a joint venture, Alibaba Japan, with SoftBank. In 2009, Tencent 
launched its English language portal IMQQ.com.153 These overseas activities, however, remained 
both limited in scope and exploratory in nature at this stage, as will be discussed in Chapter 3. 
By the end of the 2000s, the Chinese Internet has grown by great leaps and bounds, 
making it the largest online user base in the world. On the one hand, the WTO deal at the end of 
2001 has indeed opened up China’s digital market to a greater extent, which in turn prompted a 
wave of outward expansion of its homegrown Internet companies. On the other hand, 
recognizing China’s marginal position in the global Internet ecosystem as well as many pitfalls 
of its outward-looking development trajectory in the 1980s and 1990s, the Hu-Wen leadership 
redirected China’s information policy toward nationalistic indigenous innovation and domestic 
market consumption, using varying policy measures (e.g., licensing and ownership control) to 
exercise regulatory power over its domestic network. The Chinese Internet industry, across all its 
three subsectors, demonstrated a growing but also contradictory entanglement with transnational 
digital capitalism.  
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Post-2010s: “Internet Plus,” “One Belt One Road,” and a “Strong” Internet Nation  
China’s growing interpenetration with the global Internet stands out at a time when China 
and the Internet have constituted two of today’s “unsurpassed poles of growth” during a 
prolonged “digital depression”.154 Despite recent slowdowns, China has maintained a relatively 
stable GDP growth rate during the economic turmoil. It has also accelerated the process of global 
economic power projection. It is reported that during the financial crisis, China’s outward FDI 
increased 110 percent, from $26 billion in 2007 to $55 billion in 2008.155   
Meanwhile, the Internet has become the “dragonhead” of China’s economy, which can be 
observed across all the three industrial segments. In 2011, state-owned China Mobile became the 
world’s largest mobile operator. Huawei also replaced Ericsson and topped the global telecom 
equipment sector in 2012. In the web services and applications sector, the massive $25 billion 
IPO of Alibaba constituted the highest-profile episode of the global rise of the Chinese Internet. 
It seems like China has indeed become a “big” player in global cyberspace.  
However, this seeming rise needs careful qualification. In spite of strong state 
intervention in the 2000s and the rise of a group of powerful Internet companies, the joint 
strategies of “attracting in” and “going out” have yet “not made China the real leader of the 
global ICT industry,” as its production networks are still largely controlled by foreign 
enterprises.156 The former US intelligence contractor Edward Snowden’s revelations of the US 
National Security Agency (NSA)’s massive digital surveillance in 2013, on the other hand, 
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intensified China’s long-standing concerns over its technological dependence on foreign 
companies. 
Recognizing both China’s strength and – probably more significantly – its vulnerability 
in the post-Snowden and post-crisis global Internet, the newly inaugurated Xi Jinping-Li 
Keqiang administration pushed “strong Internet power” into the policy foreground, calling the 
nation to transform from a “big Internet country” to a “strong Internet power”.157 Still unfolding, 
China’s efforts of turning itself into a globally competitive cyber force has become more 
integrated under the new leadership, based on a two-pronged approach: maintaining a firm 
political stance on Internet security issues, while engaging in proactive and accelerated digital 
market integration.  
On the one hand, probably in response both to the Snowden revelation and escalating 
accusations of cyber espionage activities levelled by the United States, China has put a greater 
emphasis on the issues of Internet security. In 2014, Xi renamed the long-standing State 
Informatization Leading Group under previous administrations to the “Central Internet Security 
and Informatization Leading Group,” raising the issue of Internet security on the same level of 
importance as informatization. He claimed that “Internet security” and “informatization” are 
"two wings of a bird and two wheels of an engine”.158 Since then, a series of cyber security-
related laws or regulations were in formulation, including a National Security Law passed in 
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2015 and a Cybersecurity Law passed in 2016, which shared the same aim to make China's 
network equipment “secure and controllable”. 159 
On the other hand, the government has also progressively pushed a new round of 
economic reform and global market integration – spearheaded by and organized around the 
Internet sector – through two hallmark policies: “Internet Plus” and “One Belt One Road”. The 
“Internet Plus” policy, unveiled by Premier Li in 2015, plans to deepen links between the 
Internet and almost all sectors of the Chinese economy and deregulates many previous highly 
restricted industrial sectors for China’s Internet capital to enter. 160 The “One Belt, One Road” 
strategy, proposed by President Xi in 2013, has a grand aim to build up the geopolitical-
economic “Silk Road Economic Belt” (SREB) and the “21st Century Maritime Silk Road” 
(MSR), connecting China to major Eurasian countries through infrastructure building, especially 
the Internet infrastructure.161 For example, the plan’s “Vision and Actions” specifically called to 
“create an information Silk Road linking regional information and communication technology 
networks”.162 In the name of building “an informational Silk Road,” China’s domestic Internet 
companies have been deeply integrated into the country’s geopolitical strategy.   
China’s effort of constructing a “strong Internet nation” has therefore manifested itself in 
these seemingly contradictory but also interrelated policy initiatives – strengthening the 
country’s network security capacity by making its Internet system “safe and controllable” while 
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simultaneously pushing its Internet companies to expand overseas. The territorial logic of the 
state, however, is not always in line with the expansive logic of China’s Internet capital.  
As mentioned previously, riding the wave of the “going out” strategy, by the end of the 
2000s, China’s equipment vendors have already become global players with internationally 
diversified revenue streams. The state’s new emphasis on market expansion and Internet security 
in the 2010s have both reinforced this trend by further pushing forward these companies’ 
overseas expansion, while also created conflict zones in their profit strategies.  
On the one hand, as the pioneers of the “going-out” of China’s Internet sector, Chinese 
equipment makers have been assigned a new role in the “Belt and Road” initiative. In 2015, the 
State Council released the “Guideline on Boosting International Cooperation in Production 
Capacity and Equipment Manufacturing,” urging domestic network equipment companies to 
collaborate with telecom operators in building overseas information networks and data centers.163 
Substantive policy support, such as export credit and diplomatic aid, was soon carried out. For 
example, in 2015, China Development Bank and Industrial and Commercial Bank of China 
issued a total of $2.5 billion credit line to Bharti Airtel, the largest telecom operator in India, for 
its domestic infrastructure projects. Bharti Airtel then outsourced its network equipment, at least 
partly, to Huawei and ZTE.164 Furthermore, the role of equipment vendors in China’s “Belt and 
Road” initiative is more than simply building telecom networks, as networking products 
essentially constitute the basic infrastructure of contemporary market system. As Zhou Jialiang, 
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the General Director of Huawei Bishkek, pointed out in a domestic interview, “One Belt, One 
Road” will benefit Huawei enormously not only because information network is one of the major 
targeted areas, but also because many modern infrastructures, such as railways, airports and oil 
pipelines, all rely on network products to realize system integration.165  
On the other hand, with the growing security concerns over its Internet system after the 
Snowden revelations, China also enacted a series of cyber security initiatives to reregulate its 
domestic digital market. Such initiatives, surprisingly, have complicated the alliance between the 
state and its already globally-oriented equipment vendors. One revealing example came in 
August 2015, as one of Huawei’s top executives openly questioned the direction of China’s 
cyber security pact, worrying that it would intensify the political tensions among different 
countries.166 In 2016, when Microsoft was investigated in China for its sales and marketing 
practices and after Huawei was shut out of the US market due to cybersecurity reasons, the two 
collaborated in creating a “buyer’s guide” for big government and corporate users to ease their 
worries over cybersecurity threats.167 Indeed, as these Chinese vendors have become more and 
more internationally oriented, to what extent the state still maintains its regulatory power 
requires continuing attention.  
For network operators, as aforementioned, despite a considerable degree of foreign 
involvement through corporate reform and overseas listing in the 2000s, China’s three operators 
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– China Telecom, Mobile, and Unicom – have still remained securely in the hands of the central 
government. This pattern has been consistent through the first half of the 2010s. It is reported 
that till 2015, foreign investment accounted less than 10 percent in all three carriers.168  
As state-owned corporate entities, these network operators have been assigned important 
roles in China’s new efforts to both upgrade its network security capacity and build information 
infrastructure connecting Eurasian countries. On the one hand, still unfolding, China’s new 
cybersecurity law is expected to grant more power to its carriers to make the connected devices 
“safe and controllable,” which might translate into favorable treatment to domestic players.169 On 
the other hand, under the banner of the “Belt and Road”, Chinese carriers also shoulder the 
responsibility to actively build network infrastructure in order to offer both platforms and outlets 
for other Chinese capital as they go out. In 2015, for instance, China’s three network operators, 
in collaboration with international partners such as Microsoft and SoftBank, announced that a 
submarine cable connecting Asia and North America – the New Cross Pacific Cable Network – 
was under construction. This cable, with a total estimated expenditure of $500 million, will not 
only help build information channels that connect countries alongside the “Belt and Road,” but 
also benefit fiber optic cable makers as they struggle to find new growth opportunities during the 
prolonged global economic crisis.170  
As internationally listed corporations, however, all the three Chinese carriers are also 
subject to the stock market pressure – though limited – on a transnational scale. This translates 
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into the fact that sometimes they have to balance their procurement plans to include not only 
Chinese players, but also foreign ones. For example, in August 2016, China Mobile announced 
that it contracted Finnish vendor Nokia to deploy 4G technology in 19 provinces in China’s 
domestic market.171 Their complex relationship with the digital players from the external Internet, 
therefore, cannot be overlooked.  
As will be shown in greater detail in Chapter 3 and 4, unlike the sporadic and 
unsystematic internationalization activities in the 2000s, Chinese web services and applications 
providers started to project significant amount of capital in global cyberspace since the 2010s. It 
is reported that from 2013 to mid-2016, Baidu, Alibaba and Tencent have invested a combined 
$75 billion in acquiring strategic assets.172 Allying themselves closely with the state’s “going out” 
strategy – with an updated version manifested in the newly-minted “One Belt One Road” plan – 
China’s homegrown Internet companies have become increasingly entangled in the global web. 
The expansive logic of capitalistic accumulation seems to have overlapped with the territorial 
logic of the Chinese state.   
Under the growing national security concerns and with the disproportionate weight 
exercised by these companies in both China’s domestic market and its international strategies, 
however, the state has also started to flex its regulatory muscle to reorganize these companies’ 
relationship with transnational capital. The aforementioned VIE structure, which channeled a 
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large amount of foreign capital into China’s web sector, has become a target. In 2015, China's 
Ministry of Commerce issued a draft Foreign Investment Law, claimed that the “nationality” of 
an enterprise in the VIE structure would be defined not based on ownership structure, but based 
on who has ultimate control over the enterprise. Under this circumstance, companies like Baidu 
that have adopted structures of dual-class shares, or similar ones like Alibaba’s unique “Alibaba 
Partnership,” will remain intact, since the dual-class share structure has given their Chinese 
executives effective voting power over foreign investors.173 For other companies, however, this 
new Law, once implemented, would have considerable impact, as many foreign investors in the 
VIE structure would be pressed to render control to their Chinese partners in order to keep their 
operational licenses in China.174 Although the specific outcome remains uncertain as of this 
writing, it has nevertheless demonstrated the state’s awareness and efforts to reregulate its web 
application sector, with results remain to be seen.  
In sum, the first half of the 2010s has witnessed a more proactive China rising in the post-
Snowden and post-economic crisis global cyberspace, making continuing efforts to renovate 
itself from a “big Internet country” to a “strong Internet power”. These efforts, however, are 
multifaceted. On one side, the leadership’s increased emphasis on Internet security has reflected 
deep-seated geopolitical-economic tensions around this critical international infrastructure, 
which can hardly be resolved in the near future. At the same time, China has also clearly taken 
steps toward accelerating the process of economic opening and global integration both in and via 
the Internet sector, as the strategic industry has not only become a locomotive of China’s 
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economy, but also served as a vital underlying infrastructure of China’s interaction with 
transnational capitalism. After all, apart from the much-highlighted cyber security pact, President 
Xi also attended the 8th US-China Internet Industry Forum during his 2015 US visit, joining the 
meeting with a group of Internet elites from both China and the US – including Apple’s Tim 
Cook and Facebook’s Mark Zuckerberg.175 Will the security concerns and heightened tensions 
over the management of the global Internet reinforce the territorial logic of the Chinese state that 
has been strong under Xi? Or will the dynamics of transnational capitalist accumulation precede 
these concerns and push for further economic integration?  
 
Conclusion 
Taking a historical approach, this chapter maps out the rise and transformation of China’s 
now large and diversified Internet industry in the past three decades, from its first international 
email in 1987 to the more recently minted “Internet Plus” and “One Belt One Road” strategies, 
foregrounding its multifaceted interactions with the political economy of the International 
Internet. Conceptualizing China’s Internet industry as three distinctive but highly interrelated 
digital segments – hardware and equipment manufacturers, network operators and web services 
and applications providers, this chapter sets the stage for the dissertation by repositioning the 
development of this vital sector into the changing dynamics of global digital capitalism.  
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Tracing this evolution as a complex interplay between the territorial logic of the state and 
the expansive logic of capitalistic accumulation, this chapter identifies three major historical 
stages. In the 1990s, driven by the flashing global branding of the Internet as the “information 
superhighway,” the state’s longstanding nationalistic development agenda to catch up with the 
technologically advanced West, as well as the market pressure resulted from its capitalist 
reintegration, China opened up its domestic digital market for transnational capital. Adopting the 
“trading market for technology” strategy, China jump-started its then infant Internet sector by 
aggressively deregulating its domestic digital market. Indeed, the initial development of the 
Chinese Internet spearheaded the country’s post-1989 reintegration into the global capitalist 
system. In the 2000s, in anticipation of the growing competition along with its WTO accession 
and realizing the pitfalls of its previous FDI-driven development trajectory in the 1990s, China 
reregulated its Internet sector with varying degree across three subsectors while simultaneously 
pushed its Internet champions to go global. The 2008 global economic crisis opened up the third 
stage. This prolonged “digital depression,”176 in conjunction with the 2013 Snowden revelation 
of the massive surveillance program operated by US National Security Agency (NSA), has both 
intensified the state’s long-standing security concerns over its domestic network infrastructure, 
which triggered another round of adjustment, and propelled a new wave of market integration 
centered around China’s now-potent Internet industry.   
By bringing to light some overlooked insights and materials, this chapter offers a 
historical and structural understanding of China’s Internet Industry and its complex interaction 
with the external Internet. It demonstrates, first, the conventional perception of China's Internet 
as a "giant cage" is misleading as it overlooks the long and complex interactions between China 
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and the global Internet political economy. Indeed, transnational capital has been heavily involved 
in building a digital economy in China, and China’s Internet industry is at the pivot of the 
restructuring of global capitalism. Second, China’s increasing interpenetration with the global 
Internet ecosystem has evolved not only as a political process, but also as an economic one. The 
state’s efforts of developing a coherent cyber strategy have been accompanied with – and 
complicated by – the intricate interactions between its domestic Internet capital and the changing 
structure of transnational digital capitalism.   
The ascending role of China in global cyberspace therefore gives rise to a number of 
questions: How has China strived to (re) develop the US-centric international Internet system? 
What are the flash points of conflict? Is China still mostly marginalized? Or is China beginning 
to join the existing scheme and try to alter it to suit its own interests? If so, to serve which 
interests? In other words, if China is indeed exporting its “Internet model” to other countries, 
what is this “Chinese model”?  To answer those questions, first of all, requires a historical 
understanding of China’s evolving approach toward the management of this vital global 
infrastructure.  
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CHAPTER 2 	
	
BEYOND CYBER SOVEREIGNTY?  
CHINA AND GLOBAL INTERNET GOVERNANCE 177 
 
 
While Chapter 1 offers a brief overview of the historical formation and transformation of 
China’s Internet industry by repositioning it within the changing political economy of the global 
Internet, this chapter goes deeper to explicate an evolving Chinese approach toward the 
management of this vital infrastructure, an emerging field called “global Internet governance”.  
Defined broadly, the term “Internet governance” usually refers to “policy and technical 
coordination issues related to the exchange of information over the Internet”.178 Drawing on a 
critical political economic perspective, this chapter studies the formulation of global Internet 
polices as a potentially conflicted process that expresses rival, deep-seated political-economic 
interests.179 Indeed, as more human communication moves online and as the Internet intertwines 
with once-separate media systems, questions about how to govern this unprecedentedly versatile 
and expansive communication system not only possess widening research significance, they also 
have acquired a rising political prominence. At the 2012 World Conference on International 
Telecommunications (WCIT-12), 89 attending countries openly challenged the existing 
governance scheme and called for placing the Internet under the jurisdiction of a United Nations 
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(UN) affiliate, the International Telecommunication Union (ITU). Struggles over Internet policy 
escalated to such an extent that some observers cast the situation as a “Digital Cold War”.180  
One of the leading countries in the “ITU camp” is China. How are we to understand 
China’s position in this vital field? Based on a normative liberal position, many have sought to 
do so by positing some variant of what we may call a “cyber-sovereignty” framework. Largely 
concerned with China’s repressive Internet control domestically, this conventional framework 
foregrounds the role of an authoritarian Chinese state in attempting to govern the international 
Internet. Confrontation between China and the United States over global cyberspace in turn may 
be cast in terms of a state-centric model versus a multi-stakeholder model. Multi-stakeholderism, 
however, is a contentious concept. Milton Mueller argues that although the multi-stakeholder 
model identifies government, private sector, and civil society as the actors in the decision-
making process, it “does not determine how power is distributed among these groups or how 
much weight they are given in decision-making processes”.181   
Despite lending important insight into one aspect of China’s motivation, this “cyber-
sovereignty” framework focuses primarily on political control and generally tends to 
underestimate or oversimplify the multifaceted power dynamics among different business units 
and state agencies in the construction of China’s unfolding approach. It therefore reduces 
China’s complex and contradictory position to that of a heavy-handed state motivated to solely 
elevate governments and intergovernmental organizations as the legitimate governors of the 
global Internet. This position is then often counterposed to a US-centric policy preference for a 
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borderless Internet that should remain as free from government control as possible: for short, 
Chinese “Internet sovereignty” versus American “Internet freedom”.182 
This dichotomy, as scholars have argued, obscures more than it reveals about the 
geopolitics of the Internet.183 Recent scholarship on global Internet governance has begun to 
acknowledge the complexity of China’s approach. In a wide-ranging analysis of how the Global 
South countries negotiated Internet-related issues at the World Summit on the Information 
Society (WSIS), Bhuiyan observes deep ambiguities in China’s policy stance – indeed, in some 
cases, China acquiesced to the US.184 These recent developments call for a more comprehensive 
historical and theoretical examination of China’s evolving approach: How may we historically 
contextualize China’s position toward global Internet governance? What forces have propelled 
this evolution? Have they changed over time? How have they interacted with one another? 
Conceding that the “cyber-sovereignty” framework inadequately captures and explains China’s 
evolving approach, what may be offered in its place? 
To shed light on these questions, this chapter draws on historical methods. As with Victor 
Pickard’s recent studies,185 two levels of historical examination was conducted by using sources 
in both the English and Chinese languages. First, I systematically reviewed trade journals, news 
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articles, and the secondary literature on China’s Internet history to trace its engagement with the 
international Internet. Second, informed by these resources, I located and analyzed relevant 
primary sources, including government reports, state documents, national statistical compendia, 
and conference documents issued by both the WSIS and the WCIT-12, focusing on those 
submitted by the Chinese delegation.  
The structure of this chapter is organized as follows. Moving beyond the conventional 
framework of “cyber sovereignty,” the next section proposes an alternative analytical framework 
to capture the historical transformation of China’s approach toward the management of the 
global Internet. Section Three to Five tests this analytical tool by tracing the frictions and 
adjustments between China and the existing global Internet governance regime in the past three 
decades. This history is divided by two landmark events: The first is the WSIS in 2003-2005, 
which marked the first open confrontation between China and the prevailing Internet governance 
system in a global policymaking forum.186 The second is the conflict between China and Google 
in 2010, which not only produced China’s first Internet White Paper in response, but also 
signaled the eruption of “the geopolitics of the Internet” in public awareness.187 After a brief 
overview, each historical section is organized around the three critical Internet governance 
functions proposed by John Mathiason, Milton Mueller, Hans Klein, and Lee McKnight in their 
2004 report for the UN ICT Task Force; these have proven useful to other scholars in analyzing 
the Chinese situation.188 The first of these functions is technical standardization, decision-making 
about the Internet’s fundamental “networking protocols, soft application and data formats”; the 
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second is resource allocation and assignment, the distribution, coordination, and operation of 
critical Internet resources such as domain names; and the third is public policy, or “policy 
formulation, policy enforcement and dispute resolution” for the Internet.189  
 
China and Global Internet Governance: An Alternative Analytical Framework 
Drawing on the theoretical framework of the critical political economy of 
communication,190 this chapter proposes an alternative analytical framework to better capture the 
multifaceted dimensions of China’s changing approach toward global Internet governance. The 
critical political economy approach to media policies aims to “ruthlessly scrutinize these policies, 
expose their contingencies and contradictions” and “emphasize the power structures that produce 
any given media system”.191 Instead of “technologies of freedom,”192 critical political economy 
posits network technologies as political-economic constructions and policymaking for 
communication technologies needs to be situated and analyzed within prevailing social power 
relations.193 This theoretical framework prioritizes the relationship between the development and 
governance of the Internet and the reconfiguration of global capitalism.194 As Dan Schiller 
argued, the escalating geopolitical-economic controversy over Internet governance is a chief 
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feature of the wide inter-capitalist struggle to appropriate the strategically vital ICT industry, 
which is “a rare pole of profitable growth” in today’s capitalist political economy.195 This 
conceptualization considers Internet governance a site of not only political control and 
geopolitical struggle, but also capitalist construction. This perspective is particularly relevant to 
China. As Yuezhi Zhao reminded us in her study of the China’s recently policy reorientation 
toward “indigenous innovation,” the evolution of the Internet in China has been shaped by not 
only the state but also corporate power. 196 Moreover, it is possible that neither the “Chinese state” 
nor “corporate China” is monolithic, while the growing conflicts and contradictions between 
different state agencies and various units of capital has been further complicated by China’s 
accelerated global integration.197 
Drawing on this critical tradition, the chapter seeks a further clarification of the 
interlocking power relations between capital and the state in shaping China’s strategies to 
achieve global Internet governance. It argues that China’s approach can be best understood as the 
result of multifaceted power interactions among a group of power-holders, including different 
state agencies and business units on a level that is transnational in scope. The chief actors for the 
state include economic agencies, notably, the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology 
(MIIT); political and ideological units, including the State Internet Information Office (SIIO); 
and military departments led by the People's Liberation Army (PLA). On the side of capital, 
several different actors are prominent. Web application and service providers such as Alibaba, 
telecom equipment manufacturers such as Huawei, network operators such as China Mobile, and 
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major corporate network users are all centrally involved. China’s policy formation process also 
extends beyond national considerations to interact with foreign government agencies, 
transnational corporations that invest in or trade with China, and organizations with 
supranational responsibilities.  
The alternative model proposed here contributes to the existing literature in three ways. 
First, it recognizes that both the state and capital have been critical in constructing China’s 
approach, and it breaks down the monolithic category of the “state” and “capital” into different 
state agencies and business units in order to identify the key power-holders in each category. 
Second, rather than merely emphasizing one aspect of the complex state-capital relations, it 
underscores the multifaceted nature of this relationship, which encompasses both conflict and 
cooperation. Indeed, the territorial logic of the state and the expansionist logic of capital 
sometimes overlap, but more often than not, are in conflict with each other. The “dialectic of the 
territorial and capitalistic logics of power,”198 as David Harvey puts it, is at the center of this 
proposed model. Third, instead of attempting to identify a mechanical or static formula, the 
chosen analytical framework situates these interactions both on a transnational level and within a 
contingent historically unfolding process. This framework permits us to see that China’s 
approach to Internet governance over the past three decades has been shaped and reshaped as a 
product of these power dynamics (see Figure 2.1). 
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Figure 2.1: An alternative analytical framework for China and global Internet governance. 
 
 
1987-2001: Early Engagements with Global Internet Governance  
As we saw in the previous chapter, since the first international email in 1987, China’s 
interactions with the international Internet were been part and parcel of its reintegration with 
transnational capitalism. After the leadership accorded to ICTs a critical role in this process, 
China then claimed for itself a role in the arena of global Internet governance, albeit from a very 
peripheral position. During this stage, state initiatives were paramount in structuring China’s 
approach.  
In the field of technical standardization, among a number of groups involving in the 
standard setting process, the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), is generally considered as 
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the leading organization in Internet standardization. Started in 1986 and overseen by the Internet 
Society (ISOC) through the Internet Architecture Board (IAB), the IETF is a private organization 
for technical experts to discuss and make recommendations on technical standards for the global 
Internet. Far from an international organization, the IETF is largely dominated by corporate 
players, especially computer companies, from the United States.199  
Standard setting in the area of information technology is a highly conflict-ridden process 
internationally, for one crucial aim of IT standards is to “make technologies and equipment 
compatible across companies and regions”.200 There are a couple of reasons for a country to get 
involved. On the one hand, there are political and national security concerns as Internet standards, 
once globally established, often constituted the foundation of a country’s network infrastructure. 
On the other hand, there are also economic reasons. Proprietary technology standards allow their 
corporate developers to charge royalties for the use of their technologies and thus can be 
employed to nurture the development of a country’s own IT industry.  
In the years between 1987 and 2001, China had a very limited, if not entirely negligible 
role, in the IETF. Li Xing, a Tsinghua professor and the deputy director of the CERNET Center, 
recounts that at the 2002 IETF meeting, only around ten Mainland Chinese were present among 
over 1,000 participants. Before 2007, the IETF did not even keep statistics for Chinese 
attendees.201 Of the 2,206 Requests for Comments (RFCs) – the key documents for the 
development of Internet standards – published by the IETF from 1987 to 2001, China co-
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authored just one: RFC 1922, in 1996, titled “Chinese Character Encoding for Internet Messages.” 
202 This indicates, on one side, China’s early awareness of and willingness to enter global 
Internet governance. On the other side, however, that this was China’s only RFC in that 
formative stage in global Internet development signifies its then-marginal position.  
China faced a similar situation in resource allocation, represented by its initial interaction 
with the Domain Name System (DNS) and the establishment of the China Network Internet 
Information Center (CNNIC). Comprising the name space, name registration, and name 
resolution function, the DNS is the focal point of the Internet. Through the DNS, the Internet has 
been far more extensively governed than is often recognized.203  
The DNS originated in the United States. In 1998, with the fast commercialization of the 
Internet, the US Government transferred power over the DNS to the Internet Corporation for 
Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN), a private nonprofit organization in California. 
However, as per a separate Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) contract, ICANN is 
formally accountable to the US Commerce Department. As Mueller et al have contended, the 
ICANN model has demonstrated the US government “succeeded in establishing a governance 
regime dominated by itself and by non-state actors” through “privatizing and internationalizing 
key policymaking functions but retained considerable authority for itself”.204 In other words, the 
organizational structure of ICANN is designed to favor the United States and private sectors, 
with little space for other governments to share its authority. In fact, the only room for 
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governmental participants in ICANN is the Governmental Advisor Committee (GAC) that is 
authorized only to "consider and provide advice on the activities of ICANN".205  
As a latecomer, China’s first engagement with the DNS involved merely the registration 
of its country code top-level domain name (ccTLD) in 1990. There are two types of Internet top-
level domains (TLDs): generic TLDs (gTLDs) such as .com and ccTLDs such as .cn. Werner 
Zorn, the German professor who directed China’s first international email team, also helped 
China apply for the .cn domain name from the Internet Network Information Center. Since China 
didn’t have full Internet connection at that time, the .cn root server was maintained in German’s 
Karlsruhe University until China fully connected to the global Internet in 1994.206 In 1997, the 
CNNIC, a state-owned non-profit organization that manages the .cn name system, was 
established. Since then, domestic domain name registration became “a function of the Chinese 
state”. 207 
China also made its first forays into ICANN. In 1999, Tsinghua Professor Wu Jianping 
was elected to ICANN’s Address Supporting Organization. The same year, Chen Yin, a deputy 
bureau director of the Ministry of Information Industry (MII, later MIIT), represented China at 
the meeting of the ICANN Governmental Advisory Committee (GAC), the official, albeit 
secondary, space for governmental input into ICANN’s activities.208 
However, friction between China and ICANN soon arose. One dispute concerned 
ICANN’s acceptance of Taiwan in the GAC as an independent country, challenging China’s 
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diplomatic stance.209 Another cause of estrangement came after the rapid commercialization of 
domain names during the first dot-com boom. In 2001, a Virginia court ordered the Hong Kong- 
and Shanghai-based company Maya to give up its ownership of the CNNews.com domain name 
to CNN, despite the name’s having been obtained legitimately from an accredited Chinese 
domain name registrar. As Ermert and Hughes argue, the case was broader than Maya versus 
CNN, but indicated that anyone who registers a domain name on the global Internet somehow 
“comes under United States jurisdiction, regardless of whether they go through a Chinese, 
German or South African ICANN accredited registrar”.210  
Besides its early interactions with the leading organizations in Internet standardization 
and resource allocation – which, as noted, were headed mainly by state agencies and state-owned 
research institutions – China also started to formulate its own policy position on global Internet 
affairs. On the one hand, long-standing bureaucratic conflicts impinged on China’s policymaking 
and the leadership had grown concerned about an outbreak in conflict between rival state 
agencies that rushed into the profitable area of network operation. Apart from the long-standing 
turf war between the MPT and MEI – the two competing agencies that carved up  China’s 
lucrative telecom market, in 2000, military departments led by PLA, the Ministry of Foreign 
Trade and Economic Cooperation and the Ministry of Railway all joined this competition.211 In a 
move to reorganize the decision-making process, the State Council had established the National 
Joint Conference on Economic Informatization in 1993; this evolved into the State Council’s 
Steering Committee on National Information Infrastructure, chaired by vice Premier Zhou Jiahua. 
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In 1998, integrating both the MEI and MPT, the MII was established, and the Steering 
Committee was absorbed into the newly established ministry.212 
On the other hand, it is worth noting that the leadership was well aware of the country’s 
peripheral position in the international Internet system and was already actively seeking ways to 
boost China’s position in this critical front. As early as in 2000, at the 16th World Computer 
Congress, the then President Jiang Zemin had commented on the digital discrepancy between the 
developing countries and the developed countries and advocated the formulation of an 
international Internet convention.213 In the words of Jiang, the world was increasingly divided 
between the “information rich” and “information poor” – and that, because developed countries 
enjoyed superior information technology, the continuing diffusion of the Internet was not 
alleviating this.214 
 This concern – probably not ungrounded, as shown in the previous Chapter – tinged 
China’s response to even seemingly benign attempts to internationalize Internet access. In 2000, 
VeriSign, the American company in charge of the .com domain name, announced a plan to start 
developing technical standards and registering domain names in non-Roman characters, or 
“internationalized” domain names, on a trial basis. This plan also included the standardization 
and registration of Chinese-script domain names, potentially an extremely lucrative market. The 
CNNIC countered with a rival system under the .cn extension. The MII also published the 
“Circular Concerning Administration of Internet Chinese Character Domain Names,” which 
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required any entity intending to enter the Chinese domain name market to get approval from the 
MII. As Xue observes, for Chinese leaders, keeping a Chinese domain name under China’s 
control was driven not just by political and national security concerns but by such factors as 
economic consideration, consumer protection and content regulation as well.215 And although 
VeriSign eventually withdrew from the Chinese market, such initiatives, especially the 
disproportionate power of US corporations in global cyberspace, continued to raise anxieties. 
Chinese leaders’ wariness assumed political form when Wu Jichuan, then MII Minister, declared 
at the Pacific Telecommunication Conference that the uneven information flow had “challenged” 
the “cultural traditions, moral standards and values” of developing countries, since the majority 
of Internet content was in English and produced in developed countries.216 These concerns 
escalated to the point that, in 2001, China stopped sending representatives to the ICANN GAC 
meeting. 
To this point, the Chinese government, represented by state agencies like the CNNIC and 
state-owned research institutions, was the central actor in shaping China’s position toward global 
Internet governance, with domestic business players largely not evident. The government, 
however, still did not speak with a single voice: Rival agencies (e.g., the MEI and MPT) 
competed with one another for influence and control over the both economically lucrative and 
politically strategic network operation system.  And China’s position was already complicated by 
transnational forces: For example, the state’s insistence on a Chinese domain name system 
controlled by China conflicted with the offerings of the US corporation VeriSign. Soon, these 
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complex interactions between China and a US-centric Internet would be elevated to a global 
stage.  
 
2002-2009: Selective Participation in the Existing Regime 
China’s further entry into the global market after its 2001 WTO accession deepened the 
linkage between its domestic cyber market and the global Internet system. At the same time, as 
mentioned in Chapter 1, with the Hu-Wen administration taking office, this period also 
witnessed a restructuring of China’s developmental path more toward its domestic market and a 
particular highlight of “indigenous innovation” in its domestic IT industry. A mixed approach to 
global Internet governance has therefore started to take shape: China became more outspoken in 
its critique of the unilateral US control of the DNS but also displayed limited acquiescence to the 
established governance system.  
Behind China’s ambivalent position there were complex power dynamics. First, with the 
growing importance of the Internet in China’s political economy and the internal fragmentation 
of its domestic Internet governance apparatus, the central government continued to consolidate 
its Internet governing capability. As a successor to the previous informatization committee, the 
State Informatization Leading Group (SILG) was reestablished and this time was elevated from 
the vice-Premier level to the Premier level, chaired first by Premier Zhu Rongji, then by Wen 
Jiabao. In 2008, the industry regulator MII was also upgraded into the Ministry of Industry and 
Information Technology (MIIT), in order to better coordinate the application of information 
technology to traditional industry.  
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Second, more non-governmental or semi-governmental Internet governance organizations 
also started to take shape and joined the game. For example, the Internet Society of China (ISC) 
was established in 2001, with more than 400 industrial and academic members, including the 
most prominent Chinese Internet corporate elites serving on its board – Jack Ma from Alibaba, 
Pony Ma from Tencent and Robin Li from Baidu. However, it might still be a mistake to regard 
the ISC as a pure industrial or civil society organization without governmental connections. On 
the one hand, despite sharing the similar name, it is not associated with the global non-profit 
Internet Society. On the other hand, the ISC states clearly on its official website that the 
organization is “guided by the MIIT”.217  
Finally, this period also witnessed the takeoff of a China-based Internet industry, whose 
constituents showed pressing interests in participating in this vital field. Apart from an already 
growing network equipment industry spearheaded by Huawei and ZTE, the state-owned 
telecommunications sector had undergone a series of radical corporate restructuring, which in 
2008 settled into three powerful operators, China Telecom, Unicom and Mobile. Meanwhile, its 
web application and service sector started to show positive progress. In 2004, for example, under 
significant foreign financing, the three major homegrown web portals – Sina, Sohu and Netease 
– reported notable revenue growth and achieved full-year profitability for the first time.218  All 
these developments added further complexity on China’s approach, not only introducing new 
corporate actors into the game, but also restructuring state’s policy discourse to a both resistant 
and accommodating tone.  
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In the realm of Internet standardization, the CNNIC was still at the forefront, but a small 
group of corporate actors, such as Huawei, also began to emerge. Although China’s influence 
within the IETF community remained limited, beginning in 2004, the nation’s RFC publication 
record accelerated (see Table 2.1).  
 
Table 2.1: RFCs led or participated by China (1996-2009) 
Year Number of RFCsa Leading or participating organizations 
1996 1 Tsinghua (1) 
2004 1 CNNIC (1)  
2006 3 CNNIC (1), Huawei (1), China mobile (1) 
2007 2 Tsinghua (1), Huawei (1) 
2008 6 Huawei (3), China mobile (2), Tsinghua (1), CNNIC (1) 
2009b 6 Huawei (5), China mobile (1), Tsinghua (1)  
 
Source: Cao, “The Current Situation and Suggestions for China’s Participation in the IETF 
Standardization Work”.  
Notes: a Some RFCs may have multiple authors; b the data is updated till June 30, 2009.  
 
 
 
In 2004, in collaboration with the Japan Network Information Center and the Korea 
Network Information Center, the CNNIC published RFC 3743 – China’s second RFC. China 
then published three RFCs in 2006, two in 2007, six in 2008 and six by the end of June in 2009, 
of which four reached the standard track.219 It is worth noting that there is still a long way for a 
RFC to become an official Internet Standard. For one thing, not all RFCs are standard track 
documents, some may be published as “Informational” or “Experimental”. Moreover, not all 
standard-track RFCs would reach the level of Internet standards, which often requires different 
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rounds of review in the community.220  Although still just a fraction of the total number of annual 
RFCs – IETF published 459 RFCs in 2006, 320 in 2007, 290 in 2008 and 286 in 2009 221  – this 
rise testified that China was enlarging its role within the crucial Internet standardization process. 
As Suttermeier et al. note, a complex “neo-techno-nationalism,” in which national interests were 
pursued through “leveraging opportunities provided by globalization,” became prominent in 
China’s post-WTO technology strategy.222 Such an approach necessitated a certain compliance 
with global norms. Indeed, as the organization that is responsible for the allocation and 
standardization of Chinese domain names, the CNNIC has been one of the pioneers in pushing 
native Internet standards into the global arena. Recognizing the necessity to join – rather than to 
exit – the existing international technology setting apparatus, its former Director Mao Wei once 
warned, “to set up standards, we need to get into the standard setting process first”.223 
Besides participating in the IETF, China also vigorously promoted the development and 
adoption of a number of indigenous technological standards at home. In carrying out these 
domestic experiments, its growing Internet industry moved to a more prominent position. 
However, such pointed attempts to introduce indigenous standards drew resistance from different 
state and business players, both domestic and international. The case of WAPI (Wireless Local 
Area Network Authentication and Piracy Infrastructure), a native Chinese standard alleged to 
improve the security weakness of the Wi-Fi standard, was illustrative in this conflict zone. When 
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the state announced in 2003 its plan to require all wireless devices on the Chinese market to 
install WAPI, a campaign was organized by foreign governments (e.g., the US government) and 
transnational companies (e.g., Intel) to oppose this initiative. As Kennedy argues, this “high-tech 
standard war” occurred not only because of the advanced industrial countries’ uneasiness about 
China’s rise as a high-tech power and their unwillingness to share their advantage with 
newcomers, but also because this new standard seriously challenged the vested economic interest 
of a powerful coalition of transnational companies and their Chinese partners.224 And as Zhao 
points out, battling interests among domestic state agencies and business players also fractured 
the state’s agenda.225 The promotion of WAPI was more in line with the interests of the state’s 
military and national security division (e.g., the PLA) than those of its commerce and trade 
division – which sports close ties with transnational political-economic forces. Moreover, 
because the standard was developed and owned by a small inland firm, Jietong (IWNCOMM), 
who has a reportedly military connection, those well-established heavyweights like Huawei and 
ZTE showed little interest in supporting it. When China tried to push WAPI internationally, it 
faced additional geopolitical pressure. In 2004, the US embassy denied visas to some important 
technical members of China’s delegation seeking to attend the Joint Technical Committee, 
Subcommittee 6, of the International Organization for Standardization and the International 
Electrochemical Commission (ISO/IEC JTC1 S6) in Florida, preventing them from joining the 
discussion of WAPI as an international standard. In 2005, the WAPI application was moved off 
the agenda of a follow-up meeting of ISO/IEC JTC1 S6, triggering a walkout protest by the 
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Chinese delegation. 226 As a visible and complex example, it indicated China’s increasing efforts 
to gain more power within the Internet standardization community and the resistance – both 
inside and outside of China – this stance engendered.  
In the realm of resource allocation, this period witnessed estrangement between the 
Chinese state and the process of Internet governance, as the state not only stopped attending the 
ICANN GAC meeting, but also developed a series of domestic initiatives to boost its own 
control over the governance of Internet resources. During this period, however, different 
governmental and quasi-governmental organizations of China remained active in their interaction 
with the existing system.  
Internet resources like domain names constitute the backbone of the internationally 
interconnected network system and therefore bear critical importance for the states. Two highly 
visible examples uncovered China’s ambition to gain more control over Internet resource 
allocation: the progressive development of Internet Protocol version 6 (IPv6) and the promotion 
of the .cn domain name system. Backed by strong concerns over the uneven distribution of 
Internet resources among developing and developed countries—a situation that was widely 
framed by the Chinese media as “Stanford University has more internet addresses than China” 227 
– the state strenuously advocated the development of a national network backbone around a new 
Internet Protocol, IPv6. IPv6 claims to have a number of advantages over the current IPv4 
protocol, especially its ability to provide for almost unlimited Internet addresses. As Zhao argues, 
                                                
226 Jack Linchuan Qiu, “Chinese Techno-Nationalism and Global Wifi Policy,” in Reorienting Global 
Communication: Indian and Chinese Media beyond Borders, ed. Michael Curtin and Hemant Shah 
(Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2010), 289–303. 
227 Huang Quanquan and Feng XiaofangȋMĮ XĠƟ,“IPv9 heyi chengwei hulianwang jishu zhongda 
chuangxin,” IPV9</ò!ƖƎúĬǣdĕ [Why IPv9 became a major Internet innovation], 
 Xinhua Net, January 23, 2008, http://news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2008-01/23/content_7482216.htm. 
	
 
98 
due to America’s initial hesitation to promote this new version of Internet Protocol, China’s 
political economic elites saw the development of IPv6 as a “historical opportunity” to leapfrog 
toward technological leadership of digital networks as well as to rectify the “glaring disparity in 
the distribution of IP addresses”.228 Starting formally in 2003, a series of state-led initiatives 
aggressively pushed forward the technological development and commercial application of IPv6 
and related products (e.g., Internet routers) in the hope of gaining a growing share of the global 
network market going forward.229 In 2006, CERNET2, the core IPv6-based network that linked 
25 universities across the country, announced its formal operation. As the world’s largest pure 
IPv6 network, CERNET2 was portrayed in the Chinese media as a landmark of China’s impact 
on the global Internet, with one article even heralding that the “future of the Internet begins to 
take shape”.230 
In addition to the development of IPv6, China also strongly promoted the registration 
of .cn domain names. This became urgent after the Taiwan earthquake in December 2006, which 
knocked out a few undersea cables connecting the United States and East Asia. At the time, 
almost half the domain names in China were registered under .com and relied on US-based 
servers for Internet connection.231 The earthquake therefore severely disrupted China’s domestic 
Internet operation. In 2007, with support from the MII, the CNNIC announced a plan to reduce 
the yearly registration price of .cn domain names dramatically – from around 300 Yuan per name 
to 1 Yuan. In January 2008, the number of .cn domain names soared from 1.8 million to 8.45 
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million, which made .cn the second largest ccTLD in the world, only after Germany's national 
domain name .de.232 In July 22, 2008, the number of .cn domain further increased to 12.2 million 
and.cn officially became the world’s largest ccTLD. 233 In a statement, the CNNIC declared that 
the “wider use of the ‘.cn’ service will improve our Internet independency and it's safer for 
Chinese website operators”.234 
Yet these state-led initiatives revealed only one aspect of China’s multifaceted approach. 
While the Chinese state stopped sending government representatives to the ICANN GAC 
meeting from 2001 to 2009 and proactively carried out these projects at home, the interaction 
between ICANN and other actors in the Chinese Internet community continued. In 2003, Qian 
Hualin, a research fellow of the CAS, was elected to the ICANN Board of Directors to serve a 
three-year term. The CNNIC and the ISC also jointly hosted ICANN’s 2002 meeting in 
Shanghai.235 The state’s acquiescence to these continuing interactions revealed underlying rival 
approaches pursued by different agencies in China’s strategies. 
Accompanying the changes happened in the realm of technical standardization and 
resource allocation, a public policy position toward global Internet governance also began to 
cohere around the WSIS. This position was marked by a mixture of resistance and 
accommodation. 
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For China, the most pressing issue was unilateral US control over the DNS. During the 
WSIS, China actively sought to internationalize the governance of the DNS by putting it under 
an intergovernmental organization like the ITU. China insisted that the governance of the domain 
name system should be prioritized over other public policy issues pertaining to the Internet. 
China’s argument was that the Internet belongs to the international community – and that critical 
Internet resources were public resources belonging to the world – and therefore that the DNS 
should be governed jointly by developing and developed countries through intergovernmental 
organizations like the United Nations.236 
However, China’s position was more complex than a simple forswearing of the existing 
system and a call to have the UN “take over” the Internet, as some journalists declared.237 The 
further integration of China into the global system and the development of an emerging Chinese 
Internet industry pressed the state to participate in, or to make room for other Chinese entities to 
participate in, the existing governance institutions, in order to be able to defend and negotiate on 
their behalf in the current system, as in the case of the upcoming release of the internationalized 
top-level domain names, which will be discussed shortly. This ambivalence can be found in 
China’s policy discourse, as the Chinese state, to a limited extent, acknowledged the existing 
multi-stakeholder Internet governance model. In its report to the Working Group on Internet 
Governance (WGIG), a committee set up to investigate and compose a report on Internet 
governance during the two phases of the WSIS, China suggested that “sovereign governments 
and governmental organizations should play leading roles under the United Nations’ framework, 
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while guaranteeing broad participation of all the other stakeholders”.238 This complex stance was 
also reaffirmed by Hu Qiheng, the Chinese representative at the WGIG. As the President of the 
ISC, Hu was purported to represent the interests of non-state actors. However, as aforementioned, 
given the fact that the ISC is not associated with the global non-profit Internet Society but is 
rather supported by the MII and that Hu herself was once the Vice President of the CAS, her 
close linkage to the Chinese government cannot be ignored. Those factors jointly complicated 
Hu’s position. In a domestic interview, Hu pointed out that there were several layers of global 
Internet governance. While the governance of critical Internet resource needed to be arranged 
multilaterally based on the equal participation of states, the governance of Internet content and 
application required an alliance of governments, businesses and civil society organizations.239 
During this stage, China’s approach toward global Internet governance demonstrated 
considerable ambivalence as nascent domestic business units started to claim a visible presence. 
For example, both Huawei and ZTE were major sponsors for the WSIS at Tunis. The interests of 
these Chinese business players, however, were not always in line with the official position of the 
Chinese government. The WAPI case suggests that, sometimes, vested economic interests could 
lead domestic companies, in cooperation with foreign governments and transnational businesses, 
to work against the state’s developmental agenda. The complex interplay between the territorial 
logical of the state – which prioritizes nationalistic and developmental goals, and the expansive 
logic of capital – which prioritizes borderless capitalist accumulation, has manifested itself in 
China’s policy discourse and created significantly complexity.  
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2010-Present: Integration and Revision 
The close of the new millennium’s first decade marked a flashpoint of geopolitical 
conflict between China and the United States in global cyberspace. In 2010, Google announced 
its plan to stop censoring results in Mainland China, with the possibility of entirely pulling out of 
the Chinese market. In supporting Google’s position, then-US Secretary of State Hilary Clinton 
implied that the Chinese government was building a new virtual Berlin wall, which was entirely 
against the US “Internet freedom” agenda.240 In response, China strongly insisted that it had 
world’s “most active development of the Internet” and the US should stop exercising 
“information imperialism” over China. 241 The Chinese State Council also issued a policy White 
Paper to elaborate on its Internet governance approach for the first time. A more assertive and 
sophisticated position therefore started to surface, indicating that China’s approach toward the 
global Internet had entered into a new stage.  
Concomitant with the surfacing of this new approach has been the emergence of an 
increasingly powerful domestic Internet industry. In 2014, four out of the ten largest Internet 
application firms by market capitalization were based in China: Alibaba, Tencent, Baidu, and 
JD.com.242 Members from this now fully-fledged industry have been actively seeking 
opportunities to leverage its own position and its access to the state in order to further a preferred 
vision of global Internet management that will favor their continuing capitalist expansion in the 
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International market. For example, as will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 5, Tencent’s 
CEO Pony Ma submitted several proposals to the 2013 National People’s Congress, asking for 
high-level state backing for the industry’s overseas expansion, including providing preferential 
financial assistance and offering diplomacy support. 243  
On the other hand, with the rising importance of the Internet, the state’s governing 
institutions reshuffled again. In 2011, the State Internet Information Office (SIIO) was 
established under the State Council Information Office (SCIO), mainly taking responsibility for 
Internet content regulation. In 2014, the former State Informatization Leading Group chaired by 
the Premier during the Hu-Wen administration was elevated to the President level and became an 
organizational apparatus of the Party, the State and the military. Renamed as the “Central 
Internet Security and Informatization Leading Group” and headed by President Xi Jinping, this 
new group brought together high-ranking officials from varying ministries, including 
representatives from economic agencies (e.g., MIIT), political and ideological units (e.g, the 
Party Propaganda Department) as well as military departments (e.g, the PLA and the Ministry of 
Public Security).  Soon the SIIO was integrated under the Leading Group and restructured as a 
ministry-level body, the Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC). Directed by Lu Wei, a 
senior propaganda officer, this new CAC reports directly to Xi and claims to manage a wide 
range of cyber issues, including content governance, infrastructure building and international 
Internet affairs. The CAC, therefore, has become the “chief manager” of China’s Internet. Other 
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organizational bodies, such as the CNNIC and ISC all report directly to it.244 This institutional 
setup, however, is not without rivalries. For example, for several global Internet governance 
meetings, such as the 2015 Global Conference on Cyberspace, the CAC and the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs have sent separate delegations. The consolidation process is expected to keep 
unfolding.245 
The global Internet governance system has also gradually realized and begun to respond 
to China’s growing influence. The Internet standardization community offers a salient example. 
In 2010, the 79th IETF Meeting was held in Beijing, the first IETF meeting to be held in 
Mainland China. This could be viewed as a reaction to the fast-growing Chinese community of 
network technical experts: Of the 1,200 engineers at the meeting, only the United States sent a 
number greater than China.246 The number of RFCs formulated by Chinese experts also 
increased. IETF Chair Jari Arkko estimated that with the further development of emerging 
technical areas like IPv6 and Internet of Things, China would soon be the most prolific RFC 
contributor after the United States. 247 
Concurrent with this boost in public engagement, Chinese private players also grew in 
prominence. In 2010, two experts from Huawei, China’s largest telecommunication equipment 
provider, were appointed as, respectively, Internet Architecture Board (IAB) member and 
Transport Area Director (AD); this combined to form a strong representation of the homegrown 
Chinese company at IETF, with two members of the Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG), 
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one IAB member, two ADs, and over 10 working groups chairs in total. By the end of 2010, 
Huawei had in total submitted 38 RFCs, 85 working group drafts, and 286 active drafts. 
Covering a wide range of network standards, the company had become one of the fastest-
growing standards contributors in the IP field. 248 Thus the Chinese private sector, like the 
Chinese state, was taking on an increasingly active approach to maximize its interests of 
capitalist expansion in the present regime.  
China’s reengagement with the ICANN-centric DNS further revealed this proactive and 
complex position. As Rebecca Mackinnon points out, the key background for this reconnection 
was the opening up of a new set of gTLDs in addition to the existing ones like .com, and the 
introduction of internationalized top-level domain names.249 In 2009, for the first time since 2001, 
the Chinese state sent a deputy divisional director of the MIIT, Cui Shutian, to the ICANN GAC 
meeting. For China, this meant the possibilities of a Chinese ccTLD representing China in the 
global Internet system (i.e., zhongguo) and new trademark gTLDs like .alibaba and .taobao. With 
China’s expanding Internet market and the growing power of its private players, it was 
paramount for the state to speak for their interests during this major reform, during which a 
considerable quantity of critical Internet resources would be released. Meanwhile, China’s active 
participation in the standardization of Chinese domain names also gave the state a more 
confident position in the negotiation. 
ICANN welcomed China’s return by offering China an accelerated process for creating 
its ccTLDs in the native language. The reason behind this attitude is probably simple: By 2008, 
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China has already had the world’s largest online population and, as aforementioned, the world’s 
largest ccTLD, the .cn domain name.250 This pure size made the existing global Internet 
governance institutions to realize that in order to maintain their global legitimacy, they have to 
engage China within the system. In 2010, ICANN approved the establishment of Chinese 
ccTLDs, in both simplified and traditional Chinese characters, in an accelerated pace – indeed, 
less than one year after China’s return. Like the .cn system, the new Chinese ccTLDs would be 
managed by the CNNIC. The expedited approval and allocation of the new Chinese ccTLDs to 
the CNNIC could be construed as a compromise by ICANN to keep China acquiescent to the 
existing governance mechanism. Milton Mueller notes that the US government and ICANN 
appeased antagonistic states like China and Russia, by granting their state ccTLD monopolies 
“an economically valuable and politically powerful gift in order to keep them happy with the 
ICANN regime”. 251 China’s re-connection with ICANN, however, did little to alter the existing 
power structure: The US government, through its contract with ICANN, has retained the power 
to rename the core, or the “root,” of the global Internet.  
Since then, the relationship between China and ICANN has seemed to enter into a period 
of active cooperation – for example, in 2013, ICANN opened its global engagement office in 
Beijing and, in 2014, it signed a Memorandum of Understanding with MIIT’s research arm to 
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enhance its connections with China.252 This reengagement, however, by no means suggested that 
China had become comprehensively aligned with the current US-centered DNS scheme. Major 
contention in the international arena continued to expose the entrenched power relations. The 
Snowden disclosures in 2013 intensified the longstanding concerns about the US spying on the 
global Internet. In the international community, both German Chancellor Angela Merkel and 
Brazil President Dilma Rousseff took strong public stands for privacy. Major Internet 
governance organizations, including ICANN and IETF, also issued a statement, expressing their 
uneasiness about the growing discontent over the existing Internet governance regime that is 
dominated by the US. In response to escalating pressure, the US Commerce Department 
announced its intention to transfer its control over ICANN to the global multi-stakeholder 
community. A series of regional and international meetings were convened in reaction to these 
events, or in attempts to explore solutions to this policy transition, including the Brazil-
sponsored NETmundial conference in 2014. It seemed that the US-centric global Internet has 
been, to a certain extent, called into question. 
China seemed to keep a relatively low profile in these tumultuous meetings – as Zhao 
observes, the state sent only a bureau-level, rather than a ministerial-level, representative to 
NETmundial.253 State agencies, however, were not the only interactive points between China and 
ICANN. Private players also increasingly assumed critical positions. One latest indication of this 
change is the council election of the NETmundial Initiative, a multi-stakeholder global Internet 
governance platform co-sponsored by ICANN, the Brazilian Internet Steering Committee and the 
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World Economic Forum. During its inaugural meeting in June 2015, Alibaba’s founder Jack Ma 
was elected as one of the five co-chairs of the council, along with four other high-profile figures, 
including ICANN CEO Fadi Chehade, while CAC director Lu Wei participated as a council 
member.254 China is now therefore engaging in ICANN’s reform not only through government 
agencies or quasi-governmental organizations, but also through business actors, much like in the 
realm of technical standardization. 
During this stage, a more assertive Chinese policy position also began to unfold. This 
new attitude has been manifested both through a key policy document – the Internet White Paper 
– and an international conference, the WCIT-12. With the growing importance of Chinese 
cyberspace for the global economy, the state increasingly situated its attempts to rebalance the 
power structure of the global Internet within the existing governance system. 
On the one hand, partly as a response to the American cyber-freedom agenda, Internet 
sovereignty was raised to the top level of China’s policy discourse. The Internet White Paper 
declared: “Within Chinese territory the Internet is under the jurisdiction of Chinese sovereignty. 
The Internet sovereignty of China should be respected and protected”.255 At the WCIT-12, the 
Chinese government, in alliance with other states, proposed to define the Internet as the 
“international conglomeration of interconnected telecommunication networks” in which 
sovereign states possess the ultimate power over each “national Internet segment”.256 An 
extension of this policy discourse was China’s consistent preference for the UN system to take 
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the lead in global Internet governance. In the Internet White Paper, China recommended, “the 
role of the UN should be given full scope in international Internet administration.”257 This is not 
a surprising position for China to take, since individual nation-states usually have more power in 
the UN system than in organizations that allow different forms of weighted voting. In addition, 
China is one of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council. China’s claim to 
“Internet sovereignty” might have been designed to help the government defend its own 
questionable Internet censorship within its borders. However, it also served as a stepping-stone 
for the Chinese state, as a legitimate player in the global communications system, to press for a 
reconstitution of the US-dominated global Internet.  
On the other hand, although the official US policy discourse portrayed the Chinese 
position as a mere reflex of heavy-handed state domination,258 this was belied by the reality of an 
increasingly powerful Chinese Internet industry that had introduced important extra-
governmental actors into the existing Internet governance structure. This complex development 
can be observed in both the actual character of China’s engagement with the existing system and 
the state’s policy discourse. Practically, the state no longer served as the only major Chinese 
participant in the governance institutions; instead, it appeared to be making increased room for 
corporate actors, notably Huawei and Alibaba. In policy discourse, the existing governance 
arrangement was recognized by the Chinese government, as its Internet White Paper went as far 
as to pronounce that the ideal framework for global Internet governance, especially the 
administration of the critical Internet resources, be “established on the basis of the current 
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management mode”.259 Similarly, at the WCIT-12, although China, joining Russia and a number 
of other governments, tried to expand the ITU’s role in Internet governance by adding articles 
related to “Internet” (e.g., cyber security) to its treaty, the proposal still reaffirmed that “Internet 
governance shall be effected through the development and application by governments, the 
private sector and civil society”.260  
China’s hosting of the World Internet Conference offers a notable example of this 
assertive and sophisticated approach. Titled “An interconnected world shared and governed by 
all,” this annual summit was launched in 2014 and updated in 2015, as a major initiative 
sponsored by the newly established CAC. It could be viewed as a proactive attempt by the state 
to enlarge China’s role in a post-Snowden cyberspace and, as a China Daily article put it, have 
“its voice heard”. 261 What “China’s voice” is, however, needs careful clarification. On the one 
hand, President Xi, in his 2014 congratulatory message and 2015 keynote speech, continued to 
propose “an international Internet governance system of multilateralism, democracy and 
transparency.” On the other hand, the conference itself was far more inclusive than pure 
“multilateralism”. The attendees comprised not only delegates from state agencies and leaders 
from key Internet institutions, but also, notably, high-level executives from both domestic and 
foreign Internet corporations, such as Alibaba’s founder Ma and Facebook Vice President 
Vaughan Smith. In 2015, a high-level advisory committee was established, with ICANN CEO 
Chehade and Alibaba’s Ma sharing the chairman position. Li Yuxiao, a professor of Internet 
governance at Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunications, was quoted in a domestic 
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interview to highlight the role of Internet companies in structuring China’s approach. For Li, 
“Chinese Internet-based companies, not only the government, have to take their shared 
responsibility in developing facilities, operating systems and applications as concrete steps to 
carry out China’s strategy on the Internet”. 262  
In sum, this third stage witnessed the growing power and presence of China’s domestic 
business players as they increasingly acquired a critical position in China’s approach toward 
global Internet governance. Indeed, the ascent of corporate capital has now become a chief 
feature of China’s Internet power. For example, Huawei emerged as a significant player in 
Internet standardization, while other companies – such as Alibaba – likewise acquired quickly 
growing international stature. While the state continued to sharpen its approach toward this 
crucial geo-political economic terrain, relationships between the state and these substantial units 
of capital could not be assumed. Will Chinese capital and the Chinese state work as a unity to 
maximize their shared interests within the US-centric cyberspace? Or, do significant conflict-
points characterize the opaque interlock between the state and capital, both domestically and on a 
transnational level?  
 
Conclusion 
In December 2015, China opened its door to launch the second World Internet 
Conference in Wuzhen, Zhejiang, after its previous one in 2014. This time, President Xi Jinping 
attended and delivered a keynote speech. The importance of this meeting was thus elevated to the 
highest level of China’s political economy. As a clear indicator of the leadership’s effort to build 
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a “strong Internet power” and to shift the terrain of battle on to its home ground, this Wuzhen 
Summit warrants discussion in some detail.  
Attended by some 2,000 participants from over 120 countries and regions – including 
representatives from states, corporations and organizations, the Wuzhen summit certainly 
signifies China’s increasing readiness and capability to shift the center of gravity of global 
cyberspace. It also exposes China’s weaknesses, however. For one thing, the International 
breadth of this “World Internet Conference” was rather limited.  Twenty-one countries sent 
ministerial level government officials – but not the major Internet powers, including the United 
States.   
The lack of participation of high-level state representatives from major Internet advanced 
countries – notably, the United States – is hardly a minor issue. It reveals deep geopolitical-
economic tensions in this volatile arena, as exemplified in two competing media discourses. On 
the one side, concerned with China’s repressive Internet censorship practices and its insistence 
on “respecting the cyber sovereignty and honoring the rights of countries to choose 
independently cyberspace development path, cyberspace regulation models and Internet public 
policies,”263 Western media largely framed the summit as China’s new effort to export its version 
of the global Internet – or to sell its “filtered and policed Internet model” –  to other countries.264 
On the other hand, probably not unaware of this resistant international environment, the Chinese 
side claimed that its aim was to construct a “community of common future in cyberspace,” with 
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a particular emphasis on building cyber infrastructure to connect developing countries.265 
Domestic media headlines thus trumpeted, “Wuzhen summit speaks for the developing 
nations”.266 Is China the “world’s largest online censor” that is eager to export its “Internet 
sovereignty model” to other nations, as criticized by the West? 267  Or it is the speaker and 
defender of the developing nations against the American “Information imperialism,” as claimed 
by Beijing? 268 
This chapter analyzes and clarifies China’s evolving stance toward the governance of 
global cyberspace over the past three decades and tests the adequacy of the conventional 
framework for capturing and interpreting this approach. It argues that the dominant “cyber 
sovereignty” framework focuses primarily on political control and therefore generally reduces 
China’s position to that of a heavy-handed authoritarian state motivated to elevate governments 
and intergovernmental organizations as the sole governors of the global Internet. The historical 
record demonstrates that China’s approach has been more complex than the conventional 
framework allows, and that it is both built upon and differentiable from the US-centric, market-
oriented Internet governance scheme that predominates today. 
In the Internet’s nascency, China participated in the US-dominated governing institutions 
from a very peripheral position and soon clashed with them. The 2000s witnessed heightened 
alienation between the Chinese state and the governing mechanisms of the global Internet. 
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Nevertheless, China’s efforts to rebalance the system were backed by selective participation in 
existing governance entities and a series of domestic experiments, and epitomized by its position 
at the WSIS. After the 2010 battle with Google, China, boasting the world’s largest online 
population and a thriving Internet industry, started to fully integrate into the current system, with 
a proactive and sophisticated approach of revising it from within. 
Based on historical evidence, this chapter argues that, China’s policy formation toward 
global Internet governance is best understood as the product of multifaceted interactions among a 
group of power-holders, including different state agencies and business units, in both domestic 
and transnational contexts.  
First, as this and other studies 269 make clear, competing political and economic interests 
among different domestic state agencies have significantly influenced China’s governing 
approach; China’s effort to centralize its Internet policymaking system may be seen as a result of 
this intra-state struggle. Second, nationally headquartered business units have also emerged as 
important players and are using their access to the state to further their own visions of global 
Internet governance. There is every reason to expect that other Chinese companies are joining 
Huawei and Alibaba in this respect, as will be discussed in Chapter 3. Third, China’s stance is 
not only influenced by domestic players but also mediated by the multifaceted interactions 
among state agencies and business units on a transnational level. As the WAPI case illustrates, 
under certain circumstances, transnational and domestic business players might work together to 
oppose China’s attempts to rebalance the global Internet. It is these multifaceted power dynamics 
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– which encompass both conflict and cooperation – among different state and business actors on 
a transnational scope that constitute an appropriate analytic focus with which to study the 
unfolding Chinese approach toward global Internet governance. 
While it is still too early to make any definite prediction regarding China’s future stance 
in this critical field, because – as for many fundamental policy questions – China has not yet 
developed a full-fledged approach, it is probably safe to say that in the near future, China will 
continue to demonstrate a mixture of resistance and compliance in its strategies. On the one hand, 
at the 2014 China-US Internet Industry Forum, Lu Wei, China’s Director of the SIIO, openly 
called for “mutual governance of cyberspace” because of “the deep fusion and high mutual 
stakes” between the two countries in the Internet industry.270 Indeed, as discussed in Chapter 1, 
for instance, the intricate but widely adopted business structure VIE has deeply involved US 
Internet and investment capitals into China’s web applications and services industry.  If this is 
any indication, we must not discount the possibility of a shared policy vision between the US and 
China in some areas, such as making room for Internet companies based in each country to 
operate transnationally. On the other hand, this study reminds us that neither can we dismiss the 
growing conflict between forces within and without China over whose vision should structure 
the global Internet. As this chapter has demonstrated, different state agencies and business units 
compete but also cooperate with one other at particular sites and specific historical moments in 
this volatile and important area. What is certain is that, however the global Internet and its 
governance may evolve, China – which continues to move from the margins to the center – will 
be a major force in shaping it. 
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CHAPTER 3 	
	
TOWARD THE “EXTERNAL” INTERNET:  
THE “GOING OUT” OF CHINA’S INTERNET INDUSTRY 
 
 
 
The world capital market is a highly unequal, deeply stratified field and Chinese 
transnational corporations are now joining the game. Since the state promulgated its “going out” 
strategies in the early 2000s, Chinese companies have increasingly looked to expand into global 
markets. By the end of 2014, 18,500 Chinese corporations had established 29,700 foreign 
affiliates in 186 countries and regions all over the world.271 The World Investment Report 
released by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) also shows, 
in 2015, China’s Outward Foreign Direct Investment (OFDI) flow reached 127 billion, ranked 
3rd in the world, after the US and Japan. From 2000 to 2015, total Chinese-based outward FDI 
stock – FDI calculated on a cumulative basis – surged from $27 billion to $1,010 billion; ranked 
9th, after the US, Germany, UK, Hong Kong SAR (Special Administrative Region),272 France, 
Switzerland, Japan and Netherlands.273  
With more than $3 trillion foreign exchange reserve at hand and, indeed, as the “world’s 
largest capital-surplus economy,” this trend is estimated to continue.274 The UNCTAD predicts 
that in the next few years, China’s outward FDI will surpass inward FDI, shifting the country’s 
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role from a net FDI recipient to a net FDI supplier.275 Despite this significant growth, it is worth 
note that China is still a young and recent global investor and its outward FDI magnitude remains 
small: In 2015 China’s outward FDI accounted to 9% in global FDI outflow, while its share in 
the global FDI stock was only 4%.276 
Apart from its quantity, China’s outbound FDI landscape is also rapidly evolving. 
National oil companies used to be at the forefront of this trend. Increasingly, however, the 
Internet sector has started to gather momentum. An investment report from consulting firm Ernst 
& Young calculated that from 2010 to 2014, the share of Chinese companies’ overseas M&A 
deals in the technology, media and telecommunication sector has increased from 6% to 21%, 
while the share of energy and mining dropped from 61% to 16%.277 Recent firm level examples 
support this observation, as China’s three Internet giants – the BATs – all aggressively engaged 
in the global buying spree. Alibaba, the e-commerce behemoth, announced its plan to invest 
$575 million into the Indian online marketplace.278 Baidu, China’s search engine company, 
similarly, confirmed its recent investment in Uber, the US-based taxi sharing company, with 
some estimate the figure to be around $600 million.279 It is also reported that by the middle of 
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2016, Tencent, China’s social media and mobile gaming giant, is leading an investment group to 
purchase 84% percent of Finland’s mobile games maker Supercell Oy for $8.6 billion.280  
How are we to understand this recent but highly visible phenomenon? Is this the digital 
version of “China buying the world,” as often portrayed in the popular media? Or, from a 
communication scholar's perspective, does this mean the authoritarian Chinese state is now 
“taking over the global Internet” through its commercial arms? Previous literature has 
documented the motivations, policy evolutions and institutional setting of China’s “going out” 
strategies, often with a special focus on the resource extraction sector.281 The Internet industry, 
however, has received limited attention. Scholars of China’s Internet and telecommunication 
industry tend to focus more on the domestic aspect, rarely extending their analysis to the external 
Internet.282 What remains little known is how Chinese Internet companies, in all the three 
different but interpenetrating cyber domains – network equipment, operation, services and 
applications – have interacted with various state entities in their route to global cyberspace. What 
causes have motivated their overseas expansion? What have been the major strategies and routes 
for each of these three segments to strike abroad, respectively? Do they exhibit a unique reliance 
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on and closeness to the Chinese state? To what extent may the Chinese state set the parameters 
of ownership and behavior in these three market segments? And how important are these 
companies in the global digital political economy?  
While the interactions between China and global cyberspace have been both diverse and 
extensive since the late 1980s – as we saw in Chapter 1 – this chapter highlights one of the most 
crucial aspects of this relationship: outward capital projection from China-based Internet 
companies. Recent Internet OFDI is analyzed at two levels: at the aggregate level using the 
official data provided by the Chinese Ministry of Commerce and at the firm and sector level 
based on the data compiled by the American Enterprise Institute-Heritage Foundation.  
This chapter is organized as following: The first section briefly reviews the historical 
evolution of China’s “going out” policies and the changing landscape of China’s outward FDI, in 
which the Internet sector has gained increasing importance in recent years. The second section 
delineates the institutional structure and state strategies that impact China’s Internet capital 
projection. The third section, rely on firm-level data, further disaggregates the Internet industry 
to three subsectors. It looks at how different units of capital in network equipment, operation, 
and services and applications sectors, have interacted with state institutions in different ways to 
carry out their global objectives as well as how the Chinese state, through different policy 
mechanisms, has exercised various degree of control over these Internet firms.  
This chapter concludes by presenting a more nuanced picture of China’s “going out” in 
global cyberspace: Neither the label of “China Inc.” nor the characterization of “state capitalism” 
accurately captures the complex interactions between the state and capital in this historical 
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process.283 Instead, the theoretical framework presented in the Introduction suggests that this 
state-capital relation is best understood as a constantly changing and highly complicated 
dynamics between the territorial logic of the state and the expansive logic of capitalist 
accumulation.284  On the one hand, the Chinese state, as a territorially defined entity, aims to 
retain its control over China’s homegrown Internet companies and to keep them in line with the 
state’s developmental and diplomatic agenda. On the other hand, Chinese Internet companies, 
propelled by the borderless logic of capital accumulation, have coordinated an increasingly 
powerful and expansive transnational capital network with an overarching aim of profit-
maximization. As will be manifested in China’s Internet OFDI projects, state objectives and 
business initiatives sometimes collaborate, but are often in tension with each other. Moreover, 
not only is there a tension between the state and capital, but the state itself is constrained by 
internal fragmentation and contradiction, while different units of Chinese Internet capital 
compete ruthlessly with each other in the global digital market. Under certain circumstances, 
they might collaborate with foreign companies against the state’s agenda.  
Indeed, one perplexing questions is, in what ways are these Internet corporations 
“Chinese” – since most, if not all of them, are jointly funded by transnational capital?  As we 
saw in Chapter 1, foreign ownership controlled by transnational capital – through the VIE 
arrangement – has been prevalent in China’s web services and applications sector. However, it 
might be premature to conclude that the state has lost its control. By looking closely at individual 
OFDI projects on the firm level, this chapter demonstrates that through various regulatory 
mechanisms, the jurisdictions and rules of the Chinese state still hold considerable impact on 
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many units of China’s Internet capital in their own profit strategies, even when they have worked 
their way into the global scene. This influential role of the Chinese state, however, should not be 
overestimated, as the rising power of Chinese Internet corporations have continued to push the 
capitalist logic of accumulation into the forefront of China’s “going out” process.  
 
Methods and Data 
To explore the global expansion of China’s Internet industry as part of the wide process 
of Chinese outward capital investment, this chapter utilizes two types of datasets.285   
The first is aggregate data of China’s outbound FDI complied by China’s Ministry of 
Commerce (MOFCOM).286 This official statistical compilation, from a macro level, offers a 
valuable perspective to look at the historical and structural trends of China’s outward capital 
projection. However, it has several problems, especially with regard to studying the Internet 
industry. First, MOFCOM’s data are based on officially registered investments that exceed a 
certain capital floor. This means a large number of small-scale investments will not be 
documented. Second, frequent reclassification of industrial sectors in MOFCOM’s data makes it 
hard to study the industrial breakdown of China’s OFDI on a disaggregated level.287 Moreover, 
the “Internet industry,” as defined in this study, is not specified in MOFCOM’s statistics. Finally, 
the third problem relates to Chinese capital that goes to overseas financial centers and tax havens. 
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It is reported that in 2014, Hong Kong, the Cayman Islands, the British Virgin Islands and 
Luxemburg, collectively received almost 70 percent of China’s outbound FDI.288 It is possible 
that companies might inject capital into these overseas financial center and tax havens via the 
establishment of special purpose vehicles, then bring them back in China in order to receive 
preferential financial treatment and other policy benefits – a widespread practice called “round-
tripping”. Indeed, before the promulgation of the 2008 Enterprise Income Tax Law, foreign-
investment enterprises received preferential tax breaks in China as they were taxed at only 11 
percent, compared with domestic firms’ 23 percent tax rate.289 Scholars also report that around 
2008, in anticipation and after the announcement of the Enterprise Income Tax Law, China’s 
FDI to Cayman Islands and Hong Kong dropped significantly.290 Given that VIE structures, 
which often involve using special purpose vehicles in overseas financial centers to redirect 
capital projection, are extremely popular among Chinese web firms, such practices of “round-
tripping” may have significant impact for documenting the outward FDI of China’s Internet 
sector. Indeed, VIE structure can be viewed as “a variation of the round-trip investment 
model”.291 With those caveats in mind, however, it is still possible to use such aggregate data to 
identify some major historical trends and characteristics of China’s outward FDI, which sets the 
background for the discussion on China’s Internet industry.  
To move the analysis to a micro level, this chapter also employs a firm-level database – 
the “China Global Investment Tracker” (2005-2015) complied by the American Enterprise 
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Institute-Heritage Foundation.292 This dataset documents individual transactions of more than 
$100 million in China’s global investment – both successful and troubled (including both failed 
and incomplete ones), and includes information on transaction parties, capital amount, share size 
and mode of entry (greenfield investments or mergers and acquisitions). It has been proven to be 
useful to other scholars in analyzing the Chinese case.293 The database starts from 2005, when 
China’s outward capital flow in general, and the Internet OFDI in particular, started to take off, 
after the state implemented the “going out” policy.294  
Drawing on this dataset, and supplemented by knowledge gained from news reports and 
companies’ annual reports, I have further complied an individual transaction dataset that 
specifically focuses on China’s Internet industry. Investors in the dataset were categorized 
according to the three subsectors of China’s Internet industry: Equipment, operation, and 
services and applications. Investors whose core businesses are not Internet but nevertheless inject 
capital into the Internet sector are categorized as “others” and discussed at the end of this chapter. 
The finalized firm-level dataset includes 102 deals, of which 10 were troubled (see appendix A). 
It helps provide investment projects as examples for illustration and allow an examination of the 
actual investment activities made by Chinese Internet companies in global cyberspace. 
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The Turn to “Going Out” and China’s Internet industry  
Although Chinese firms’ overseas adventures can be dated back to the late 1970s, 
China’s outbound FDI in general remained trivial at this early stage, especially compared with 
the massive foreign capital poured into the country.295 In the 1990s, China brought in an average 
of more than 7 percent of world total FDI annually, while only projected around 0.6 percent 
outward.296 Foreign exchange and capital shortage, as well as worries over illegal outward 
capital flight and loss of control of state assets in a volatile global capital market, which was 
intensified by the 1997 Asian financial crisis, jointly contributed to this phenomenon. Overall, 
throughout the 1990s, China’s “open door” policy consistently focused on the “attracting in” 
facet, while its policy and institutional support for outward investment remained “eclectic, ad 
hoc, and even half-hearted”.297 Indeed, before 2003, private owned enterprises were officially 
banned from investing overseas. 
This situation began to change in the late 1990s. After two decades of export-oriented 
economic development – as the “world’s factory” – China had accumulated a growing foreign 
exchange reserve: from $0.8 billion in 1979 to $139.9 billion in 1997.298 Meanwhile, rising 
demand for natural resources, domestic market saturation and under consumption, and the need 
for industrial upgrading became urgent problems for China’s future development. The upcoming 
WTO deal also made Chinese leaders realize that they need a group of globally competitive 
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Chinese corporations to join the anticipated fierce competition both in and outside China.299 
Indeed, China’s outward FDI policy is in part an aspect of this large domestic economic 
structural restructuring. As stated in the 2006 State Council’s Opinions on Encouraging and 
Guiding Foreign Investment and Cooperation by Chinese Enterprises, one objective of China’s 
OFDI strategies is to “facilitate the structural adjustment of the economy”.300 
Accordingly, a noticeable change started to occur in China’s policy discourse, in which 
the top leadership openly advocated for an institutional environment that encourages firms to go 
out. In 1996, after his visit to six African countries, Jiang Zemin first introduced the term “going 
out,” encouraging SOEs to expand into developing countries. 1997, he raised the term to the 
same level as “attracting in,” claiming that the former was complementary to the latter, both of 
that were inseparable aspects of the “open door” policy.301 This ‘‘going out” (zouchuqu, ) 
initiative, was then officially endorsed in the 10th Five Year Plan (2001-2005), and reiterated in 
all the Five Year Plans thereafter – including the 11th (2006-2010), the 12th (2011-2015) and the 
most recent one, the 13th (2016-2020) under the current Xi-Li administration.302 Based on this 
national strategy, a series of institutional restructurings have been introduced and the regulatory 
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framework for outward capital investment has also shifted “from restricting to facilitating to 
supporting to encouraging”. 303  
Two major institutional changes marked the evolution of this OFDI friendly initiative. 
The first one in 2004, came when the State Council issued a "Decision on reforming the 
investment management system,” officially regularizing its FDI authorization system. Two 
approving state bodies – the MOFCOM and NDRC – were identified, with each issuing follow-
up documents to clarify their respective roles in the system. The two agencies also delegated part 
of their authorization power to the local level, further decentralizing the approval process.  
Another significant deregulation of China’s FDI regime has been undertaken under the 
current leadership. In 2013, the State Council issued the “Catalogue of Investment Projects 
Subject to Governmental Verifications (2013),” substantially reducing the powers of the NDRC 
and MOFCOM and making “record-filing” – instead of “approval” – as the primary measure for 
China’s outward FDI. In 2014, the State Council also announced its plan to entirely eliminate 
OFDI approvals in the next a few years. In light of this policy shift, both the NDRC and 
MOFCOM issued similar orders to further relax the regulatory regime, under which only a small 
number of overseas projects would need approval. All others need only be filed for record. It is 
reported that in 2013, only 2% of China’s outward FDI projects needed approval from the 
government.304 
This turn to “going out” can be observed from the aggregated data from the MOFCOM 
(see Figure 3.1). China’s outward FDI started to take off in the early 2000s. Animated by the 
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RMB 4 trillion (US $586 billion) stimulus package installed by the state, it more than doubled in 
the global financial crisis during 2007-2008, when foreign assets became considerably cheaper. 
The significant appreciation of the Chinese currency Yuan since 2005 – at an average annual rate 
of 20% – also further decreased the price of foreign acquisition and therefore contributed to this 
growth.305 The rising trend continued through the date of this writing. The main sources of these 
investments came, as might be expected, from companies based in the wealthier areas such as 
Shanghai, Zhejiang, and Guangdong. The MOFCOM reports that in 2014, non-financial OFDI 
flow from east coastal provinces accounted for 81.8% of all the investment from local companies 
that are not controlled by the central government.306 
 
 
Figure 3.1: China's Outward FDI 2000-2015 (USD billions).  
 
Source: MOFCOM, Statistical Bulletin of China's Outward Foreign Direct Investment, various years.  
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Accompanying this spectacular growth of China’s outward capital flow has been an 
equally impressive rise of China’s Internet industry. As Hong Yu shows, an ICT-based 
developmental strategy of “informatization” has been instrumental in China’s global rise and 
domestic transformation in the past three decades.307 In the 1980-1990s, ICT manufacturing was 
considered as a “pillar industry” that spearheaded China’s FDI-driven, export-oriented, and 
labor-intensive development. In the 2000s, network connectivity and online applications started 
to gain prominence and have been accorded a new role in propelling China’s post-2008 
restructuring toward an innovation and consumption-based economy, i.e., both moving up the 
global production chain and transitioning to a more domestic-oriented economy. And as Chapter 
1 has shown, this consistent prioritization of ICTs, and later the Internet, in Chinese political 
economy – with various preferential policy treatments, including selective substitution initiatives, 
as well as substantial interactions with transnational capitalism – has cultivated a large and 
diversified Internet industry in China. If anything, the 2008 Global Financial Crisis, which put a 
stop sign on China’s low-tech, labor-intensive and export-oriented development model, has only 
amplified this sector’s importance in China’s domestic market. 
 China’s now-potent Internet industry, however, is not only critical for its domestic 
economic transformation. It has also become an important segment of, and a crucial vehicle for, 
corporate China’s outward expansion. On the one hand, as one of the two “rare poles of growth” 
of today’s crisis-ridden transnational capitalism, Internet companies have accumulated a large 
amount of money capital that in turn needs profitable outlets to reinvest. It is reported that in 
2013, China’s e-commerce giant Alibaba held $7 billion in cash reserves, social media and 
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129 
online gaming company Tencent has $5 billion, and telecom vendor Huawei $13 billion.308 In 
other words, China’s Internet companies have become capable of substantial investment 
themselves. On the other hand, when Internet companies go abroad, instead of bringing in 
natural resources or circumventing trade barriers – two important motives for China’s early 
OFDI projects 309 – they bring in advanced technologies, expand digital networks, and develop 
marketing channels that might be helpful for other Chinese companies when they venture out. 
All these potential impacts are perceived as critical for China’s economic transformation.  
The newly minted “Internet Plus” strategy illustrates this dual role of the Internet industry 
in China’s political economy. In March 2015, Premier Li Keqiang announced that China has 
adopted an “Internet Plus” strategy, which not only plans to deepen links between the Internet 
and almost all the sectors of China’s domestic economy, but also commits the Government to 
active support for Chinese Internet companies as they expand their reach in global cyberspace.310 
A few months later, the State Council released the “Guiding Opinions on Actively Promoting the 
‘Internet Plus’ Action Plan,“ strongly advocated Chinese Internet firms to join traditional 
industries, such as manufacturing and finance, in their overseas expansion. It also encouraged 
those firms to build globally competitive application platforms to offer Internet service such as 
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cloud computing and big data analysis, to both Chinese and global businesses.311 Moreover, the 
Internet sector also held a critical role in China’s recent “One Belt, One Road” strategy. In a 
speech given at China-Arab State Expo, Lu Wei, China’s director of the State Internet 
Information Office (SIIO) and the Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC), proposed an 
“Online Silk Road” of cross-border e-commerce between China and Arab countries that would 
be equipped with new IT technologies (e.g., cloud computing and big data) from Chinese 
Internet companies. As he said, “connectivity is the key to ‘One Belt One Road,’ and 
connectivity to the Internet is the top priority”.312 
The growing importance of the Internet sector for China’s “going out” strategies may be 
observed from the changes in China’s outward FDI distribution. Indeed, in recent years there has 
been a sectoral shift from the previous high concentration in trade and resource-intensive 
industry toward a more technology-intensive focus.313 Aggregate data from MOFCOM, though 
incomplete, offers a glimpse of this trend. From 2004 to 2010, the annual outward FDI flows in 
the category “Information Transmission, Computer Service and Software” rose from $31 million 
to $506 million. In 2014, this number reached $3.17 billion, a significant increase of 126.4% 
from 2013.314 For example, a quick look into the firm-level dataset confirmed that this year, the 
BATs have all completed large-scale overseas acquisitions: Tencent spent $500 million in 
exchange for a 28 percent share of South Korea’s CJ Games, Baidu poured out $600 million in 
taxi-hauling company Uber, and Alibaba invested $220 million into US social media company 
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TangoMe. Although the absolute magnitude of this category remains small – possible reasons 
include that the transaction numbers in mining and energy are usually larger and MOFCOM 
classifies network equipment into the manufacturing sector – it nevertheless constitutes the 
fastest growing sector in China’s now expansive OFDI landscape, compared to mining ($16.5 
billion, a yearly decrease of 33.3%) and construction ($3.4 billion, a yearly decrease of 22%).315 
A report from global Intelligence and consulting company Stratfor estimated that in 2014, more 
than half of China’s FDI to the US are in the ICT industry.316 
Firm level data, calculated based on “China Global Investment Tracker,” further 
illustrates this trend (see Table 3.1). From 2005 to 2015, the number of large OFDI deals – 
meaning the transaction value is over $100 million – attempted by Chinese Internet companies 
has increased significantly – from 1 deal in 2005 to 21 deals in 2015. Moreover, the sub-sectoral 
distribution has also expanded – starting from the network equipment sector to all the three 
subsectors. Finally, both the equipment sector and the services and applications sector saw a 
strong growth after the 2008 economic downturn.  
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Table 3.1: Numbers of OFDI deals attempted by China’s Internet companies (2005-2015) 
Year 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Equipment 1 1 2 1 4 4 5 6 8 5 10 
Operation 0 0 2 0 2 0 1 0 0 2 2 
Services & 
Applications 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 1 2 7 9 
Troubled 0 1 0 3 0 3 0 0 1 1 1 
Total 1 2 4 4 6 9 7 7 11 15 22 
 
Source: The author, based on “China Global Investment Tracker” (2005-2015) complied by American 
Enterprise Institute-Heritage Foundation.  
Note: Only deals over $100 million are included in the database. 
 
 
 
China’s Internet OFDI Regime: Fragmentation and Contradiction 
The changing landscape of China’s OFDI has been shaped by both state polices and 
capital initiatives. The role of the state, however, has been regarded as the most significant factor 
for the overseas propulsion of China’s corporations.317 As Huang Yasheng argues: “The fact that 
Chinese OFDI increased over ten-fold within a short five-year span (2005–10) is prima facie 
evidence that the Chinese OFDI flows are driven or at least induced by policies or policy 
changes”.318  For all this, however, it is probably still misleading to portray this oversized role of 
the state in China’s OFDI as a case of “state capitalism”. In other words, the territorial logic of 
the state itself is not unified. As I will demonstrate below, although the state retains some critical 
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maneuvering powers over China’s OFDI activities, its regulatory regime is rather fragmented. 
The complexity and expansive nature of the Internet sector, as discussed in this study, further 
contributes to this fragmentation and contradiction.  
In general, the bureaucracies that regulate China’s Internet OFDI can be divided into 
three groups: First, the core OFDI authorities that have approving or reviewing power over an 
OFDI project; Second, the supporting agencies that don’t hold direct power but nevertheless 
impact China’s OFDI activities; and third, the Internet regulatory system that governs China’s 
Internet sector and therefore retains considerable sway over these companies’ overseas 
undertakings (see figure 3.2).  
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Figure 3.2: China's Internet OFDI regime.  
Note: The abbreviations used in this figure are MIIT (Ministry of Industry and Information Technology), 
SIIO (State Internet Information Office), CAC (Cyberspace Administration of China), PLA (People’s 
Liberation Army), NDRC (National Development and Reform Commission), MOFCOM (Ministry of 
Commerce), SASAC (State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration), SAFE (State Administration 
of Foreign Exchange), MOF (Ministry of Finance), MFA (Ministry of Foreign Affairs), CDB (China 
Development Bank), Exim (China Export-Import Bank).  
 
First, the state agencies that have direct power – meaning that they have approving or 
reviewing authority over an OFDI project – include the State Council, the Ministry of Commerce 
(MOFCOM), the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), the State 
Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE), and the State-owned Assets Supervision and 
Administration (SASAC).  
The State Council, at the top of the power hierarchy, is responsible for formulating 
China’s OFDI polices. Under the current regime, companies, including Internet companies, that 
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wish to invest more than $2 billion into sensitive countries or regions (e.g., countries or regions 
that are politically unstable or do not have diplomatic ties with China), or sensitive industries 
(e.g. basic telecommunications service or news media), would need an approval from the State 
Council. Under the State Council, there are two parallel approving ministries: the NDRC and 
MOFCOM. Central NDRC’s approval is needed when investment exceeds $1 billion or project 
involves sensitive countries, or regions, or industries. Others only need to be either filed with the 
central NDRC or provincial-level NDRC. Besides the NDRC, OFDI projects also need to go 
through the MOFCOM. The existing system requires projects in sensitive countries, or regions, 
or industries to be approved by the MOFCOM, regardless of deal size. Others only need to be 
filed. Moreover, after going through both the NDRC and MOFCOM and before transferring 
foreign currency outbound, companies need to submit their proposals to the SAFE – the agency 
that manages China’s foreign exchange market – for a review. Finally, SASAC, which owns 
many large State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs), including three network operators – China 
Telecom, Unicom, and Mobile, also has the power to decide whether or which OFDI projects are 
allowed to be pursued among SOEs.  
Second, aside from those core authorities, there are other supporting agencies that have 
impact on China’s Internet OFDI. On the diplomatic side, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), 
which supervises China’s foreign policies, and the Ministry of Finance (MOF), which is 
involved in negotiating China’s international tariff and taxation agreements, also offer various 
supports for corporate China’s “going out”. Indeed, China has long been an active member in 
signing bilateral and regional investment treaties as well as Free Trade Agreements along its 
“opening up” process. These agreements have become even more important for the state as its 
policy focus started to shift to “going out,” since these agreements and treaties now also serve 
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the purpose of protecting the interests of Chinese capital – making sure that they receive 
preferential treatments in other countries.319 According to UNCTAD, as of 1 June 2016, China 
has signed in total 129 Bilateral Investment Treaties with different countries in the world. It is 
currently ranked 2rd in the world, only after Germany, which has signed 135 Bilateral 
Investment Treaties.320 As trade agreement established between two countries to facilitate capital 
investment both from state agencies and private companies, those treaties hold profound 
importance for China’s Internet OFDI.  Data from MOFCOM also show that China is currently a 
signatory to 13 Free Trade Agreements, including ones with Switzerland and Australia.321 The 
“One Belt One Road” initiative under the current leadership is expected to create more room and 
opportunities to for companies to go out, including Internet companies.  
On the economic side, two major policy banks – the China Development Bank (CDB) 
and the China Export-Import Bank (Exim) – provide financial incentives along with the “going 
out” initiatives. These economic supports are often a mixture of different means of financial 
instruments, including foreign aid program like concessional loans as well as strategic line of 
credit like export seller’s/buyer’s credit.322  
Concessional loans are part of China’s foreign aid program that offers low-interest loans 
to underdeveloped countries. Operating as an agreement between the Chinese state (through the 
MOFCOM) and the foreign government, this program has funded many countries in building 
their backbone infrastructure that they otherwise would not be able to afford. It has benefited 
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Chinese network companies, too, as the loan often requires foreign governments and their state-
owned operators to use Chinese products and service. For example, in 2006, Huawei successfully 
secured a concessional loan of around $16.6 million from China Exim bank in its project with 
Sierra Leone’s state-owned telecommunications company, to develop a wireless communication 
system in this West African country.323  
Besides foreign aid loans, both the CDB and China Exim bank offer strategic lines of 
credit to support China’s national champions’ global expansion, such as export seller’s/buyer’s 
credit. Unlike foreign aid programs that function between two governments, this type of credit 
allows foreign companies to borrow money from Chinese banks to buy products and service 
from Chinese companies, and then either repay to the lending banks (export buyer’s credit) or to 
Chinese companies (export seller’s credit). Such strong financial backing from Chinese policy 
banks, in addition to their highly competitive price, has helped Chinese gear suppliers, notably, 
Huawei and ZTE, successfully gain a toehold in many rapidly developing Internet markets. For 
example, in 2006, with $15 billion line of credit from the CDB, ZTE secured a contract from 
Ethiopia Telecom to build the country’s Millennium Telecoms project, including 
2259 kilometers of fiber-optic cable to cover 13 major cities.324  
Finally, the third group of state agencies that retains substantial sway over China’s 
Internet OFDI is the country’s Internet governance regulators. As discussed in Chapter 2, due to 
the expansive nature of the Internet sector in China’s political economy, this regulatory apparatus 
is extremely complex: On the economic level, MIIT, the industry regulator, manages China’s 
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Internet sector in general, and therefore has certain power over these companies’ global 
strategies. On the political front, the newly established SIIO/CAC, besides regulating domestic 
Internet content, also holds responsibility for China’s global Internet diplomacy. Furthermore, 
the military departments, led by PLA, exercise considerable influence over some of the 
companies that are considered as “military enterprises,” such as China Electronic Technology 
Corporation and China Aerospace Science and Technology. Finally, the current Central Leading 
Group for Internet Security and Informatization, a tripartite Party-State-Military endeavor led by 
President Xi Jinping, sitting at the top of China’s Internet governance system, aims to smooth out 
some long-standing power struggles and turf wars among different state bodies vying for 
influence by coordinating policy in the existing system. The impact of this new Leading Group, 
however, remains to be seen.  
Offering substantial support, this expansive and complex institutional apparatus, however, 
also creates considerable conflicts and contradictions for China’s Internet OFDI. 
First, as previous literature on China’s OFDI has pointed out, significant simplification 
and streamlining notwithstanding, the current system remains fragmented. On the one hand, 
China’s OFDI system lacks overall policy coordination: there is no specific state body or law 
that oversees the entire regulatory regime, which may result in uncoordinated government 
actions.325 On the other hand, there is no clear division of labor between the NDRC and the 
MOFCOM – the two parallel ministerial-level agencies that both hold approving authority of 
China’s OFDI projects, which also creates ambiguities in the system.326  Since China’s Internet 
companies, like other Chinese corporations, need to go through this regulatory system before 
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projecting capital outward, all these fragmentations and ambiguities of the exiting OFDI 
framework affect China’s Internet industry by slowing actions or creating opportunities for 
corruption and rent seeking.  
Second, the role of the SASAC in China’s political economy in general, and its OFDI 
system in particular, remains self-contradictory. As the major shareholder that represents the 
state in many large SOEs, the SASAC carries both the political objective of regulating these 
companies and keeping them in line with China’s international agenda as well as the economic 
objective of profit-maximization. This dual task creates sharp conflicts, especially when the 
performance of the SASAC has been increasingly tied up with the profitability of its subsidiary 
SOEs.327 Sometimes, profits of the SOEs are pursued at the expense of China’s strategic and 
diplomatic agenda. For example, in Africa, the profit-seeking activities of China’s SOEs have 
created issues of environment pollution and labor exploitation, which then resulted in local 
protests, seriously damaging China’s international reputation and diplomatic relationship with 
host countries.328 Since all the three network operators, and other large Internet SOEs, come 
under the purview of the SASAC, this self-contradiction is also played out in China’s Internet 
sector, as I will demonstrate in the following discussion. 
Third, as discussed in Chapter 2, intra-state power struggles as well as center-local 
tensions have long characterized China’s Internet policymaking, which adds further complexity 
to its Internet firms’ OFDI activities. A prominent indicator of this persistent internal 
bureaucratic division is the continuous need of the central government to create a series of 
Leading Groups to coordinate and centralize its regulatory regime. Moreover, various 
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government agencies, with their diverse functions and varied interests in China’s digital 
economy, might choose to pursue their own interests, through Internet companies’ outward 
expansion. As aforementioned, as the main industry regulator, the MIIT prioritizes the economic 
development of the Internet industry. This priority, which probably in many cases aligns with the 
Internet companies’ global ambitions, however, is not always in line with the strategic 
consideration of the military departments to maintain China’s “Internet security”. Furthermore, 
China’s long-standing center-local tensions have also played out in the game as local 
governments, representing their respective Internet companies – often the largest taxpayer and 
employer – are competing for resources and policy preferences in the central government. 
In sum, this sector delineates the regulatory framework that governs China’s Internet 
companies’ outward capital projection. This regulatory framework – as a manifestation of the 
territorial logic of the Chinese state – however, is not monolithic. Notwithstanding the 
continuing efforts of the state to promote the “going out” of its Internet sector, the fragmented 
and contradictory nature of this bureaucratic apparatus is set to limit the capacity of the capital to 
some extent. To what extent does the state still hold power over China’s Internet companies 
when those companies have increasingly become transnational in nature? Building on a detailed 
analysis of firm-level OFDI projects, the next section looks at this issue on a subsector-by-
subsector basis.  
 
China’s Internet Industry “Goes Out” 
A brief overview of the firm-level dataset gives us a general idea of the outward 
expansion of China’s Internet sector: From 2005 to 2015, Chinese Internet companies – across 
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all the three subsectors – initiated a total of 88 outbound FDI projects that had a value of $100 
million or more, of which 10 were troubled. Those OFDI deals – with a medium value around 
$300 million – were widely distributed geographically, in both the Global South and Global 
North – 34 in Asia (16 in West Asia and 17 in East Asia), 22 in North America (20 in USA), 14 
in Europe, 12 in Africa, five in Latin America, and one in Australia.  They have also been widely 
diversified – 55 in the equipment sector, 11 in the operation sector, and 22 in the services and 
applications sector (see Appendix A). Indeed, Chinese Internet companies have become active 
investors across global cyberspace. 
 
Equipment manufacturers 
Among all the three subsectors, network equipment manufacturers have so far played a 
leading role in the “going out” of China’s Internet industry. The data shows that from 2005 to 
2015, China’s equipment-makers initiated a total of 55 large OFDI deals; among them, eight 
went failed. Geographically, these projects were widely distributed. In the Global South, Chinese 
network equipment-makers started their global expansion by participating in national 
infrastructure projects, sometimes with substantial financial support from the Chinese state. The 
aforementioned ZTE’s project in Ethiopia is an example in this regard. They also moved into the 
Global North by collaborating or purchasing companies with strong sales networks or brand 
names. China’s computer maker, Lenovo’s 2005 acquisition of IBM’s PC division – a $1.75 
billion deal, as well as its 2014 purchase of Motorola Mobility from Google – a $2.91 billion 
deal, offer good examples in this area. Finally, those Chinese vendors also invested in 
transnational telecommunications operators to establish cooperative relationships. For example, 
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Huawei invested $180 million to Telenor of Norway in 2009 and another $970 million in 
Vodafone Italia in 2010. Such	capital projections have helped Chinese firms to gain a toehold in 
overseas telecommunications markets.  
In terms of sectional distribution, although the majority of these OFDI projects were still 
in the hardware manufacturing or network operations sector, some companies have also moved 
into other realms to improve their core businesses or to look for other investment outlets. For 
example, to improve power consumption in network base-stations, equipment manufacturers 
have made strategical investments into the renewable energy sector. In November 2015, ZTE 
invested $200 million in Zimbabwe Power to develop solar farms in this African country. Others, 
through their related private equity funds,329 have started to project capital into non-Internet 
related areas in order to diversify their assets and look for other profitable projects. Legend 
Holdings, the parent company of China’s computer vendors Lenovo, offers an interesting case. 
In 2014, Legend Holding, through its private equity arm, Holy Capital, brought British restaurant 
chain PizzaExpress for $1.54 billion. In 2015, it spent another $490 million to acquire 8% of 
Santos, an Australian Energy company.  
Finally, with all the geographical and sectoral diversifications in mind, Huawei, ZTE and 
Lenovo have evidently emerged as the “dragonheads” in this sector’s outward movement: 
Among all the 54 deals, Huawei were involved in 26 of them, ZTE 12 and Lenovo 8.  
Chinese equipment makers spearheaded the outward expansion of the Chinese Internet. 
As Chapter 1 has demonstrated, domestic market saturation and foreign domination, resulting 
from the inward FDI-driven developmental model in the 1980s and 1990s, have largely propelled 
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many Chinese network gear suppliers to turn to overseas markets for development. For example, 
in the late 1990s and before the state’s “going out” initiative, Huawei already got its first 
overseas contract From a Hong Kong company and extended its international business to 
Russia.330 State support, however, has also played an important role in those companies’ 
globalization strategies, mainly through financial support and diplomatic assistance.  
On the one hand, Chinese networking gear providers have received significant financial 
support from China’s policy banks. In 2004 and 2009, Huawei were granted a $10 billion and a 
$30 billion line of credit by China’s Development Bank, respectively. ZTE, in 2009 alone, 
received $10 billion credit line from China Exim bank and $15 billion from China’s 
Development Bank; the latter increased ZTE’s credit line to $20 billion in 2012.331 Apart from 
those strategic credits, another common practice of the Chinese state is to utilize policy funds 
and foreign aid programs to support its “national champions”. For example, in 2010, China and 
Nigeria reached a $900 million concessional loan agreement for basic infrastructure building. 
Nigeria’s government, in turn, awarded ZTE a $400 million contract to build its Public Safety 
Communication System.332 
On the other hand, the Chinese state has also offered considerable diplomatic assistance 
in the internationalization of its equipment-makers. As Yun Wen shows, Huawei’s entry into 
Russia and later into Africa has significantly benefited from the state’s diplomatic efforts, such 
as the establishment of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation in 2000, and therefore closely 
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“followed the state’s diplomatic trajectories”.333 The Chinese state has also hoped that the 
international operation of these Chinese vendors would reciprocally reinforce its diplomatic 
relationship with host countries and enhance its international status. Sometimes, those vendors’ 
overseas projects have even been elevated as a manifestation of Chinese foreign policy. For 
example, in 2011, during his visit to Ethiopia, China’s then propaganda officer Liu Yunshan 
visited ZTE’s local branch and openly praised the company’s Ethiopian network infrastructure 
project as “a model of Sino-Africa cooperation”.334 
This close and highly complex relationship between the state and Chinese network gear 
suppliers in their outward expansion, however, should not be oversimplified.  
First, although government credit has certainly helped China’s companies gain a foothold 
in the international market, the real impact of these credit lines still requires careful evaluation. 
In 2011, facing charge of unfair competition and government support from Fred Hockber, the 
Chairman of US Exim bank,335 Huawei pointed out that government credit had played a limited 
role in its business operation. Although China Exim bank had granted a total $40 billion credit 
line (mainly in the form of exporter’s credit) to Huawei, only a small portion of that credit – 
$2.99 billion – was actually used, while during the same time period, the company had made a 
far more substantial $110 billion in its revenue.336  
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Second, due to the fact that foreign markets have become an important part of some of 
the leading firms in this sector – indeed, in 2008, Huawei’s overseas revenues accounted for a 
historical high of 75% of its total revenue,337 to what extent the Chinese state still exercises 
control over its “national champions” has become a vexing question. In certain cases, Chinese 
vendors, under the logic of capital accumulation, have chosen to distance themselves from the 
state’s agenda. For example, when the state determined to promote China’s indigenous third 
generation (3G) networking standard – TD-SCDMA, leading Chinese vendors such as Huawei 
and ZTE only offered limited support. Instead, they prioritized the application of European-
backed WCDMA and the US-backed CDMA 2000 standards in their global development, since 
those non-Chinese 3G standard enjoyed wider global market penetration.338 
Moreover, when facing obstacles in entering lucrative markets in the Global North, 
Chinese firms have aligned themselves with the structure of global neoliberal capitalism. 
Huawei’s arduous journey in the United States is illustrative of this conflict zone. According to 
the data, from 2005 to 2015, eight OFDI deals in the network equipment sector were troubled, of 
which six were targeted to the US market. In particular, Huawei, has been repeatedly forced by 
the US government to drop its investments in several US equipment manufacturers and network 
operators, including its investment in 3Com in 2008, and in 2Wire, Motorola and Sprint in 2010. 
The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) rejected those deals based 
on national security grounds. Entrenched players in the US market, notably, Cisco, have also 
lobbied aggressively to protect their home fronts. To counter these accusations, Huawei has 
adopted Western rules of game playing: It hired a group of high-level executives from 
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transnational corporations (e.g., Cisco and Ericsson), involved in extensive lobbying activities in 
Washington, and eventually, opened all its source code to the US government.339 Those practices, 
however, seemed to have little effect; in 2012, a House intelligence committee report warned that 
both Huawei and ZTE, with their opaque ties with the Chinese state, posed a national security 
threat to the US.340 In 2013, just 2.2% of Huawei revenue came from the US, the largest Telecom 
market in the world.341 Since then, along with its rapidly expanding handsets arm, Huawei 
seemed to have rearranged its US strategy by shifting its focus to the less security-concerned 
consumer market. In 2015, Huawei announced a strategic partnership with Google to 
manufacture the Google Nexus 6P Smartphone.342 
Finally, the fierce global competition among major players in this sector has further 
undercut the idea of a monolithic "China, Inc.". It is well known that Huawei and ZTE are sworn 
rivals in African telecommunications markets, as bloody price wars have become common 
practices between the two firms. It is reported that when Huawei first entered into the African 
market, its bidding price was 5%-15% lower than that of Ericsson and Nokia Siemens, which 
helped the company win significant market share from those well-entrenched Western players; 
however, when ZTE came in, it offered an even more aggressive price that was 30%-40% lower 
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and snatched part of the market share from Huawei.343 The increasingly overlapping markets and 
similar low-price strategies of the two firms reached a highly conflicting point in 2011: In March 
2011, Huawei filed lawsuits in Germany, France and Hungary, accusing ZTE for patent 
infringements; ZTE, in response, filed similar cases against Huawei in China. The battle was so 
intense that China’s MIIT, as the industry regulator, eventually stepped in and arranged talks 
with executives from both firms, but achieved limited results.344 
By the end of 2015, a number of globally competitive firms had emerged from China’s 
network hardware manufacturing sector: Since 2012, Huawei has replaced Ericsson as the 
world’s largest network equipment suppliers in terms of revenue. ZTE has also pushed its way 
into the top league. The 2016 Fortune Global 500, based on revenue, ranked Huawei as 129 on 
its list, Lenovo as 202, China Electronics Corporation as 329, and China Electronics Technology 
Group as 408.345 Furthermore, some leading Chinese firms have enjoyed a high degree of 
transnationality. In 2015, revenue generated outside China accounted for 58% for Huawei, 47% 
for ZTE and 68% for Lenovo, respectively.346 However, with the ongoing economic downturn in 
the US and European markets and the implementation of a series of Internet-centered 
developmental strategies under the Xi-Li administration, domestic market still remains as a 
critical growth engine for those Chinese vendors – in 2015, while the global equipment market 
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saw a weak annual increase of 0.5%, the Chinese market still enjoyed an increase of 4.6%.347 
Moreover, when facing the territorial power of other states in their global routes, Chinese firms 
might still turn to their home country for help. When the CFIUS forced Huawei to drop its OFDI 
projects, China’s MOFCOM intervened and expressed diplomatic regret to the US government. 
Domestic media also called on the state to “show the sword” to foreign states and companies in 
order to “not let Huawei fight all by itself”.348 In 2011, China established its Security Review 
System on Mergers and Acquisitions of Domestic Enterprises by Foreign Investors – a Chinese 
version of the CFIUS, which was largely believed to be a reaction to previous US interventions 
into Huawei’s deals.349 The real impact of this relatively new regulation, however, remained to 
be seen.350  
In sum, it is true that some of the leading Chinese Internet equipment manufacturers have 
become genuinely “transnational” in terms of business scope and profit strategies. However, 
China’s growing domestic Internet market that is controlled tightly by state-owned carriers, as 
well as the diplomatic and financial power of the Chinese government, still subject theses 
hardware makers to Chinese state power, at least to a limitepid extent.  
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Network operators  
Compared with the massive and wide-ranging OFDI projects in the equipment-
manufacturing sector, both the number and the range of the deals in China’s network operating 
sector have remained limited so far. The data show that from 2005 to 2015, China’s major 
operators – China Telecom, Unicom and Mobile – have initiated a total of 11 large OFDI deals, 
of which two were troubled. Geographically, the majority of these deals have targeted countries 
that either have strong diplomatic ties with China (e.g., Parkistan) or countries that have 
geographical proximity (e.g. Thailand and South Korea). Sectionally, those overseas acquisitions 
have so far still concentrated on the core business of network operation. In other words, Chinese 
operators haven’t started to diversify their business model in the global arena. Finally, China 
Mobile, as the world’s largest operator by subscribers, has become the flagship company in the 
global expansion of Chinese operators: Among all the 11 attempted deals, China Mobile had 
eight (two were failed), China Unicom had three, and China Telecom has not yet accomplished 
any large OFDI deal, despite the growing number of its overseas offices – it is reported by 2015, 
China Telecom has established foreign branches in 27 countries.351 
The “going out” of Chinese carriers started in the early 2000s. In anticipation of fierce 
post-WTO competition, the Chinese state restructured its basic telecommunications sector with 
the aim of cultivating a group of globally competitive corporations. To absorb foreign capital, it 
also allowed all the state-owned operators to adopt corporate structure reform and list part of 
their assets on foreign stock exchanges. The “plugging” of those network operators into 
transnational financial markets has resulted in an extremely high degree of involvement of 
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transnational financial institutions in the process, including investment banks such as Goldman 
Sachs and law and accountant firms like Linklaters & Paines.352 Despite this high degree of 
involvement, foreign equity investment, however, has been tightly regulated in this strategic area. 
By 2015, foreign investment remains under 10% in all three Chinese carriers, although the 
country’s WTO commitment promised that it would open up its operating sector up to 49%. 353 
Through the institutional setup of both the MIIT and SASAC, the state also retains its power of 
executive regulation and ownership control, as demonstrated in the 2004 reshuffle of the chief 
executives among the three companies. China’s network operators, therefore, have been 
transformed into state-owned enterprises with corporate structure. On the one hand, they carry 
the logic of capital accumulation, performing as corporate entities with a prominent goal of profit 
maximization and capitalist-expansion. On the other hand, they are tightly controlled by the state 
through both the industry regulator (the MIIT) and the ownership agency (the SASAC). 
Therefore, they are also obliged to undertake special political missions. This dual identity, which 
creates significant contradictions, has become prominent in their overseas expansion.  
China Mobile’s global route illustrates this dual identity. On the one hand, state supports 
and geopolitical considerations have certainly infused its global projects. For example, in 2007, 
China Mobile spend a total of $560 million in acquiring Paktel, the fifth largest mobile operator 
in Pakistan, and has since operated local networks under the “ZONG” brand. As the first 
successful OFDI project completed by China Mobile, Pakistan was not a random choice. Wang 
Jianzhou, the company’s former Chairman, was quoted in saying, “if we can’t do well in 
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Pakistan, we wouldn’t be able to do well in other places”.354  As one of China’s closest allies 
since the 1950s, China Mobile’s expansion into Parkistan has certainly taken into account the 
diplomatic assistance of the Chinese state; the establishment of a Chinese telecommunications 
brand in Parkistan, in turn, might also serve to boost the close connections between the two 
countries.  
Apart from geopolitical considerations, another prominent role played by Chinese 
operators in their journey abroad is to promote China-owned network standards. In the 2008 
restructuring, China Mobile, as the strongest among three, has been assigned by the MIIT as the 
single major carrier of China’s indigenous third generation (3G) networking standard – TD-
SCDMA, and subsequently, as one of the major carriers of the China-developed fourth 
generation (4G) TD-LTE standard. As discussed in previous chapters, technological standards 
matter for both political and economic reasons, as they not only constitute the foundation of the 
global network system but also play a major role in shaping related equipment industry. The 
outward expansion of China Mobile, therefore, also shoulders the political responsibility of 
promoting China’s homegrown standards. The company is well aware of this situation. Xi 
Guohua, China Mobile’s Chairman, in his proposal to the National People’s Congress, reportedly 
stated that China Mobile would actively promote the internationalization of TD-LTE; meanwhile, 
it will also use this opportunity to expand its own overseas territory.355 In October 2015, China 
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Mobile invested $280 million in South Korea’s KT to jointly fund a new network operator in 
Korea – with an aim to expand TD LTE to the local customer.356 
For all this, however, it might be misleading to consider political aims as the only logic 
that has driven China Mobile’s global expansion. Profit maximization, sometimes, plays a more 
decisive role. As aforementioned, the state strongly encourages Chinese Internet companies to 
work together in conquering foreign markets – a practice called “go global in groups” (Jituan 
Chuhai ǳ^ň). Operators’ overseas expansion, in particular, carries the aim of promoting 
the export of Chinese network products. To some extent, China Mobile has built part of its 
overseas network based on equipment provided by Chinese makers such as Huawei and ZTE. It 
has also, however, collaborated with foreign vendors. For example, in 2007, Alcatel-Lucent, 
Ericsson, ZTE and Huawei jointly shared a $500 million network expansion contract from China 
Mobile’s Parkistan subsidiary.357 Sometimes, instead of granting a contract to the members in its 
home team, China Mobile has chosen to let the vendors compete and has benefited from the 
price wars.358 Such practices, driven by the corporate rationale of profit maximization, have 
certainly decreased the company’s procurement expenditure; however, they have also weakened 
the state’s agenda of promoting a unified “Chinese team” in the global arena.  
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Thanks to China’s growing domestic market and its state’s protectionist policy, by the 
end of 2015, all the three network operators had grown into the top-tier telecommunications 
companies in the world. For example, the 2016 Fortune Global 500 ranks China Mobile as 45, 
China Telecom as 132 and China Unicom as 207 on its list.359 Their international presence, 
however, has so far been rather limited. China Telecom has not yet had any large overseas 
acquisitions. This pattern persisted for China Unicom, as two of its three large OFDI projects in 
the past ten years were minority equity investment into Spain’s Telefonica – 1% in 2009 and 1% 
in 2011. In contrast, Telefonica once held a 9.57% stake in China Unicom and recently decreased 
this number to 5.01% due to financial constraints.360 For China Mobile, the most powerful 
among the three, not only has Parkistan remained as the only overseas market, but by the middle 
of 2013, the company only possessed a market share of 15.7% in Parkistan.361 
But this trend might start to change, as the Internet sector has been assigned an 
unprecedented role in the current leadership’s “Internet Plus” and “One Belt, One Road” 
strategies. The Internet’s growing importance in both China’s domestic market and its foreign 
diplomacy might reinforce the territorial power of the state in those network operators’ global 
strategies. As aforementioned, since 2015, China Mobile has started a new project to build local 
network in South Korea to support the homegrown 4G standard. The same year, China Unicom 
invested $490 million in Cameroon’s CamTel to build a trans-Atlantic submarine cable 
connecting Africa to Latin America. Supported by Telefonica’s international facilities and 
constructed by Huawei Marine, this project is expected not only to improve local Internet service, 
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but also to serve “Chinese enterprises which have entered into the African and Latin American 
markets”.362  
 
Web services and applications providers 
In contrast to hardware manufacturing and network operation, large OFDI projects from 
China’s web services and applications sector have been a fairly recent but rapidly growing 
phenomenon. Beginning in 2010, Chinese Internet application companies started to invest 
overseas; by the end of 2015, they had accomplished 22 OFDI projects that had a transaction 
value of $100 million or over. The majority of these deals were targeted at countries of the 
Global North – indeed, more than half (11) were targeted at the US market. Others concentrated 
in neighboring countries that either shared cultural proximity or linguistic commonality with 
China (such as Japan, Singapore, and South Korea), or that enjoyed significant growth potential 
due to large population sizes (such as India), or that maintained close diplomatic ties with China 
(such as Russia and Brazil). Moreover, China’s BATs played a dominant role in this sector’s 
OFDI projects: Of the 22 deals, Alibaba had 8, Tencent 7, and Baidu 2.  
In terms of OFDI strategies, most companies in this sector still chose to focus on their 
core businesses. For example, Shanda Interactive, an online gaming company, bought Eyedentity 
Games in South Korea in 2010. Ctrip, China’s largest online travel agency, acquired 
Travelfusion of Britain in 2015 to gain a toehold in the British online travel booking business. 
Among Tencent’s 7 OFDI deals, 5 supported the company’s primary growth engine – the online 
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gaming market (with Riot Games, Epic games, Activision, CJ games, Glu Mobile). However, 
some companies have started to diversify their overseas investments. For Alibaba, although half 
of its OFDI deals were to support the development of its main business of e-commerce (with 
Shoprunner, Singapore Post, One 97, and Snapdeal), the company also accomplished 2 deals in 
social media (with Tangome and Snapchat), 1 deal in online gaming (with Kabam) and 1 in in 
robotics (with SoftBank and FoxConn). Baidu’s OFDI projects have remained modest so far: In 
May 2014, it spent $300 million to build an overseas research center in Silicon Valley; in 
December 2014, it invested $600 million in Uber to build a strategic relationship with this fast-
expanding US ride-hailing company.363  
Finally, an emerging but significant trend can also be observed from the data: Chinese 
Internet companies have started to partner with transnational venture capital firms in their global 
capital projection. In April 2010, Tencent injected $300 million to Digital Sky Technologies, a 
Russian investment firm that is well known for its investments in Facebook, to build a “long-
term strategic partnership”.364 In January 2015, Tencent and another Chinese social media 
company Renren, invested $100 million in Singulariteam, an Israeli venture capital firm. This 
$100 million money, according to Singulariteam, would be used to fund local startups.365 In 
other words, China-based Internet companies have now started to form collaborative relationship 
with transnational financial capital to project money outbound. 
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As discussed in Chapter 1, the Internet services and applications sector in China has 
largely been funded by transnational capital from the beginning. Although the state has 
controlled China’s domestic Internet through various regulatory measures, it has exhibited a high 
degree of tolerance toward foreign capital as a portfolio investor in this sector. One possible 
reason behind this strategy is the relatively less sensitive nature of value-added services in terms 
of national security threats.366 On the other hand, because the state in the late 1990s only 
perceived web applications as “an extension of telecom services,” companies in this sector had a 
low priority in terms of state funding.367 The rise of the dot.com bubble in the US also prompted 
many transnational financial firms to look into emerging Internet markets for investment 
opportunities, especially China. As a result, a large amount of transnational capital poured into 
the Chinese online market in the late 1990s and early 2000s, often through an extremely complex 
VIE structure, and literally jump-started China’s Internet applications sector. Due to the highly 
speculative and short-term nature of venture capital investments,368 those firms – many of them 
were registered in offshore tax havens such as the Cayman Islands – have also rushed to list 
shares on foreign stock markets to raise capital and, to some extent, to further “internationalize” 
their assets. The Chinese state, therefore, does not hold significant influence over these 
companies in terms of ownership and financing structure, especially compared with its close 
relationship with hardware manufacturers and network operators.  
For China’s web applications companies, this relatively detached relationship with the 
state has significantly influenced their global adventures. Indeed, their deep tie with global 
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financial networks means that global banks, instead of the Chinese state, have often stood behind 
their OFDI projects. In this regard, it is not “China buying the world,” but rather “transnational 
capital buying the world”. For example, in 2015-2016, with help from foreign investment banks 
such as Citigroup, Deutsche Bank, Goldman Sachs, JP Morgan and Morgan Stanley, all the three 
Internet giants in China have secured some types of syndicated loans to fund their overseas 
buying spree: Alibaba $4 billion, Tencent $4.4 billion and Baidu $2 billion.369 And, more often 
than not, China’s Internet firms have used these loans to invade each other’s turf. For example, 
Alibaba, the e-commerce behemoth, has elbowed into Tencent’s core businesses – the social 
media and online gaming market – through aggressive transborder capital projections. In 2014-
15, Alibaba invested over $400 million in mobile messaging apps like TangoMe and Snapchat, 
and another $120 million in Kabam, an online gaming company. In other words, China-based 
Internet firms have competed ruthlessly with each other on a global scale based on the support of 
transnational financial networks. There is, indeed, no unified “Chinese team” to speak of.  
Moreover, for those China-based Internet services and applications companies, to keep 
some forms of distance with the Chinese state might be beneficial for their expansion into the 
center of neoliberal capitalism, notably, the US. For example, from 2005 to 2015, none of the 21 
OFDI projects in this sector were troubled, including 11 targeting the US market. This contrasts 
sharply with the equipment-manufacturing sector – 8 out of 54 were troubled, and network 
operation sector – 2 out of 11 were failed. As aforementioned, the US state has forced several 
Chinese vendors, including ZTE and Huawei, to drop their OFDI deals in the US market. Then 
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why didn’t the territorial logic of the US intervene into the merger and acquisition activities of 
Chinese Internet application companies? One possible reason is, as previous scholars have 
argued, in general, value-added services present fewer security concerns for states.370 Another 
possible reason, however, might lie in the transnational nature of these companies. As Alibaba’s 
IPO prospectus reveals, SoftBank of Japan holds a 34.4% stake of the company, Yahoo owns 
22.6% and the founder Jack Ma only 8.9%.371 To what extent are Alibaba – and many other 
companies in this sector – Chinese? Furthermore, under certain circumstances, those companies 
might choose to delink themselves from the state and realign with neoliberal transnational 
capitalism. Indeed, when New York Times raised questions over Alibaba’s potential political ties 
with some high-level Chinese politicians, the company firmly responded through its Weibo 
account that “our only background is the market”.372 This response, of course, has concealed the 
fact that Alibaba, and other Chinese Internet companies, are dependent for access to Chinese 
market on state-controlled operators.  
This does not mean, however, that the state has lost its control over its homegrown 
Internet companies.  First, it is worth noting that in some cases, the state still offered critical 
financial support to those Internet firms through its now highly capable and complex financial 
arms. Alibaba 2012’s deal with Yahoo to buy back half of its stock is illustrative in this regard. It 
is reported that this $7.6 billion project were funded by a group of mixed investors, including not 
only foreign banks, but also Chinese investors. For example, China Development Bank made 
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Alibaba a $2 billion loan. Alibaba also raised part of the funds by selling its stocks to China-
based investors, including China’s sovereign wealth fund (the CIC), CITIC capital holdings, an 
investment management firm under the state-owned CITIC, and CDB capital, the private 
investment arm of the China Development Bank.373 Apart from providing the loan, the Chinese 
state has also teamed up with China-based Internet firms in their overseas buying activities. For 
example, in October 2015, China’s sovereign wealth fund has collaborated with Didi Kuaidi 
(now Didi Chuxing), China’s dominant ride-hailing company, to inject $100 million into 
GrabTaxi, Uber’s rival in Southeast Asia, with a possible aim to distract Uber from its fierce 
competition with Didi Kuaidi in the Chinese market. Such financial muscle, under certain 
circumstance, might be able to translate into some maneuvering power over these Internet firms.  
Second, although in some cases, China-based Internet companies may want to distance 
themselves from the state, in other cases, they also need to rely on the state’s diplomatic relations 
to further their global journey. Indeed, it has now become a common practice that high-level 
executives of China’s Internet companies often accompanied Chinese leaders in their diplomatic 
visits. For example, in July 2014, Baidu’s CEO, Robin Li, accompanied Chinese President Xi 
Jinping on a visit to Brazil. During the visit, Baidu launched its Portuguese search engine, with 
an opening ceremony attended by both Xi Jinping and Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff. 374 
The same year, Baidu acquired Peixe Urbano, a Brazilian online-discount company to gain a 
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foothold in a country whose e-commerce market is expected to maintain a strong annual growth 
of 18% in 2016.375 Apart from significant market potential, Brazil was chosen by Baidu probably 
also for geopolitical reasons. South Asian historian Vijay Prashad illustrates the deepening 
connections between China and Brazil in the era of neoliberal globalization. He documents how 
the non-Aligned Movement in the 1970s, which was originally constructed as an alternative 
South-South movement to Western capitalism, were demolished and how the BRICS countries 
(Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) noteworthily reemerged as the “locomotives of 
the South” pulling the “wagons of the North”.376 Deep divisions and conflicts notwithstanding, 
Yuezhi Zhao reminds us in her case study of the BRICS cable that in a Post-Snowden cyberspace 
where the US hegemonic power has been – at least to some extent – destabilized, there might 
exist possibilities that the BRICS would start to form a potential power bloc to rebalance the US-
dominated global communication order.377 Baidu’s engagement with Brazil, and the involvement 
of two countries’ top leaders in the process, is illustrative of this complex economic and 
geopolitical zone.  
Finally, and probably most importantly, as we saw in Chapter 1, the Chinese state has so 
far still retained a strong command over its domestic online market. This is especially relevant 
for China’s web services and applications companies because the majority – if not all – of them 
are still heavily, if not exclusively, reliant on the domestic market for profit and growth. In 2014, 
the overseas revenues of the three strongest Internet applications companies in China – Alibaba, 
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Tencent, and Baidu – only accounted for 8.5%, 8.2%, and 0.5% of their annual revenues, 
respectively.378 In other words, despite their extensive and deep ties with transnational financial 
capital, in terms of revenue distribution, China’s Internet applications companies are still 
dominantly “Chinese”. The state’s tight control over the domestic digital market, in turn, can be 
converted into leverage over these companies, in order to keep them in line with the state’s 
developmental and international agenda, especially through regulatory power such as licensing.  
One highly visible manifestation of this state power is the recently released draft Foreign 
Investment Law by China's Ministry of Commerce in 2015, which has largely been interpreted as 
an effort by the state to regulate the VIE structures in China’s Internet sector.379 As will be 
discussed in Chapter 4, with the growing interpenetration of Internet capital into various aspects 
of China’s political economy, the state has both political and security concerns to curb the 
influence of foreign capital. Although the specific outcome remains uncertain as of this writing, 
it is reported that under this new Law, the state will define the “nationality” of an enterprise in 
the VIE arrangement not based on ownership structure, but based on who has ultimate control 
over the enterprise. Given the fact that foreign ownership has largely been shielded from China’s 
online sector and a large amount of transnational capital has entered into this market through the 
VIEs, this new Law holds enormous significance. If a VIE can prove that Chinese executives or 
Chinese companies are in control, it will be qualified as “Chinese” and will be able to continue 
operating in the much-restricted but highly lucrative Chinese market. Under this circumstance, 
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companies like Baidu that have adopted structures of dual-class shares, or similar ones like 
Alibaba’s unique “Alibaba Partnership,” will remain intact, since the dual-class share structure 
has given their Chinese executives effective voting power over foreign investors.380 For other 
companies, however, this new Law, once implemented, would have massive impact, as many 
VIEs would be pressed to render control to their Chinese partners in order to keep their 
operational licenses in China.381 The formulation process of this Foreign Investment Law has 
remained largely opaque: It is possible that Chinese Internet elites, under the logic of capital 
accumulation, have propelled the state to maximize their interests – sometimes against the 
interests of their transnational partners – through legal means. It is also possible, however, that 
the Chinese state, under the territorial logic, has started to flex its regulatory muscle and tighten 
control over its online market. No matter what or who was behind the curtain, this new Law has 
demonstrated the state’s regulatory power to continue disciplining these firms in spite of the 
domination of transnational capital in their ownership structure.  
By the end of 2015, China’s web services and applications sector had gained substantial 
importance in global cyberspace. In 2014, four out of the ten largest Internet applications firms 
by market capitalization were based in China: Alibaba, Tencent, Baidu, and JD.com.382 Despite 
strong ties with transnational capital and an aggressive record of transborder FDI activities, 
however, for those companies, China has remained as the largest market segment in their profit 
strategies. The dominant position of the Chinese market, in addition to the state’s highly capable 
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and complex financial arms as well as its diplomatic support, still lend the Chinese government 
certain leverage over these firms in their global ventures, and therefore might keep them in line 
with the state’s diplomatic agenda, as will be discussed in the case of Alibaba.  
 
Other Chinese investors in global cyberspace  
Aside from companies in all the three Internet subsectors, a closer look at the firm-level 
data also reveals several other China-based investors that have injected capital in global 
cyberspace. Those investors – categorized as “others” in the dataset because their primary 
businesses are not Internet-related – can be generally divided into two camps and warrant some 
discussion here.  
The first type involves state-owned construction contractors, such as China 
Communications Construction, China National Machinery Industry Corporation (Sinomach) and 
its subsidy China Machinery Engineering Corporation (CMEC). Those contractors have been 
active in building overseas engineering projects, including network infrastructures. The projects 
were mostly in the Global South and often were built with the financial support of China’s policy 
banks. It is therefore fair to say that this type of Chinese investment has helped many countries in 
the Global South build national networks that they otherwise would not be able to afford. More 
often than not, however, those Chinese contractors outsourced the network equipment part to 
their fellow Chinese firms. In this way, the same type of Chinese investment has also helped the 
global expansion of China’s Internet sector. For example, in 2010, with a concession loan of 216 
million from China Exim bank, Sinomach/CMEC signed a contract with Bangladesh’s state-
owned operator Teletalk to help the country build its 3G network; it then sub-contracted the 
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network equipment and service work to Alcatel-Lucent Shanghai Bell, a SASAC-controlled 
telecommunications enterprise.383   
The second camp of the Chinese investors includes portfolio investment – financial firms 
and venture capital organizations based in China. According to the data, they started to project 
capital into foreign Internet firms since the early 2010s. This group of Chinese investors is highly 
diverse: Not only includes state agencies such as the SAFE; China’s Sovereign Wealth Fund, the 
China Investment Corporation (CIC); state-owned investment company, the CITIC; but also 
includes private financial firms like Uphill Investment and Cybernaut. Most of these investments 
targeted Internet firms in the Global North, especially those in the US. For example, in 2014, 
China Huaxin Post and Telecommunication Economy Development Center, a state-controlled 
ICT investment firm, spent $310 million in acquiring an Alcatel-Lucent enterprise. In August 
2015, the state-owned investment firm CITIC, invested $100 million in US taxi hauling company 
Uber. The relationship between those different units of Chinese financial capital is extremely 
intricate and in some cases, state-owned financial firms and private investment companies have 
worked together to accomplish a single deal. In April 2015, Hua Capital, a private equity 
management firm in Beijing, in collaboration with the CITIC, completed a $1.9 billion 
acquisition of OmniVision, a US tablet and smartphone chipmaker. While still emergent, this 
new trend illustrates the increasing interpenetration of finance capital and FDI, and of China and 
global cyberspace. More importantly, unlike the situation in the late 1990s and early 2000s – in 
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which global financial capital poured into China to activate its web applications sector, China-
based financial capital has now started to project investment outbound to fund companies in 
global cyberspace. Tencent’s strategic relationship with Russian investment firm Digital Sky 
Technologies and Israeli venture capital firm Singulariteam, as aforementioned, might add to this 
trend.  
  
Conclusion 
Not only having the world’s largest number of Internet users, China now has a group of 
world-class Internet corporations that started to aggressively set their sights on the international 
market. What does the “going-out” strategy of China’s Internet industry look like? What have 
been the enabling and constraining forces for this aspect of their growth? How have they become 
entangled and engaged with the state, other units of capital and inter-state and inter-capitalist 
relationships? And how important are these Internet companies in global and comparative 
perspective?  
To answer those questions, this Chapter, based on two types of datasets, has offered an 
overview of the “going out” of China’s Internet industry, focusing on the OFDI projects 
attempted by China-based Internet firms from 2005 to 2015. It has demonstrated, contrary to the 
conventional wisdom, that China’s Internet companies are not the expansionist tools of a 
monolithic authoritarian state nor do they constitute a unified “corporate China” as they venture 
out into the international Internet. Instead, the global expansion of China’s Internet sector has 
been constituted and complicated by both the territorial logic of the state and the expansive logic 
of capital accumulation. Moreover, not only has the state itself been constrained by inter-
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department conflicts and center-local tensions, but the complex relationship between the state 
and the different sub-sectors of China’s Internet industry does not adhere to a single template.   
Moreover, the independence of this state power should also not be overestimated. With 
the increasingly overarching role played by the Internet in both China’s political economy and 
global digital capitalism, the ability of China’s Internet elites to shape or set the state’s agenda 
become a vital research question. For this reason, we will zoom in and look at the relationship 
between the state and an emerging Internet capitalist class fraction in China. But before doing so, 
the following chapter will first dig deeper into the state-capital interactions covered in this 
chapter by offering a case study of a particularly important unit of Chinese Internet capital, the e-
commerce giant, Alibaba.  
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CHAPTER 4 	
	
“THE COMMUNISTS JUST BEAT US AT CAPITALISM”?  
THE “INTERNATIONALIZATION” OF ALIBABA 
 
	
In September 2014, Alibaba Group Holding Limited (hereafter “Alibaba”) debuted on the 
New York Stock Exchange, claiming the world’s largest Initial Public Offering (IPO) in 
history.384 This historical IPO has brought the Hangzhou-headquartered company into the global 
spotlight. Despite intensive media coverage, however, to a certain extent, Alibaba remains a 
puzzle.  
Indeed, a simple question like “is Alibaba a Chinese company” may still need careful 
qualification, as evidenced by a quick survey of its 2014 IPO filing to the US Security and 
Exchange Commission. In terms of revenue distribution, Alibaba is dominantly “Chinese” as 
China’s domestic market has accounted for up to 84% of its total revenue. In terms of ownership 
structure, however, Alibaba is barely “Chinese” – SoftBank of Japan holds a 34.4% stake of the 
company, Yahoo owns 22.6% and its Chinese founder Jack Ma only 8.9%.385 In terms of 
location, Alibaba is a mix. On the one hand, its five major subsidiaries (and their respective 
operating companies) are all based in China, mainly registered in the East Coast regions like 
Zhejiang or Shanghai. On the other hand, through a series of complex contractual agreements, 
these China-based entities have also linked to a number of overseas entities registered in offshore 
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tax havens like Hong Kong and the British Virgin Islands. Indeed, the parent company Alibaba 
Group itself is incorporated in the Cayman Islands.386 Commenting on the intricate ownership 
and corporate structure of a China-based company that successfully raised an enormous amount 
of capital on the New York capital market, Jon Stewart of the Daily Show joked, “the 
Communists just beat us at Capitalism!”  
Among all the Chinese Internet companies that have established a global presence, 
Alibaba stands out as a particularly significant case. In 2014, it has become the largest e-
commerce company in the world, according to a couple of measurements, including active 
buyers, profits, market capitalization and gross merchandise volume, or commerce transactions 
occurred on its platforms.387 In 2013, the total online transaction value on Alibaba’s platforms 
reached $248 billion, triple the size of eBay, more than double the size of Amazon, and one-third 
larger than Amazon and eBay – the two US-based e-commerce giants – combined.388 In the 
fiscal year ending in March 2016, Alibaba’s online transaction volume has reportedly surpassed 
Wal-Mart’s annual sales, making the company officially the largest retail platform in the world, 
both online and offline.389  
This enormous online trading volume has translated into a lofty market valuation. In 2007, 
during its first IPO, Alibaba raised $1.5 billion by listing 17% of its business-to-business (B2B) 
division – Alibaba.com and Alibaba.com.cn – on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange, claiming the 
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largest technology IPO since Google in 2004.390 In September 2014, the parent company Alibaba 
Group revealed another historical IPO of $25 billion on the New York Stock Exchange – as we 
saw at the beginning of this chapter – surpassing the total amount of capital raised by Google 
($2.7 billion in 2004), Facebook ($16.8 billion in 2012) and Twitter ($1.82 billion in 2013) in 
their respective IPOs.391 It has also positioned Alibaba as one of the most valuable Internet 
companies in the world: Valued at $167.6 billion at the time of its IPO, Alibaba trailed only a 
few US Internet giants such as Google, Microsoft and Facebook.392  
The strategic importance of Alibaba in both the Chinese and global Internet, as well as 
the puzzles around its corporate nationality – i.e., how international it is – makes the company a 
revealing case for studying the evolution, structure, and especially the global journey of China’s 
web companies. Popular media, on the one hand, have highlighted the “Chineseness” of Alibaba, 
framing it as a manifestation of a rising Chinese Internet, indeed, a “symbol of China’s new tech 
giants”.393 The company itself, on the other hand, has tried to blur its nationality and presented 
itself as an “international” firm – as its founder Jack Ma famously announced before its New 
York IPO, “we are not a company from China, we are an Internet company that happened to be 
in China.”394 Although there is a growing body of literature examining the internationalization of 
Chinese multinationals,395 few studies have paid attention to the recently-emerged Internet 
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395 See, for example, John Child and Suzana B. Rodrigues, “The Internationalization of Chinese Firms: A 
Case for Theoretical Extension?,” Management and Organization Review 1, no. 3 (2005): 381–410; 
	
 
170 
services and applications industry in China – an industry born with intensive ties with 
transnational capital and an industry that has been “internationalized” since its inception. Indeed, 
as Dariusz Wojcik and James Camilleri remind us in their case study of China Mobile, global 
financial networks have been instrumental in the construction and internationalization of China’s 
“national champions”.396 Building upon previous literature but also taking these insights further, 
this chapter takes a comprehensive political economic approach to understanding the global 
routes of Alibaba, which not only includes physical expansion beyond home base, but also 
interactions with transnational capital within Chinese borders.  
In what follows, this chapter discusses the “internationalization” of Alibaba, its business 
development and its rise on the global Internet landscape. It asks: How has Alibaba’s route 
toward internationalization interlocked with the structural development of both the Chinese and 
the global Internet? What pattern of state-capital relationships does it manifest? What 
implications may it have for understanding the “internationalization” of China’s Internet industry 
in general? In this regard, this chapter also digs deeper into the questions covered in previous 
chapters: How have the constantly changing and highly complicated dynamics between the 
territorial logic of the state and the expansionary logic of capital accumulation played out in the 
internationalization of Alibaba, a particularly important unit of Chinese Internet capital? 
This chapter draws on both secondary and primary sources of data. To investigate the 
fundamental but also convoluted information on ownership and corporate structure, market share 
                                                                                                                                                       
Yadong Luo and Rosalie L. Tung, “International Expansion of Emerging Market Enterprises: A 
Springboard Perspective,” Journal of International Business Studies 38, no. 4 (2007): 481–98; Eunsuk 
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and financial flows of the company, hundreds of pages-long prospectuses prepared for both 
Alibaba.com’s Hong Kong IPO in 2007 and Alibaba Group’s New York IPO in 2014 have been 
studied. Additionally, to trace the history of Alibaba’s global journey in the past 15 years, I have 
used the company’s annual reports and filings with the US Securities and Exchange Commission 
(e.g., Annual Report SEC form 20-F) to gain a historical perspective on its business development. 
Government policies and initiatives related to e-commerce development in China were also 
examined to provide insights into the intersection between Alibaba and state agencies. Related 
secondary sources, such as media coverage, press releases, and especially several Chinese 
publications, including books on Alibaba’s developmental history and biographies of and 
speeches by its founder, Jack Ma, were also reviewed to provide supplemental information.  
The chapter is organized as follows. The first section offers a brief overview of Alibaba’s 
ownership structure and business scope to contextualize the following historical analysis. 
Sections two to four delineate, document and assess Alibaba’s evolution in the past 15 years – 
from its inception in Hangzhou in 1999 to its debut on the New York Stock Exchange in 2014 – 
and situate this history in a broader political economic context. It does not claim that Alibaba’s 
development reflects a coherent corporate strategy. Rather, the historical analysis shows that it is 
both strategic and opportunistic. Indeed, it is likely become more strategic as the company 
becomes bigger and cultivating more close ties with the state.  
The last section concludes and presents implications for understanding Alibaba’s global 
journey, and the internationalization of China’s Internet industry in general. As the following 
analysis will show, the state and capital both collaborate and compete for control in Alibaba’s 
various interactions with the global Internet. The territorial logic of the state and the 
expansionary logic of capital sometimes overlap, but more often than not, are in conflict with 
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each other. As a China-based Internet company that is enmeshed deeply in global digital 
capitalism, Alibaba’s intricate global trajectory presents a specific pattern of state-capital 
relationships that encompasses both tension and cooperation. Instead of creating a formula, the 
following analysis will show that this state-capital relation needs to be understood and analyzed 
in specific historical and global contexts.  
 
What is Alibaba: Ownership Structure and Business Scope 
What is Alibaba? This seemingly simple question turns out to be surprisingly difficult to 
answer. First and foremost, its ownership structure remains an enigma. In its 2014 prospectus 
(SEC Form F-1) to the US Securities and Exchange Commission, Alibaba revealed an 
exceptionally complex structure of major shareholders (see Table 4.1). Among them, Japanese 
Internet and investment company SoftBank owns 34.1% of the company, American Internet 
company Yahoo owns another 22.4%, Alibaba’s management team – including its executive 
chairman Jack Ma and vice executive Chairman Joseph Tsai – controls only 14.6%. Other major 
shareholders include: Fengmao Investment Corporation – a division of China Investment 
Corporation, the nation’s sovereign wealth fund – owns 2.8%. Silver Lake, an American 
investment firm, owns 2.5%. Yunfeng Capital, a China-based investment fund established by 
Jack Ma, owns 1.5%. And CITIC Capital Excel Wisdom Fund, a unit of China’s state-owned 
investment company CITIC, owns 1.1%.397 In other words, Alibaba’s major shareholders 
consisted of a complex network, including not only foreign units of Internet capital like 
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SoftBank and Yahoo, transnational investment firms like Silver Lake, but also state-controlled 
investment firms like CITIC, and China-based private funds like Yunfeng Capital. How has 
Alibaba developed such a convoluted ownership structure? Is Alibaba still a Chinese company?  
There are different measurements to define a company’s corporation nationality, such as 
ownership structure, headquarter location, dominant market, or relationship with the state. 
Corporate nationality matters, in the case of Alibaba and more generally, of China’s Internet 
industry, for two reasons. Domestically, “Chinese” companies and “foreign” companies often 
receive different policy treatment in their operations in the Chinese market, and public opinion 
and policy interventions can often be mobilized in favor of the “home company,” as we saw in 
the case of China’s continuing effort to define the “de facto controller” in the VIE structure. 
Internationally, corporate nationality will also determine whether a company is qualified to 
receive favorable trade treatments or subject to certain trade barriers and national security 
scrutiny, as those considerations are still organized on a national basis.398    
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 Table 4.1: The main shareholders of Alibaba 
Name Stock 
 
SoftBank  
 
Yahoo 
Jack Yun MA 
 
34.1% 
22.4% 
8.8% 
Joseph C. TSAI 
Fengmao Investment Corporation 
Silver Lake Affiliated entities 
Yunfeng affiliated entities  
CITIC Capital Excel Wisdom Fund, L.P. 
All directors and executive officers as a group* 
3.6% 
2.8%  
2.5% 
1.5% 
1.1% 
14.6% 
 
Source: Alibaba Group, SEC form F-1, 250-254. 
Note: This table only includes major shareholders that have a stake over 1%.  
 
 
 
Moreover, Alibaba’s business scope presents another puzzle. In its 2014 prospectus, the 
company described itself as “the largest online and mobile commerce company in the world in 
terms of gross merchandise volume in 2013”.399 E-commerce, however, appeared to be only the 
“tip of iceberg” of its now eclectic digital empire. As its prospectus continued to reveal, in 2014, 
Alibaba operated approximately 290 subsidiaries and other consolidated entities both in and 
outside of China, including not only 70 domestic business units, but also approximately 120 
offshore subsidiaries that registered in overseas tax havens like Hong Kong, the British Islands 
and the Cayman Islands. Most of these overseas entities were tied with onshore companies 
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through a series of complex contractual agreements called the VIE structure, a topic I will return 
to shortly.  
It is worth mentioning that the prospectus only offers information on major subsidiaries, 
which is presented in Figure 4.1. The function of these relatively smaller subsidiaries, including 
around 70 in China and more than 120 outside of China – which might serve the aim as   
infrastructure companies for other Chinese company as they go overseas – is an important topic 
for future research.  
Figure 4.1, based on the information the company submitted to the US Securities and 
Exchange Commission, presents a simplified chart of Alibaba’s corporate structure and its five 
major subsidiaries, including a business-to-business (B2B) division, Alibaba; a consumer-to-
consumer (C2C) division, Taobao; a business-to-consumer (B2C) division, Tmall; a proprietary 
online marketing platform, Alimama, and an online business software provider, Alisoft.400 To 
add to the complexity, online payment service Alipay and Internet portal Yahoo China – the 
previous two major subsidiaries of Alibaba – are not included since they were either closed 
(Yahoo China) or transferred into a different company (Alipay) by the time Alibaba filed its 
2014 IPO. I will elaborate more on these two subsidiaries in the following discussion.  
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Figure 4.1: The simplified corporate structure of Alibaba Group. 
Source: Author, based on information in Alibaba Group, SEC form F-1, 11.  
Note: Apart from major subsidiaries illustrated in this figure, Alibaba Group has also operated around 70 
subsidiaries incorporated in China, and approximately 120 subsidiaries incorporated in offshore tax 
havens, including Cayman Islands, British Virgin Islands and Hong Kong.  
 
 
 
The five major subsidiaries in this already quite intricate corporate structure, however, 
have only presented a limited picture of Alibaba’s multifaceted digital landscape. As will be 
discussed later, in the years around its 2014 IPO, funded by both domestic and transnational 
capital, the company conducted a buying spree both at home and abroad, penetrating deeply in 
China’s political economy and expanding significantly its business footprint in the global 
Internet. This significant expansion has been both strategic and opportunistic. In general, 
Alibaba’s now massive corporate system can be divided into three layers: (1) the core layer of e-
commerce; (2) the middle layer that directly supports or relates with the operation of the core, 
Alibaba Group 
(Cayman Islands)
Alibaba
B2B
(Hangzhou)
Taobao
C2C
(Zhejiang)
Tmall
B2C
(Zhejiang)
Alimama
marketing
(Hangzhou)
Alisoft
software
(Shanghai)
70+ onshore 
subsidiaries
120+ offshore subsidiaries
(Cayman Islands, 
British Virgin Islands,
Hong Kong)  
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including mobile Internet, logistics, finance, and offline retailing; and (3) the outermost layer that 
moves beyond e-commerce and extends into different aspects of the global political economy, 
ranging from cloud computing, media and entertainment, to healthcare and automobile 
manufacturing.  
First, Alibaba’s core business has remained in the e-commerce domain. It is worth noting 
that despite fierce competition from domestic rivals such as Baidu, Tencent and JD, and 
formidable challenges from transnational peers like Amazon and eBay, by the end of 2015 
Alibaba still commands over 80% of China’s domestic e-commerce marketplace – by some 
measure the world’s largest online market that accounted for 35% of all global digital trade.401 Its 
various platforms have touched upon almost every aspect of online commerce. In the Chinese 
market, Alibaba owns the largest online C2C platform, Taobao; the largest B2C platform, Tmall; 
China’s most popular group buying website, Juhuasuan. Facing the international market, it 
operates China’s largest B2B website Alibaba.com (and its Chinese version 1688.com), 
connecting Chinese manufacturers with global buyers; and AliExpress, a platform though which 
global consumers can buy products from Chinese manufacturers in small quantities.402 To spread 
its core business overseas, Alibaba has also acquired various stakes in a group of foreign e-
commerce companies, including Shoprunner in the US, Lazada in Southeast Asia, and Snapdeal 
in India.  
Second, aside from e-commerce, Alibaba has also built up a middle layer that directly 
relates to or supports the development of its core in order to keep its edge in the extremely 
competitive digital market. This layer consists of a group of different business units, ranging 
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from mobile Internet, logistics, financial services, to offline retailing. In the realm of mobile 
Internet – to compete with Tencent’s killer app WeChat 403 – Alibaba has developed its own 
R&D group on the android operating system YunOS in 2011, acquired UCWeb, a popular 
mobile browse in 2013, and invested in Meizu, a Chinese smartphone maker in 2015.404 In the 
field of logistics – to fend off the competition from JD, its major rival in China’s B2C market 
that holds inventory in its own warehouses – Alibaba formed a logistics group “China Smart 
Logistics” (or Cainiao) in 2013 to connect logistics providers, warehouses and distribution 
centers using consumer data it collected on its various websites.405 In 2014, it also acquired 
shares in Singapore Post to participate in overseas logistics operations. In the field of financial 
services, building upon its successful online payment service Alipay, Alibaba has developed new 
financial investment tools such as Yu’e Bao and micro loans businesses. Through investments 
into One 97, it now owns a share of Paytm, a popular Mobile Wallet in India. Moreover, the 
company also invested into Chinese offline electronics retailers Sunning and department store 
operator Intime to move its business from “online” to “offline”. 406 
Finally, to further diversify its businesses and to search for new profit channels, Alibaba 
has extended its reach beyond e-commerce to build an outermost layer that infiltrates into 
various aspects of the global political economy. It has entered the media and entertainment 
industry, acquiring the Hong Kong-based English newspaper South China Morning Post, the US-
                                                
403 For a detailed discussion on Tencent, see Min Tang, “Tencent as a Nexus: The Political Economy of 
China’s Internet Industry” (PhD dissertation, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 2017). 
404 Charles Clover, “Alibaba invests $590m in Chinese smartphone maker Meizu,” Financial Times, 
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traded Chinese video streaming giant Youku Tudou, 30% of the financial media China Business 
News, 18% of social media giant Sina Weibo, 20% of the US-based social media company 
TangoMe, and even half of Guangzhou Evergrande football club.407 It has set foot in the fast 
growing cloud business – six years after launching its own cloud computing service, Aliyun, the 
parent group announced in 2015 that it will invest another $1 billion into it to competes directly 
with Amazon Web Services.408 To add to this picture, in 2014, Alibaba brought the Hong Kong 
based pharmaceutical data firm CITIC 21CN to restructure it into Alibaba Health in order to get 
a foothold in the healthcare industry. In 2015, it started a robotics project with SoftBank and 
Foxconn. In 2016, the company even moved into the automobile industry by jointly developing 
driverless cars with China’s largest automaker, the state-owned SAIC Motor Corporation.409 
How has Alibaba constructed such a massive online empire in the past 15 years? What 
implications does it have for both the Chinese and the global Internet? Apart from various 
business strategies that have been well-documented in the business literature,410 the following 
historical analysis focuses on state-capital dynamics and situates the evolution of Alibaba at the 
interplay between China’s shifting developmental strategies and the structural transformation of 
global digital capitalism.  
 
                                                
407 Charles Clover, “Alibaba buys 50% stake in Chinese football club,” Financial Times, June 5, 2014, 
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Before 2008: A Broker Between Chinese Suppliers and Global Buyers 
In March 1999, Alibaba launched its first business, Alibaba.com, in Hangzhou, a city 
close to the east coast of China, just a few months after the first Internet commerce transaction 
was conducted in the country in early 1998.411 Alibaba.com is a B2B e-commerce platform that 
connects small and medium-sized Chinese manufactures with transnational buyers. In the words 
of Jack Ma, different from many B2B websites in the US that primarily served large companies, 
Alibaba’s target is the “shrimp.”412 This was not a random choice. Indeed, different from the US 
market, which was already dominated by a group of big businesses, the then emerging Chinese 
market were filled up with smaller companies.413 To encourage rapid growth realistically, 
Alibaba had to focus on the existing players in its domestic market. More importantly, the 
company was established at a time when the development of electronic commerce among small 
and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) had become a top priority for the Chinese leadership.  
On the one hand, the reintegration of China into global capitalism since the “opening up” 
in the late 1970s has transformed the country from a self-reliant one in the Mao’s era to an 
export-oriented economy.414 China’s export industry has experienced dramatic growth and its 
share of total exports in the global market rose from 1.8% in 1990 to 9.1% in 2008.415 
Meanwhile, the concurrent market reform has also led to a rapid growth of small and medium-
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sized enterprises in China’s domestic economy – first through the development of town and 
village enterprises in the 1980s and then through the restructuring and privatizing of the state-
owned enterprise sector in the 1990s; in 2002, the government promulgated the SMEs promotion 
law, indicating its determination to nurture the role of SMEs in its exported-oriented economy.416 
By the end of 2001, there were around 2.4 million SMEs in China, accounting for the majority – 
99% – of all registered corporations in the country.417 Unlike large-sized state-owned enterprises, 
many SMEs lacked access to state-operated trading companies and some could not afford to 
travel long distance to attend national trade shows like the China Export and Import Fair (also 
known as the “Canton Fair”) in Guangzhou of southeast China.418 How to connect this diverse 
group of enterprises to the global market had become a prime concern for the Chinese leadership. 
On the other hand, as shown in Chapter 1, in the 1990s, the global branding of the 
Internet as the “information superhighway” has greatly shaped China’s developmental strategies. 
The then-emerging ICT sector was not only touted as a “pillar industry” in China’s economic 
development, but was also regarded as a critical tool for the restructuring of the Chinese political 
economy and its global reintegration, including trade and commerce.419 In 2000, the state 
launched an "Enterprise Online" initiative, aiming at using network technologies to better 
connect Chinese businesses to the global market, with a special emphasis on the growing sector 
of SMEs.420  
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Alibaba was established in this supportive policy environment. Indeed, the founders were 
well aware of this situation – before the launch of Alibaba, Jack Ma was reportedly working at a 
unit of China’s Ministry of Commerce, helping the government agency develop its e-commerce 
capacity.421 The state’s promotion of e-commerce among SMEs established a fast growing 
customer base for Alibaba. According to iReseach, a China-based market research and 
consulting firm, from 2002 to 2006, while the number of China’s Internet users increased from 
59 million to 137 million, the number of SMEs that traded on third-party platforms also 
increased, from 1 million in 2002 to 8.8 million in 2006.422  
The Chinese state, however, was not the only architect of Alibaba. Transnational capital 
played an equally, if not more important role in the inception of the company – with the tacit 
consent of the state.  
As discussed in previous chapters, in its domestic web services and applications sector, 
the Chinese state demonstrated a complex and ambiguous attitude toward transnational capital: 
impeding or even prohibiting foreign-operated enterprises – despite its WTO promise – but 
tacitly allowing foreign portfolio investments. This ambiguous policy has given rise to a highly 
convoluted business structure between Chinese Internet companies and their foreign investors – 
the Variable Interest Entity, or VIE.  
The VIE model, despite its unclear legal status and high risks, has become very popular 
in China’s Internet services and applications industry. For Chinese Internet companies, it helped 
them build connections with global financial networks, which was of vital importance for their 
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early development as venture capital market was largely absent in China in the 1990s and state 
banks were reluctant to lend to this newly emerged web applications sector.423 For transnational 
capital, VIE offered them a precious link to China’s rapidly growing digital market that 
otherwise they would not easily have accesses to. Fueled by the dot.com bubble in the US, a 
large amount of foreign capital poured into China’s then-emergent internet industry through the 
VIE structure – The Wall Street Journal reported in 2015 that “virtually every Chinese tech 
company listed in New York” had used this structure.424 
Under the VIE model, the Chinese company would first set up an offshore holding 
company, most in tax havens such as the Cayman Islands or the British Virgin Islands, in order 
to ease the transfer of foreign capital. The offshore holding company – jointly-owned by foreign 
investors and their Chinese partner after capital injection – would then channel equity capital into 
a wholly foreign-owned company in China. Due to the state’s restricted policies, this wholly 
foreign-owned company would not be able to receive operating licenses from the Chinese 
authority, therefore it has to nominate its Chinese partner to obtain the necessary licenses and 
operate the business. The VIE model has been bound up through a series of complex contractual 
agreements, with an aim to ensure foreign investors to not only “capture the operating 
company’s profits,” but also “effectively control Chinese shareholders in exercising their 
shareholder power”.425 In reality, however, the model is designed deliberately opaque and has 
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changed over time. Its operation, therefore, cannot be generalized across the whole range but 
needs to be studied in different companies.  
Alibaba’s engagement with transnational capital offered a typical example of this specific 
business path. In June 1999 – only three months after the launch of Alibaba.com in Hangzhou – 
Alibaba Group, the offshore holding company, was incorporated in the Cayman Islands, in order 
to “ready Alibaba’s corporate structure to receive venture capital investment”.426 Four months 
later, in October 1999, the first round of overseas capital came in. This total $5 million venture 
capital fund consisted of $3.3 million from American investment bank Goldman Sachs and $1.7 
million from other relatively smaller venture capital firms, including US-based Fidelity Capital, 
Swedish-based Investor AB, and Singapore-based Transpac Capital and Venture TDF. The 
highly speculative and short-term nature of venture capital investments indicated the need for 
continuing fund raising as well as near-future IPOs.427 Indeed, among the early investors, only 
Venture TDF and Fidelity held on to their stakes all the way through Alibaba’s 2014 IPO. 
Goldman Sachs sold off its entire 33% stake in 2003.428 In January 2000, Japan’s telecom and 
investment firm SoftBank led a second round of $20 million in financing, taking a 30% control 
of Alibaba, which helped the company survive the upcoming popping of the Internet bubble 429 
(see Table 4.2 for a list of the major rounds of Alibaba’s fundraising).  
Drawing upon both the supportive policies of the Chinese state and the growing appetite 
of foreign investors in China’s digital market – propelled by the rise and fall of the dot.com 
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bubble in the West, as discussed in Chapter 1, Alibaba has since expanded in a spectacular 
fashion. On one side, in 2002, for the first time, the company reported a nominal profit, mainly 
drawn from popular value-added marketing services on its B2B websites, such as “Gold Supplier” 
that offered Chinese exporters a presence on its English-language website, and “Trust Pass” that 
provided authentication services for the vendors. It also introduced both Alimama – an Internet 
advertising and marketing platform, and Alisoft – an online business management solution 
provider for e-commerce companies listed on its platforms to further expand its revenue streams. 
  On the other side, Alibaba also started its outward expansion. In 2000, fueled by newly 
raised foreign capital, it opened up overseas offices in Hong Kong and London, a R&D center in 
California, and planned to expand its service to Japan and Korea by launching localized 
websites.430 With the burst of the dot.com bubble in 2001 and the urgent need of fighting eBay in 
its domestic market in 2003, however, Alibaba soon shifted its focus and those early foreign 
adventures were largely unsuccessful.  
In 2003, the complex state-capital dynamic that had constructed Alibaba in the first place 
continued to play out, manifesting itself through another milestone of Alibaba’s evolution: its 
battle with eBay in the Chinese online commerce market.  
As we saw in Chapter 1, in the early 2000s, apart from transnational financial firms, a 
group of foreign Internet companies also rushed into China, seeking for new growth 
opportunities; eBay was one of them. Those firms had high expectations of China’s emerging but 
rapidly growing online market. In the words of eBay’s then-CEO Meg Whitman, “Whoever wins 
China, wins the world.”431 In 2002, eBay entered China by investing $30 million in EachNet, a 
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Chinese online auction site that controlled 85% of China’s C2C market.432 In 2003, eBay took 
over EachNet and rebranded it as eBay EachNet, announcing its formal entry into China. At that 
time, eBay was already a global company, holding presence in 19 different countries, including 
dominant market share in Australia, Canada, Germany and the UK.433 To combat eBay in the 
Chinese market, Alibaba started its second business – Taobao Marketplace. A few months later, 
Alipay – an online payment tool – was launched to facilitate transaction on Taobao. The battle 
didn’t last too long. By the end of 2005, eBay’s market share had decreased to less than 30% and 
Taobao was approaching 60%.434 In 2006, eBay shut down its Chinese portal and entered into a 
joint venture with Hong Kong-based Tom Online.  
What was behind Alibaba’s victory over eBay? Admittedly, the Chinese state played a 
role. As aforementioned, despite its wholehearted embrace of the information economy, the state 
– through diverse means of regulation – has still held considerable sway over the domestic 
Internet. This sway, in some cases, may be translated into protective support for its domestic 
Internet capital in face of global competition. For example, when Alibaba rolled out its online 
payment service Alipay – a service that played a critical role in its battle with eBay, eBay was 
slow to bring its recent-acquired PayPal to China, partly due to China’s tight regulation of its 
banking and financial system.435 
The Chinese state, however, was not the only backer of Alibaba. To fund its battle with 
eBay in its home market, Alibaba was actively seeking support from transnational capital. 
Indeed, Alibaba was dependent on tremendous capital liquidity outside the Chinese market. For 
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example, to prepare Alibaba for its upcoming combat with eBay, in February 2004, SoftBank, 
with Fidelity Capital, Venture TDF, and GGV Capital, invested another $82 million to Alibaba. 
Among them, $60 million was directly injected into the newly-founded Taobao Marketplace.436 
One year later, another US Internet giant Yahoo joined the game. In 2005, Alibaba and Yahoo 
announced a strategic partnership: Yahoo invested $1 billion and handed over its Chinese 
business Yahoo China to Alibaba, in exchange for a 40% ownership stake.437 Yahoo’s 
partnership and its $1 billion investment proved to be decisive as eBay shut down its Chinese site 
only a few months later. The battle between Alibaba and eBay was therefore not a battle between 
a Chinese Internet company and a US Internet company, but a battle among different units of 
transnational capital. In other words, it was through Alibaba that these different units of 
transnational capital fought for control of the Chinese digital market. 
The success of Taobao notwithstanding, up to 2008, Alibaba’s B2B division remained as 
the most valuable asset for the company. Compared with the still-money-losing C2C business 
Taobao, its B2B business reported a steady profit growth, increasing from RMB 297 million in 
2004 to RMB 612 million in 2005, and to RMB 1,126 million in 2006,438 which firmly anchored 
the role of the parent company as a digital broker between Chinese suppliers and transnational 
buyers. In 2007, for the purpose of continuing fundraising and also of finding outlets for its early 
venture capital investors, Alibaba listed 17% of its B2B platform on the Hong Kong Stock 
Exchange, further “internationalized” its assets, and raised a substantial $1.5 billion. As might be 
expected, the deal was jointly underwritten by a group of transnational financial firms – US-
based Morgan Stanley, Germany-based Deutsche Bank, and one of Alibaba’s early investors, the 
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American investment bank Goldman Sachs.439 In this regard, Alibaba’s early global journey 
presents an important case to support Wojcik and Camilleri’s observation that global financial 
networks played a foundational role in the construction of China’s “national champions”.440 
 
After 2008: A Gateway to China  
The 2008 global economic crisis brought a turning point to the Chinese economy, forcing 
the state to speed up its long-planned restructuring from an export-oriented economy to a 
domestic demand-driven one. The central government, under the Hu-Wen leadership, launched a 
series of stimulus, structural adjustment, and social policies to redirect its FDI-driven and export-
oriented developmental model in the 1980-1990s. In November 2008, a RMB 4 trillion (US $586 
billion) investment plan was announced to boost the economy and prevent mass unemployment, 
including loosening monetary policy and providing bank credit to support small business.441 
The economic crisis, meanwhile, also brought a turning point to Alibaba. If Alibaba’s 
B2B business – its core business before 2008 – was a manifestation of China’s exported-oriented 
economy and has benefited from government favorable policies to nurture the role of SMEs in 
international trade, the 2008 economic crisis, which significantly hurt China’s export industry, 
also put a stop sign to this business model. The stock market soon reflected this trend. In 
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September 2008, the share price of Alibaba.com plummeted on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange, 
dropped to a historical low – only one-third – of its IPO price a year ago.442  
In response to this crisis and to take advantage of the state policies, Alibaba changed its 
business strategy, turning its focus from connecting Chinese businesses to the global market back 
to exploiting China’s domestic consumer market. In other words, Alibaba’s role has been 
transformed from a broker between Chinese manufacturers and global buyers to the gateway 
back to China. In rebranding itself for this new role, Alibaba claimed in a press release in August 
2008 that it was time for transnational businesses to “export to China” (instead of the previous 
“export from China”) because of the growing demand in China’s domestic market for imported 
goods, jointly fueled by the booming Chinese economy, the state’s policies to promote imports, 
the appreciation of the Chinese currency and the growing purchasing power of the Chinese 
“rising middle class” – a large number of favored social strata.443 
To tap on this “growing demand,” Alibaba implemented with full strength its “Big 
Taobao” strategy. Indeed, the data from the first quarter of 2008 show that Taobao has 
increasingly become the most critical asset of Alibaba, with its online transaction value reaching 
RMB $ 18.8 billion, an increase of 170% from the same period during the previous year.444 Lu 
Zhaoxi, the then Taobao CEO, stated that the aim of Alibaba’s “Big Taobao” strategy was two-
                                                
442 Clark, Alibaba: The House That Jack Ma Built, 212. 
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fold: To effectively stimulate domestic consumption and to create up to one million jobs for 
China.445  
A series of business movements were taken quickly to carry out this strategy. In April 
2008, a Business to Consumer (B2C) website Tmall.com was launched under Taobao to exploit 
the urban-based “Chinese middle class,” which was later spin off as an independent division in 
2011, due to its popularity among big corporate users from both China and overseas. Indeed, the 
growing importance of Tmall signified a clear reorientation of Alibaba’s business structure 
toward big corporate users as a many international brands – such as Loreal, P&G, Unilever, 
Macys and Costco – opened up its flagship retail storefronts on Tmall.com to expand their 
accesses to China’s domestic market. In 2015, even US e-commerce giant Amazon, which 
controlled 1.3% of China’s B2C market at the time, opened up a flagship store on Tmall, paying 
commission to its competitor Alibaba for each transaction.446 In September 2008, Alibaba 
integrated its online advertising service Alimama into Taobao to sell advertising space to its 
merchants, which has significantly boosted Taobao’s profit performance.447 One month later, the 
parent group announced that it would invest RMB 5 billion into Taobao in the next 5 years to 
further expand the online system.448 By the middle of 2009, Taobao commanded over 80% of 
China’s C2C market and more than 20% of China’s B2C market, while the market share of its 
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major competitors, such as Tencent’s e-commerce platform Paipai, remained in the single 
digits.449  
Apart from restructuring its business model to exploit China’s domestic market, Alibaba 
continued its geographical diversification, partly riding the tide of the “going out” initiative 
promoted by the Chinese state, as we saw in previous chapters. Struggling with the global 
financial crisis and its own business model transformation, however, these overseas activities 
remained rather limited and unorganized. In April 2009, Alibaba announced its partnership with 
India’s largest Yellow page company Infomedia to explore the Indian online market.450 From 
2008 to 2010, it continued its collaboration with SoftBank by launching its B2B service Alibaba 
and C2C service Taobao in Japanese.451 In July and August 2010, Alibaba made its first move 
toward the more competitive but also more lucrative US market by acquiring two small US-
based e-commerce sites, Vendio and Auctiva, with an hope that the two sites could help it reach 
some eBay sellers.452 There was no major overseas capital projection, however, during this 
period. Rather, with limited cash reserves at hand, Alibaba’s globalization strategies seemed to 
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be both restrictive and highly dependent on its local partners, as its then-CEO David Wei pointed 
out the aim is to “reduce the financial risks along with the process of globalization.” 453 
Alibaba’s redirection to China’s domestic market, as well as its limited presence in the 
international Internet, has – to a certain extent – restructured the company’s relationship with the 
state and transnational capital.  
First, the growing importance of China’s domestic market in Alibaba’s profit strategy has 
translated into greater disciplinary state power over the company, in certain cases even forcing it 
to recompose its transnational corporate ownership structure.  
The 2011 dispute between Alibaba, Yahoo and SoftBank over Alipay – a vertically 
integrated payment system toward the development of an e-commerce infrastructure – is an 
important case in this regard. In June 2010, to regulate foreign ownership in its strategic banking 
and financial industry, China’s central bank, the People’s Bank of China, issued a set of 
regulations that required all online payment service providers to obtain business licenses in order 
to operate in the Chinese market. The regulations further claimed that such licenses would “only 
be granted to the Chinese-owned entities.”454 Concerned that the parent company’s substantial 
foreign ownership – at the time Yahoo owned 43% and Softbank 29.3% of Alibaba – would 
prevent Alipay from receiving a valid operating license under the new regulations, and/or 
perhaps hoping to siege greater control himself, Jack Ma transferred Alipay out of Alibaba 
Group to a company that is wholly-owned by Chinese nationals and 80% controlled by himself – 
Zhejiang Alibaba E-Commerce Company Limited, later renamed as Alibaba Small and Micro 
Financial Service Group, or Ant Financial. Alibaba’s transnational board members, including 
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Yahoo and Softbank, were furious about their losing control over Alipay – despite significant 
compensation plan later offered by Alibaba – as the subsidiary not only was expected to replace 
PayPal to become the world’s largest e-payment provider in a few years,455 but also incubated 
much more enormous economic potential. In 2015, Alipay is valued at more than $45 billion.456 
For Jack Ma, however, the divestiture of Alipay was a necessary step for the payment service to 
keep its operation “without delay and without any detrimental impact to our China retail 
marketplaces”.457 In other words, under the VIE model,  dominant ownership stake in offshore 
holding companies does not always translate into controlling power. Under certain circumstances, 
Alibaba has the capacity and the incentives to recompose its corporate structure, even at the 
expense of its transnational partners, to keep in line with the state’s agenda in order to continue 
operating in the important Chinese market. No matter how it was managed – indeed, the process 
remained largely murky and opaque – in general it indicated the growing alliance between state 
policies and the self-interest of leading Chinese Internet capitalists. The state regulators seemed 
to welcome this movement. In May 2011, Alipay was among the first of the 27 companies to be 
issued a payment business license.458 
Second, the financial arms of the Chinese state have also played an important role in 
Alibaba’s development, sometimes manifesting in the company’s power struggles with other 
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units of transnational capital. This financial support, in turn, has further deepened the company’s 
reliance on and close bond to its home state.  
Alibaba’s restructuring with Yahoo in 2012 is illustrative of this complex relationship. As 
mentioned, in 2005, Yahoo invested $1 billion in Alibaba and took a controlling ownership 
position – up to 43% stake – of the company. In 2012, in preparation for its parent company’s 
IPO and worried about losing management control because of the frequent turnover of Yahoo’s 
executives, and Microsoft’s unsuccessful attempt to acquire Yahoo in 2008,459 Alibaba 
negotiated with Yahoo to repurchase half of its stock back, which would reduce Yahoo’s 
ownership stake to around 23%. Different from its previous fundraising efforts in the 2000s, 
during which state banks were hesitant to lend support to China’s then-emergent Internet 
services firms, Chinese state-owned financial institutions and related investors are now both 
capable and willing to extend their arms to Alibaba, partly in anticipation of a handsome 
economic return from the parent company’s upcoming IPO (see Table 4.2 for a record of the 
major rounds of Alibaba’s capital raising).  
Indeed, Alibaba’s $7.6 billion mega-project with Yahoo was jointly funded by a group of 
both domestic and overseas investors, which future complicated its corporate ownership structure, 
as we saw in the beginning of this chapter. Although foreign banks provided a portion of the 
funds – a group of eight international banks offered a $1 billion debt financing, the Chinese state 
has played an exceptional role. China Development Bank, one of China’s three policy banks that 
have provided financial support to China’s network equipment giants Huawei and ZTE, lent 
Alibaba a substantial loan of $1 billion. Alibaba also raised part of the funds by selling its shares 
of stocks to a group of China-based investors, including the China Investment Corporation 
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(China’s sovereign wealth fund), CITIC capital holdings (an investment management firm under 
the state-owned CITIC); CDB capital (the private investment arm of the China Development 
Bank); as well as private equity firms New Horizon Capital and Boyu Capital that are controlled 
by some high-level Chinese political elites.460 The intricate financial network between Alibaba 
and the Chinese state has therefore manifested itself – for the first time – in the company’s 
struggle with another unit of transnational capital.  
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Table 4.2: Alibaba’s major rounds of capital raising (1999-2014) 
Round Time Quantity in USD millions Investors 
1st October 1999 $5M 
* Goldman Sachs (USA), Fidelity Capital (USA), 
Investor AB (Sweden), Transpac Capital (Singapore), 
Venture TDF (Singapore) 
 
2st January 2000 $25M 
* SoftBank (Japan), Fidelity Capital (USA), JAIC 
(Japan), Investor AB (Sweden), Transpac Capital 
(Singapore), Venture TDF (Singapore) 
 
3rd January 2001 $82M 
* SoftBank (Japan), Fidelity Capital (USA), GGV 
capital (USA), Venture TDF (Singapore) 
 
4th August 2005 $1,000M * Yahoo (USA)  
5th September 2011 $1,600M 
Silver Lake (USA), DST Global (Russia), Temasek 
(Singapore), Yunfeng Fund (China) 
 
6th August 2012 $7,600M 
Debt providers: * CDB (China), Australia and New 
Zealand Banking Group, Barclays Bank (UK), Citi 
(USA), Credit Suisse (Switzerland), DBS Bank 
(Singapore), Deutsche Bank (Germany), Mizuho 
Corporate Bank (Japan), Morgan Stanley (USA); 
Investors: * China Investment Corporation (China), 
CITIC capital (China), CDB capital (China), Horizon 
Capital (China), Boyu Capital (China), Silver Lake 
(USA), DST Global (Russia) and Temasek (Singapore) 
 
 
Source: The author, based on Su Longfei, “Jack Ma: The new adventures of Alibaba”; Qin Wei and 
Zhang Jiadai, “Alibaba’s equity change history: Whose Alibaba”; Alibaba Group, “Alibaba Closes 
US$7.6 Billion Share Repurchase and Restructuring of Yahoo! Relationship”.  
Note: Lead investors are marked by *.  
 
 
 
 
Finally, this supportive role of the Chinese state has also extended beyond the Chinese 
border into the domain of international relations. In other words, Alibaba has – to a certain extent 
– relied on the state’s foreign diplomatic power in its business development. One important 
	
 
197 
example came in 2011. In November 2011, Taobao, Alibaba’s C2C division, was added to the 
“Notorious Markets List” by the US Trade Representative, America’s chief trade negotiator, for 
the pirated and counterfeit goods sold on its website. This move not only threatened to damage 
Alibaba’s international reputation, but further complicated its plan for an upcoming IPO. Alibaba 
worked hard to delist itself, carrying out not only large-scale anti-piracy efforts on its websites, 
but also extensive lobbying activities in Washington, including hiring the US Trade 
Representative’s former general counsel.461 The Chinese state, on the other side, also lent its 
support. For example, in a regular press conference, a spokesman of China’s Ministry of 
Commerce strongly objected to Taobao's inclusion on the 2011 notorious markets list, calling the 
action “irresponsible and not objective” and expressed “serious concerns and dissatisfaction” to 
the US government.462 In 2012, Taobao was dropped from the list, just one week before “an 
annual high-level U.S.-China trade meeting” in Washington.463 
In September 2012, Alibaba delisted the shares of its B2B division from the Hong Kong 
Stock Exchange – at the same price as its IPO price five years before – as the falling share price 
caused by the global financial crisis “continue(d) to adversely impact…employee morale.”464 
This does not indicate, however, the fall of the Alibaba. Rather, Alibaba, with its growing C2C 
division that was firmly rooted in the burgeoning Chinese market, was ready for another 
milestone: a flotation of the entire Alibaba Group. 
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Toward 2014: Beyond E-commerce and beyond China?  
In preparation for its planned IPO in 2014, Alibaba undertook an aggressive buying spree 
both in and outside of China, which continued afterward with even greater intensity. In 2014, the 
company poured out $17 billion on more than 40 different deals.465 In 2015, it invested another 
$18.5 billion on 65 companies.466 This enormous amount of capital projection, however, is not 
only an expression of power, but also a necessity compelled by its weakness, as Alibaba needs to 
both find new investment outlets and to diversify its business structure, in face of the extremely 
harsh competition both domestic and international. Probably driven by both strategic and 
opportunistic considerations, those investment has significantly transformed the role of Alibaba 
from a pure e-commerce company to an Internet behemoth that permeates various aspect of 
contemporary political economy, ranging from retailing, logistics, finance, media and 
entertainment, pharmaceutical, to smartphone and even automobile manufacturing, as we saw in 
the beginning of this chapter.467 It has also significantly enlarged Alibaba’s global footprint, as 
the company started to project sizeable amount of capital overseas, completed eight large – over 
$100 million – deals from 2013 to 2015 (see Table 4.3). Indeed, by the end of 2015, Alibaba’s e-
commerce platform has itself constituted an infrastructure, which might help spearhead the larger 
process of Chinese transnational capital as they go overseas, a topic I will return to shortly.  
What has been behind this astonishing expansion? Alibaba’s changing corporate 
landscape has been shaped by both state polices and capital initiatives. On the one hand, the 
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Chinese state has played an outsized role in energizing Alibaba’s business proliferation. As Yu 
Hong shows, network connectivity and online applications have been accorded a crucial role in 
China’s post-2008 restructuring.468 The newly-minted “Internet Plus” and “One Belt One Road” 
initiatives under the Xi-Li administration, if anything, have only augmented this trend, as we saw 
in previous chapters. This unprecedented role of the Internet in China’s contemporary political 
economy, in the context of its continued reintegration into global capitalism, has propelled the 
state to not only open up many previously closed or highly restricted areas for private Internet 
capital – like Alibaba – to penetrate, but also integrate these units of Internet capital into its 
efforts of “going out,” or international expansion. Accordingly, related investment in the Internet 
sector has risen significantly. It is reported that, even in the economic downturn, in 2015, 
China’s government and businesses spent $147 billion in ICT equipment and services, up from 
$124 billion in 2014.469 China’s Internet industry in general, and Alibaba in particular, have 
benefited from this policy reorientation.  
On the other hand, the Chinese state has not been the only force behind Alibaba’s 
aggressive expansion.  Alibaba’s gigantic purchasing power has been subsidized – at least partly 
– by global financial networks. The enormous proceeds – $25 billion – it raised on the New York 
Stock Exchange in 2014 have certainly fed into the company’s buying activities. Moreover, as 
we saw in Chapter 3, the buying sprees of China’s Internet giants are often funded by 
transnational investment capital. Alibaba offers a prominent example in this regard. In August 
2014, right before its landmark IPO, four of its six lead underwriters, including Deutsche Bank, 
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JP Morgan, Citigroup and Morgan Stanley, lent Alibaba $3 billion in its business expansion to 
“deepen their relationship with the e-commerce giant in many different ways”.470 In March 2016, 
Alibaba announced another $3 billion five-year syndicated loan with a group of eight lead 
arrangers to fund its expansion plans, including ANZ Group, Credit Suisse, Citigroup, Deutsche 
Bank, Goldman Sachs, JP Morgan, Mizuho Bank and Morgan Stanley. The aim of this loan, 
again, was to “help the e-commerce giant as it snaps up stakes in companies within China and 
overseas.”471 These financial institutions, in turn, would expect to receive considerable economic 
benefits through Alibaba’s continued and extensive penetration in both the Chinese and global 
market. For example, it is reported that after its 2014 IPO, Alibaba paid its six IPO underwriters 
a total of $300 million for their services.472 
Thanks to the support from both the state and transnational capital, during this period, the 
company has actively expanded its footprint in both China and the global Internet.  
Domestically, there have been many “first times” in Alibaba’s business adventures. In the 
area of banking and finance, as aforementioned, Alipay was the first non-banking payment 
provider that received a license from China’s central bank. In 2014, Alibaba’s affiliate bank, 
Zhejiang Internet Commerce Bank, was one of the two privately owned commercial banks – 
another one belongs to Tencent – to be allowed an operation in the highly regulated state-owned 
banking industry.473 In the area of network operation, HiChina, a subsidiary of Alibaba, was 
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among the first 11 private companies – others include Alibaba’s major competitor B2C giant JD 
– to be awarded a mobile virtual network operator license to resell network services from 
China’s three state-owned operates.474 Alibaba has also extended its tentacles into public services 
through various collaborative projects with local governments. In 2015, the municipal 
governments of Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou and Shenzhen have all reached agreements with 
Alibaba to develop smart cities initiatives, linking public services like hospital appointments or 
utility bills payments with Alibaba’s platforms.475 In addition to the well-saturated and highly 
competitive urban market, Alibaba’s expansionist initiatives have also spread into rural areas to 
look for new growth outlets. In 2014, it announced its plan to build 1,000 county-level 
distribution and 100,000 village-level drop-off e-commerce service centers in the next three to 
five years to stimulate the development of e-commerce in rural China.476 Probably most 
significantly, Alibaba has even elbowed its way into the extremely sensitive military-related 
satellite and spatial industry. It is reported that in 2015, Alibaba set up a joint venture with state-
owned defense company China North Industry Group to promote the commercialization of 
Beidou Navigation satellite – the Chinese indigenous GPS system.477  Through all these new 
initiatives, Alibaba cultivated an even closer partnership with the state.  
Alibaba’s development has gone beyond the domestic market. Both before and after its 
IPO, the company has conducted a series of vigorous capital projections at an unprecedented 
                                                
474 “Eleven companies issued with Chinese MVNO licenses, including Alibaba,” Telegeography, January 
2, 2014, https://www.telegeography.com/products/commsupdate/articles/2014/01/02/eleven-companies-
issued-with-chinese-mvno-licences-including-alibaba.  
475 “Beijing gov’t signs with Alibaba for smart city initiatives,” Xinhua Net, April 22, 2015, 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2015-04/22/c_134174691.htm 
476 Gillian Wong and Loretta Chao, “Alibaba, JD.com Target Rural China for E-Commerce Growth,” The 
Wall Street Journal, August 30, 2015, http://www.wsj.com/articles/alibaba-jd-com-target-rural-china-for-
e-commerce-growth-1440980597.  
477 Liu Rong, “Alibaba to Partner in Commercializing China's GPS System Beidou,” People’s Daily 
Online, August 19, 2015, http://en.people.cn/n/2015/0819/c90000-8938771.html.  
	
 
202 
intensity and scale in the global Internet market. According to data from the China Global 
Investment Tracker compiled by the American Enterprise Institute-Heritage foundation, it is only 
since 2013 that Alibaba began projecting large amounts of capital overseas.478 From 2013 to 
2015, the company initiated eight large deals of $100 million or above, targeting neighboring 
countries such as India, Singapore and Japan, as well as the center of global digital capitalism, 
the US. For Alibaba, those cross-border investments served two aims: First, to spread and 
strengthen its core business of online commerce; and second, to diversify its profit structure and 
risks on a global scale. For the first aim, the company acquired various stakes in a group of 
foreign e-commerce companies, including Shoprunner in the US, Snapdeal and One97 in India 
and logistic company Singapore Post. For the second aim, it invested a considerable amount of 
capital into social media and online gaming market segments – the main business of its rival 
Tencent – including $220 million in Tangome, $200 million in Snapchat, and $120 million in 
Kabam. In 2015, it even jointly funded a robotics company in Japan with SoftBank and Foxconn 
(see table 4.3).  
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Table 4.3: Major overseas deals completed by Alibaba (2005-2015) 
Year Month Transaction Party Quantity in USD millions Share Country 
2013 October Shoprunner (e-commerce) $110M 18% USA 
2014 March TangoMe (social media) $220M 20% USA 
2014 May Singapore Post  
(e-commerce) 
$250M 10% Singapore 
2014 July Kabam (online gaming) $120M  USA 
2015 Jan One 97 (e-commerce) $200M 25% India 
2015 March Snapchat (social media) $200M  USA 
2015 June SoftBank (robotics)  $120M 20% Japan 
2015 Aug Snapdeal (e-commerce) $200M 4% India 
 
Source: American Enterprise Institute-Heritage foundation, “China Global Investment Tracker (2005-
2015)”.  
Note: Only deals over 100 million are included in the database.   
 
 
 
 
Apart from these cross-border mergers and acquisitions, Alibaba has also developed 
direct presence in the international market. In Western Europe, besides upgrading its London 
office to the company’s European headquarters, Alibaba opened up three new offices – the so-
called “embassies” – in France, Germany and Italy to attract European sellers to its platforms.479 
In Russia and Brazil, AliExpress, the retail version of its B2B unit Alibaba, has reportedly gained 
                                                
479 Charles Clover “Alibaba seeks to become ‘gateway to China’ with Europe offices,” Financial Times, 
October 13, 2015, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/c93f57c2-71bb-11e5-9b9e-
690fdae72044.html#axzz4LJ1zhxVF.  
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early success through its Russian and Portuguese sites.480 Those global expansions, however, 
were not always welcomed. Deep entanglement and interpenetration notwithstanding, fierce 
competitions from other units of Internet capital have certainly restricted Alibaba’s sprawling 
route. For example, unable to gain a foothold in the home front of Amazon and eBay, Alibaba 
sold its US online shop 11main – just one year after its launch – to a New York-based e-
commerce company OpenSky, in exchange for a 37% stake.481 Indeed, even with large amount 
of capital investment and seemingly active overseas activities, the international retail and 
wholesale businesses have only accounted for a small amount of Alibaba’s annual revenue – 9.2% 
in fiscal year of 2014 and 8.5% in 2015.482 
The limited success of Alibaba’s overseas activities has another implication – even with a 
historical IPO on the New York capital market, a highly transnationalized corporate ownership 
structure, and extensive ties with global financial networks, the company still has to rely heavily 
– if not exclusively – on its home market for revenue and profit. The central role of the Chinese 
market in Alibaba’s profit strategy, in turn, has translated into some maneuvering power of the 
state that continued to structure the company’s adventures in both the domestic and overseas 
markets. In other words, it has become both more international and much closer to the Chinese 
state.  
On one side, riding the tide of the "Belt and Road” initiative – an updated version of the 
“going out” policies in the early 2000s – Alibaba has anchored itself firmly in the international 
                                                
480 Loretta Chao, “China's Alibaba Draws Brazilian Bargain Shoppers,” The Wall Street Journal, 
September 12, 2014, http://www.wsj.com/articles/chinas-alibaba-draws-brazilian-bargain-shoppers-
1410555882.  
481 Ingrid Lunden, “Alibaba Rethinks Its US E-Commerce Strategy, Folds 11 Main, Other U.S. Holdings 
into OpenSky, “TechCrunch, June 22, 2015, https://techcrunch.com/2015/06/22/alibaba-rethinks-its-us-e-
commerce-strategy-folds-11-main-other-u-s-holdings-into-opensky.  
482 Alibaba Group, Form 20-F, 2015, http://ar.alibabagroup.com/2015/assets/pdf/20-F.PDF.  
	
 
205 
agenda of the Chinese state. In 2016, speaking at the St. Petersburg International Economic 
Forum in Russia, Jack Ma proposed the idea of “e-commerce silk road” and claimed that the key 
areas for Alibaba to construct this “e-commerce silk road” are the regions along the "Belt and 
Road” initiative, including Southeast Asia, Russia and the EU.483 Probably as a manifestation of 
this “e-commerce silk road,” in April 2016, Alibaba completed its largest overseas deal so far – 
spending $1 billion for a controlling stake of Lazada, an e-commerce company that operates 
across six countries in Southeast Asia, including Singapore and Indonesia.484 To further 
emphasize its role in the state’s international strategy of “going out in groups,” or promoting an 
unified “Chinese team” in the global market, Alibaba has branded itself as a vehicle to help other 
Chinese firms in their ventures abroad. For example, in August 2016, the CEO of Aliyun, 
Alibaba’s cloud computing arm, suggested that the overseas expansion of Aliyun, including 
launching data centers in the US, Singapore and Hong Kong, will serve the purpose of 
constructing a cloud infrastructure for other Chinese firms, especially Chinese software 
companies, when they go out.485 Alibaba, therefore, while continuing its globalization efforts 
driven by the capitalist logic of constant expansion, also served, or claimed to serve – at least 
part of – China’s international and diplomatic agenda.   
                                                
483 Peng Tianxiaoà Œ and Zhang JiyeÞƊ,“Yi Dai Yi Lu changyi cuisheng xinxing dianshang 
moshi,” ÑǍCƴFťĕŧĺÝ [One Belt One Road created new modes of e-commerce], 
Xinhua Net ĕqƎ, June 18, 2016,  
http://finance.people.com.cn/n1/2016/0618/c1004-28455377.html.  
484 Newley Purnell and Alyssa Abkowitz, “Alibaba Thinks Outside the China Box,” The Wall Street 
Journal, August 12, 2016, http://www.wsj.com/articles/alibaba-thinks-outside-the-china-box-
1470995037?cx_navSource=cx_picks&cx_tag=contextual&cx_artPos=5#cxrecs_s.  
485 “Ali yun quanqiubushu, jiang daidong 100 jia Zhongguo ruanjian qiye chuhai,” ǫǢ MŢǠƏ, À
Ñk 100ºǏ15^ň [Ali Cloud’s global arrangement would help 100 Chinese software 
companies to go abroad], August 10, 2016, http://www.cnsoftnews.com/news/201608/51735.html.  
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On the other side, the company’s close ties with global financial networks, especially the 
deep entrenchment of foreign capital in its corporate ownership structure, has also prompted the 
Chinese state – under the territorial logic – to intervene into Alibaba’s seemingly borderless 
expansion in its domestic political economy.  
The aforementioned Alipay dispute among Alibaba, Yahoo and SoftBank indicated that 
in certain strategic industries such as finance and banking that are closely related with issue of 
national security, the Chinese state, leveraging its enormous domestic market, can force Alibaba 
to restructure its relationship with its major transnational shareholders.  
In recent years, along with the rising importance of the Internet industry in both its 
domestic market and global capitalism, the state has also initiated a series of new regulations in 
an attempt to keep its native Internet services and applications companies in check. As we saw in 
Chapter 3, a new Foreign Investment Draft Law has been under discussion in China’s Ministry 
of Commerce since 2015, which claimed that the “nationality” of a company under the VIE 
structure will be defined not based on its ownership structure, but based on who has ultimate 
control over the enterprise.486 Alibaba’s “Alibaba Partnership,” a specific corporate structure it 
developed in 2010 to secure the decision-making authority remaining with its management team 
in China – despite dominant foreign ownership in its parent company 487 – might be useful in 
helping the company justify its “Chineseness” under the new regulation. The specific outcome of 
these new moves, however, remained to be seen.  
 
                                                
486 Gillian Wong and Juro Osawa, “How China’s Draft Rules May Affect Foreign Investors,” The Wall 
Street Journal, January 28, 2015, http://www.wsj.com/articles/how-chinas-draft-rules-may-affect-foreign-
investors-1422412416. 
487 Prudence Ho, “Alibaba Details Partnership Structure,” The Wall Street Journal, June 19, 2014, 
http://blogs.wsj.com/moneybeat/2014/06/19/alibaba-details-partnership-structure.  
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Conclusion 
Before Alibaba’s debut on the New York capital market, a Wall Street Journal article 
confusedly commented: “Alibaba may be associated with China and the Chinese market, but it is 
an oddly global company”.488 Indeed, as this chapter has demonstrated, Alibaba started its 
“internationalization” at the inception: It was incorporated in the Cayman Islands just a few 
months after the launch of it first website, operating in China through a variety of onshore and 
offshore subsidiaries, listing its B2B subsidiary in Hong Kong in 2007 and the parent company 
on the New York Stock Exchange in 2014, and has been actively expanding overseas several 
months after its inauguration. It might be clear that Alibaba has started its global journey early, 
what remains little known, however, is how the state-capital dynamic has shaped its different 
routes toward “internationalization”?  
This chapter investigated the origins, evolution and internationalization of Alibaba – one 
of China’s most powerful Internet companies and one of the world’s largest e-commerce 
companies – through the lens of state-capital interactions. This strategy was used to dig deeper 
into the evolution of China’s Internet industry as well as its complex interactions with the 
structural transformation of the global Internet. 
Drawing on a historical examination of Alibaba’s business history, this chapter explored 
a succession of mutually constituting relationship between Alibaba’s evolution and broader 
political-economic dynamics, and between the Chinese state and transnational capital. Rather 
than creating an oversimplified formula, it shows that Alibaba’s global journal presents a specific 
                                                
488 Stephen Grocer, “Alibaba’s IPO Filing: Everything You Need to Know,” The Wall Street Journal, 
May 6, 2014, http://blogs.wsj.com/moneybeat/2014/05/06/alibabas-ipo-filing-everything-you-need-to-
know. 
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pattern of state-capital relation that includes both tension and collaboration: From the late 1990s, 
transnational capital has played a fundamental role in the construction of Alibaba, largely under 
the tacit endorsement of the Chinese state. The 2008 economic crisis, while shifting Alibaba’s 
business focus more toward China’s domestic market, also deepened the company’s reliance on 
the home state both in its business model and in its power struggle with other units of 
transnational capital. Finally, toward its 2014 debut on the New York Stock Exchange, Alibaba 
has constructed a wide-ranging digital empire and greatly enhanced its overseas presence. The 
growing importance of the company in both China’s political economy and global cyberspace, 
however, also propelled the state to exercise its disciplinary power, with many results remaining 
to be seen.  
The main finding of the chapter is threefold. First and foremost, Alibaba has been an 
“international” company from the very beginning. It would never become the “symbol of 
China’s new tech strength”489 without the state’s implicit consent to allowing transnational 
capital to engage – as portfolio investors – in the formulation of China’s internet services and 
applications industry. The deep and early articulation of transnational capital with Alibaba goes 
directly against the conventional wisdom that China has closed off its digital borders and has 
been consistently building an inward looking “intranet” that is sealed off by the “Great Firewall,” 
a point that has been raised throughout this dissertation. Indeed, transnational capital has 
facilitated the incubation of Alibaba, as well as it later development, including the recent 
international expansion. Moreover, the evolution of Alibaba has also benefited from diverse 
forms of support from different levels of the Chinese government, from the early promotion of 
the development of e-commerce in China to the recent all-round policy shift to the initiatives of 
                                                
489 McDonald, “Alibaba, Symbol of China’s New Tech Giants”.  
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“Internet Plus” and “One Belt One Road”. In other words, the rise of Alibaba in global 
cyberspace is a product of the joint efforts of both the Chinese state and transnational capital. 
The finding in this chapter therefore echoes other recent scholarly work on the interpenetration 
between transitional capital and the Chinese Internet.490 
This state-capital relationship, however, should not be oversimplified. As Alibaba’s 
business history has shown, deep integration and engagement notwithstanding, the Chinese state 
– through its various level of government entities – has presented strenuous efforts to curb the 
influence of transnational capital in its homegrown Internet industry. Far from a unified 
monolithic force, this state power has nevertheless become increasingly significant, along with 
the progressive omnipresence of Alibaba in both China’s domestic and international Internet. 
The 2011’s Alipay dispute, as well as the recently drafted Foreign Investment Law, demonstrate 
both the will and the power of the Chinese government to keep disciplining its domestic Internet 
capital. On the other hand, transnational capitals, in continuing to fund Alibaba’s expansion 
projects, have also tried to maximize their interests through Alibaba’s journey. In this regard, 
Alibaba also embodies a battlefield where the state and transnational capital have wrestled for 
the mastery of China’s digital economy.  
Finally, we should not overlook the role of Alibaba itself. With the state’s continuing 
push of Internet capital into almost every aspect of China’s political economy as well as its 
                                                
490 Dan Schiller, Digital Depression: Information Technology and Economic Crisis (Urbana: University 
of Illinois Press, 2014); Yuezhi Zhao, “China’s Pursuits of Indigenous Innovations in Information 
Technology Developments: Hopes, Follies and Uncertainties,” Chinese Journal of Communication 3, no. 
3 (2010): 266–89; Min Tang, “Tencent as a Nexus: The Political Economy of China’s Internet Industry” 
(PhD dissertation, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 2017); Hong, Networking China; 
ShinJoung Yeo, “Geopolitics of Search: Google versus China?,” Media, Culture & Society 38, no. 4 
(2016): 591–605; Christian Fuchs, “Baidu, Weibo and Renren: The Global Political Economy of Social 
Media in China,” Asian Journal of Communication 26, no. 1 (2015): 14–41. 
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international Internet, Alibaba’s tentacles have spread into myriad industries and have increasing 
turned itself into a “national champion” of China’s digital revolution. This growing influence of 
Alibaba – and China’s now powerful Internet industry in general – has given rise to a formidable 
group of Internet corporate elites in China, represented by Jack Ma in the case of Alibaba. Is 
there a fraction of the transnational capitalist class in China that is rising around network 
technologies?  How has it interacted with the Chinese party-state and other segments of the 
transnational capitalist class? The final chapter will dig deeper into these interactions between 
state, transnational capital and an emerging Internet capitalist class fraction in China.  
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CHAPTER 5  
 
THE RISE OF THE INTERNET CAPITALIST CLASS FRACTION IN CHINA 
 
 
 
In December 2014, three months after Alibaba’s historic IPO on the New York Stock 
Exchange, its Founder and Executive Chairman Jack Ma was featured as a runner-up for Time's 
Person of the Year. The title was simple, “Jack Ma, the Capitalist”.491 Underneath this 
straightforward assertion, however, are many unanswered questions: Is there a fraction of a 
capitalist class rising in China around Internet-based accumulation strategies? Have its members 
– represented by Jack Ma here – actually successfully joined the “transnational capitalist class”? 
Is that resulting a pattern of common class behavior and political consciousness, which might 
disrupt the cohesion of a Chinese state-centered strategy? And how does the configuration of this 
particular capitalist class fraction in China interact with domestic state agencies?  
Previous literature has paid due attention to the transformation of social class relations in 
the age of neoliberal globalization. Scholars have argued, on a macro level, that the 
transnationalization of capital accumulation has contributed to the rise of a transnational 
capitalist class whose class project of profit maximization has increasingly moved beyond the 
territorial logic of the nation-states.492 Few studies, however, have investigated capitalist class 
fractions in specific industries, including the Internet industry. Scholars of communication and 
information technologies, on the other hand, have given important consideration to the changing 
                                                
491 Rana Foroohar, “Jack Ma, the Capitalist,” TIME, December 8, 2014, http://time.com/time-person-of-
the-year-runner-up-jack-ma.  
492 William K. Carroll, The Making of a Transnational Capitalist Class: Corporate Power in the 21st 
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Class, and State in a Transnational World (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press., 2004); Leslie 
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social relations around new media technologies and offered valuable insights on the formation of 
a “network society.”493 The actions at the inner core of power of this society, however, have 
received relatively scant attention. What remains little known is how the chief power-holders 
sitting in the center of today’s global digital capitalism both interact with each other and interact 
with their home states. This chapter attempts to address – though not to fill – this gap, by looking 
at whether there is a specific capitalist class fraction that is growing around China’s Internet 
industry. It also opens up a new window on the social and class implications of the international 
expansion of the Chinese Internet, a vital pole of economic growth in today’s crisis-ridden 
transnational digital capitalism.494 
This chapter begins by recognizing that political economy approaches the concept of class 
through three dimensions: the structural dimension that focuses on business and governmental 
institutions, the formational dimension that investigates how class makes or constitutes itself, 
and the relational dimension that understands class in relation with other social class 
categories.495 To keep the focus on state-capital interactions – the center of this dissertation – this 
chapter draws on all three dimensions while augmenting the complex and highly fluid 
relationship between a rising group of Chinese Internet elites, the state and other segments of the 
transnational capitalist class. Indeed, in the spirit of Dan Schiller’s conceptualization, this 
chapter understands “capital” not as thing – as money or investment – but a two-sided, 
                                                
493	Manuel Castells, The Rise of the Network Society. Vol. 1 of The Information Age: Economy, Society 
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contradictory social relation that is built around wage labor.496 While previous literature on 
China’s ICT industry foregrounds one pole of class relations by studying how China’s working 
class articulates with the Internet,497 this chapter builds on and contributes to this emerging body 
of work by granting attention to the other pole – the capitalist class. It asks: How have Chinese 
Internet corporate elites interlocked with and differentiated from the transnational capitalist class 
– and how has this process interacted with the Chinese party-state? Looking specifically at the 
class fraction that is growing in China around network technologies and applications, and at its 
transnational interlocks, this chapter offers a new window onto the international Internet “with 
Chinese characteristics”. It likewise contributes to our understanding of the complex 
transnational class relations that animate contemporary digital capitalism. 
This chapter is organized as follows: The next section introduces the methods data used 
in this study. Based on the biographical data of 190 executives and senior managers at 20 major 
Chinese Internet companies, Sections Three and Four offer a preliminary definition of the 
Internet capitalist class fraction in China and sketches out some of the multifaceted connections 
between this group, the state and other transnational capitalists. It also situates this macro-level 
examination in the interplay between the restructuring of China’s domestic political economy 
and the changing dynamics of transnational capitalism. Sections Five further disaggregates the 
sample into the three different but deeply entangled industry subsectors, focusing on the chief 
executives in network equipment, operation, and services and applications. Relying on 
                                                
496 Dan Schiller, “Rosa Luxemburg’s Internet? For a Political Economy of State Mobilization and the 
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documentation collected from media reports, it looks at how their connections with both the state 
and transnational capitalists have played out in shaping these tech leaders’ political behaviors 
and class consciousness, in the context of the continuing global expansion of the Chinese 
Internet. 
This chapter concludes by presenting a multifaceted picture of the rise of China’s Internet 
capitalist class fraction in global digital capitalism. On the one hand, while these tech leaders 
have become notably transnational, they have nevertheless demonstrated a considerable level of 
engagement with their home state, to different degrees and for reasons varying for each industry 
subsector. If “a common political and economic project of the TCC [transnational capitalist class] 
is to re-engineer the state and economy to facilitate transnationalization,”498 then Chinese 
Internet capitalists, contained by the still powerful territorial logic of the Chinese state, and – to a 
limited extent – its socialist legacy, have not yet successfully joined this group. On the other 
hand, such close ties with the home government should not be mistaken as an almighty Chinese 
state taking full control of its domestic Internet capitalists – rather, the state, far from a unified 
monolithic entity, has both sought control of and courted partnership with this emerging and 
progressively influential class fraction. Animated by the “dialectic of the territorial and 
capitalistic logics of power,”499 the character and complexity of China’s Internet capitalists, and 
their rapidly evolving relations with both the state and other transnational capitalists, require 
continuing attention.  
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It is worth noting that the reconstitution of the capitalist class in China is by no means 
contained by the Internet capitalist class fraction studied in this chapter, as the process of 
capitalist development is much broader and extensive than the development of the Internet 
industry alone. China’s “digital revolution,” however, has been at the center of the country’s 
unfinished and much-contested reintegration into the global capitalist system.500  As we saw in 
previous chapters, with the further promulgation of the “Internet Plus” and “One Belt One Road” 
initiatives, the Internet industry would likely become even more important across the broader 
structure of China’s political economy, including not only network equipment, operation, and 
services and applications highlighted in this study, but also big business users and specialized 
suppliers. While studying the rise of China’s Internet capitalist class fraction does not exhaust all 
the possible forms of social class formation, it has nevertheless offered a window on the overall 
process by which class power has been reconstituted in contemporary China.    
 
Methods and Data 
To explore the emergence of the Internet capitalist class fraction in China and its relations 
both with the state and with other transnational capitalists, both quantitative and qualitative data 
were used.  
The quantitative data were obtained by compiling a sample for 20 major Internet 
companies in China in 2015, and by studying/coding the biographies of all the mainland-based 
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board members and senior managers of the companies in the sample. To compile this sample, I 
first identified a list of 20 major Chinese Internet companies, based both on their market 
capitalization and revenue in fiscal year 2015. Both rankings were used because they help us to 
understand different things: Market capitalization gets us the financial dimensions – especially 
the transnational/domestic dimension – of their identities as leading Internet companies, while 
revenues give us some benchmark sense of their significance in the product markets that they 
serve. The market capitalization of four companies on the list are not available for different 
reasons. China Electronic Technology Corporation (CETC) and China Electronics Corporation 
(CEC) are the two largest state-owned IT hardware conglomerates, each coordinating a complex 
group of public and private companies. The large number of the companies under their wings 
make the market capitalization of the two parent companies hard to calculate.501 Huawei and 
Xiaomi are privately held firms as the time of this study. Huawei, in particular, has chosen to 
stay private since its establishment in 1987, despite the company’s growing international 
presence. However, their significance to the overall Chinese Internet economy should be 
acknowledged. One critical indicator of their importance is their annual revenues: In 2015, 
CEC’s revenue reached $31.5 billion, CETC $26.4 billion, Huawei $62.8 billion and Xiaomi 
$12.5 billion.502 To put it into a comparative perspective, the same year, Cisco’s revenue was 
$49.2 billion and Apple’s iPhone revenue came to a total of $151 billion.503 The 20 Internet firms 
                                                
501 For example, according to their official websites, in October 2016, CEC controls 61 second level 
subsidiaries, including 13 public listed companies while CEIC controls 66 second level subsidiaries and 8 
of them have gone public. One estimate puts CEC’s market value at $36.7 billion while CEIC at $35.6 
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in my sample, therefore, carry disproportionate weight in both the Chinese and global digital 
political economy (see Table 5.1 for the full list).  
Based on the list of the 20 major Chinese Internet companies, I then compiled a sample 
of all the directors and executive officers for each corporation using their 2015 annual reports. 
After a general examination of the composition of the corporate board of each company, I 
singled out all the mainland-based Chinese leaders as a sample for the study. To keep 
consistency with major international business data such as the UNCTAD’s World Investment 
Report, this step excludes members from Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan. After de-duplicating 
the executives that appear in multiple boards, the finalized sample contains a total of 190 
Chinese Internet elites (see Appendix B). 
To foreground the relationship between this class fraction, the state and other capitalists, I 
obtained the biographical information of all the members from each companies’ annual reports, 
supplemented by public information available on specific organizations’ websites, such as the 
National People’s Congress. Four different measurements were used to code the biographical 
data: transnational board connections, overseas schooling, government occupation, and political 
affiliation. The first two measurements, foregrounding international linkages, have been 
confirmed by other scholars as related to forging class consciousness.504 The third and fourth 
measurements were also proved to be useful for scholars who are interested in studying state-
business interactions in China.505 In particular, a board member or senior manager was coded 
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four times in the database – as “Yes” or “No” – according to each of the four measurements: (1) 
Is he or she sitting on the same board with directors from other transnational corporation; (2) Did 
he or she go to college or graduate school overseas; (3) Is he or she a current or former employee 
in national or local government agencies; (4) Is he or she previously (or currently) serving as a 
member of major party-state organizations, such as the national or local branch of People’s 
Congress (PC), the People’s Political Consultative Conference (PPCC), or the national or local 
congress of the Chinese communist party (CCP)? I zoomed in at the chief executives or the de 
facto controllers of these companies when information on other members was incomplete or not 
publicly available. Instead of exhausting the range of possible factors in class formation, those 
measurements were taken to illuminate the multifaceted connections between Chinese Internet 
capitalists, the state, and their transnational counterparts.    
Finally, to further our understanding on how these connections have played out in 
shaping those members’ class consciousness and political actions, qualitative data were collected 
through a systematic examination of media reports in both English and Chinese languages, 
focusing on speeches, interviews and policy proposals of the most significant executives in the 
sample. Those discursive traces were then disaggregated and discussed separately according to 
the three industry subsectors those executives have served – equipment, operation, and services 
and applications – since there are different levels of state involvement in each subsector, as we 
saw in chapter 3. While quantitative data helped us gain a macro understanding of this class 
fraction, qualitative data offered both examples for illustrations and identified the locus of 
decision making power that is constituted in China.  
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Table 5.1: 20 major Chinese Internet companies (2015) 
  Company  Sector  Market Cap Revenue  Capital  Expenditure 
Numbers of 
employees 
1  China Mobile  
Network 
operator $241B  $107.8B 
RMB 195.6B 
(US $30.2B) 438,645 
2  Alibaba  Applications provider  $200.7B $14.96B 
RMB 7,705M 
(US $1,243M) 
 
36,446 
3 Tencent Applications provider $197.4B $16.3B 
RMB 7,709M 
(US $1,116M) 30,641 
4 Baidu  Applications provider $66.1B  $10.5B  
RMB 5,230M 
(US $807.3M) 41,467 
5 China Telecom 
Network 
operator $41B $52.7B 
RMB 109B 
(US $15.8B) 291,526 
6 JD.com  Applications provider  $38.8B  $28.8B  
RMB 5,300M 
(US $818M) 105,963 
7 China Unicom  
Network 
operator $29.1B  $43B  
RMB 133.88B 
(US $19.4B) 268,887 
8 Ctrip Applications provider  $21.2B  $1.7B  RMB 658.13M (US $95.58M) 31,000  
9 Netease  Applications provider  $17.5B $3.6B 
RMB 866.3M 
(US $133.7M) 12,919 
10 Leshi Applications provider $16.8B $2.4B N/A 4,885 
11 Lenovo  Equipment manufacturer $9.1B $47.1B  $935M 60,000 
12 ZTE  Equipment manufacturer $8.87B  $13.1B  
RMB 3,132M 
(US $453M) 91,452 
13 VIPshop  Applications provider $7.8B $6.3B 
RMB 4.18B 
(US $644.5M) 8,544  
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  Company  Sector  Market Cap Revenue  Capital  Expenditure 
Numbers of 
employees 
14 Qihoo 360 Applications provider  $7.54B $1.4B $156.3M 4,200  
15 Sina  
Applications 
provider $2.79B $0.88B $45.47M 76,000 
 
16 Sohu 
Applications 
provider  
 
$1.85B $1.9B $243.29M 106,000 
17 Huawei  
Equipment 
manufacturer N/A $62.8B N/A 170,000 
18 CEC Equipment manufacturer N/A $31.5B N/A 130,000 
19 CETC Equipment manufacturer N/A $26.4B N/A 110,000 
20  Xiaomi  Equipment manufacturer N/A $12.5B $133.5M 8,100 
 
Source: Google Finance; Forbes global 2000 (2015); companies’ annual reports (2015);  
Note: B=billion, M=million.  
 
 
Defining Internet Capitalists in China 
In 2016, Forbes released its second annual list of the world’s “100 Richest Tech 
Billionaires”. Corporate elites from mainland China accounted for a substantial one-fifth of the 
total. The 19 Chinese tycoons, with a combined net worth of $132.7 billion, occupied key 
positions on the list, including two among the top 10 – Alibaba’s Jack Ma ranked 8th (with a net 
Table 5.1 (cont.) 
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worth of $28.7 billion) and Tencent’s Pony Ma 9th (net worth $22 billion).506 To put it in a 
comparative perspective, China is second on the list in terms of numbers of billionaires. The US 
– probably not surprisingly – has a dominant 51, Canada 5, and Germany 4. The other 11 
countries or regions on the list each only have three or fewer members. Indeed, with the 
continuing expansion of China’s Internet industry, Chinese tech leaders – as a group – have 
become increasingly visible in global digital capitalism, sharing the stage with familiar Internet 
capitalists like Microsoft’s Bill Gates, Amazon’s Jeff Bezos, Alphabet/Google’s Larry Page and 
Sergey Brin, and Facebook’s Mark Zuckerberg.  
Despite the high visibility of China’s newly emerged Internet elites, there is little 
knowledge about them in the existing literature.507 Indeed, a crucial question remains unresolved: 
What defines these people as capitalists? This question is especially perplexing in the Chinese 
context since the term "capitalist class" has not yet been recognized in official discourse or 
documented in national statistics. In his study, Chen An distinguishes between the bourgeois 
class and the middle class in China, and refers to the former as "owners of relatively large capital, 
namely the wealthiest private entrepreneurs," but he also tends to be ambiguous on how to define 
"large capital" or "wealthiest".508 In sum, there seems to be neither settled definition nor clear 
threshold in terms of how much wealth would qualify a person as a "capitalist" in China.  
                                                
506 Kate Vinton, “The 100 Richest Tech Billionaires in the world in 2016,” Forbes, August 10, 2016, 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/katevinton/2016/08/10/the-100-richest-tech-billionaires-in-the-world-in-
2016/#76a27d6b6b3f. Forbes chose to exclude telecom and media in its definition of the technology 
industry.  
507 For an important case study on Chinese capitalists in communication industries, see Yun Wen, “From 
Margin to Center: The Remaking of the Capitalist Class in China’s Communication Industries,” Paper 
presented at the International Association for Media and Communication Research, Montreal, Canada, 
2015. 
508 An Chen, “Capitalist Development, Entrepreneurial Class, and Democratization in China,” Political 
Science Quarterly 177, no. 3 (2002): 401–22, 409. 
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Previous literature has pointed out that two types of attributes are vital in defining a 
capitalist: The ownership of personal wealth and/or the control of productive capital. Given the 
significant ambiguity in the Chinese case, I used both to get a rough idea of the sample in this 
study. For the ownership of personal wealth, I relied on the annually distributed Hurun list of 
richest Chinese, which profiles and ranks China’s richest citizens – those net worth exceeds 
RMB 2 billion (almost US $300 million).509 In 2016, Hurun had 1,877 people on its list. I cross-
checked the members of my sample with the list and found out a significant overlap – for 
example, Alibaba Group contributes eight billionaires – but the result remains far from complete 
(see Appendix 2).  
Admittedly, even as one of the most authoritative sources on economic elites in China, 
Hurun’s list has its limitations. For this study, on the one hand, many relatively not-so-prominent 
managers were not on the list, for various reasons. It might simply because they were not in the 
same league with those billionaires, or the information on their wealth was not public available, 
especially if they work in private companies. On the other hand, all SOE managers –  36 in total 
in my sample – were missing from the list given the fact that it is almost impossible to find out 
how much wealth the SOE managers have accumulated – as party members and government 
officials, they tend to keep their wealth hidden.510  
 In order to complement the first attribute, I turned to the second one: the control of 
productive capital. 511 To investigate how much productive capital these Internet elites actually 
                                                
509 For the full list, see “2015 Hurun baifu bang,” 2015ƛŋŬ»Ĺ [2015 Hurun’s list of richest Chinese], 
http://www.hurun.net/CN/HuList.aspx?nid=1031. 
510 David S. G. Goodman, Class in Contemporary China (Malden: Polity Press, 2014), 76. 
511 Marx uses “production capital” to encompass both constant and variable capital. Constant capital 
refers to capital invested in the means of production (raw materials, machinery, etc.), while variable 
capital refers to labor costs. In this study, I use companies’ annual capital expenditures as a proxy for 
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command, I collected data of both the capital expenditure and the number of employees of each 
of the 20 companies in 2015. It is worth noting that for this study, these two measurements are to 
a large extent derived from these people’s ownership/management role in one or more Internet 
corporations. It is these companies – not the capitalists themselves – which in turn mobilize labor 
power and make capital investments. In other words, their identity as members of the capitalist 
class is mediated by the corporations they control and/or direct. 
The data shows that their capital expenditures are massive. For example, web application 
provider Alibaba spent $1,243 million in 2015, equipment and hardware manufacturer Lenovo 
$935 million, and network operator China Mobile RMB195.6 billion (US $30.2 billion). Their 
ability to mobilize labor power through ownership or management role is equally impressive. In 
fact, although the wealth of all SOE managers remains unknown, these elites actually control a 
large quantity of labor power: In 2015, China Mobile had 438,645 employees, China Telecom 
291,526, China Unicom 268,887, CEC 130,000 and CETC 110, 000 (see Table 5.1).  
These two attributes, instead of offering detailed statistics of the capitalist class fraction 
in China’s Internet sector, give us a rough idea of both the wealth these elites have accumulated 
and the productive capital they are able to command. The data are indicative rather than 
comprehensive, but they have nevertheless helped sketch out a preliminary picture of this class 
fraction in China’s digital economy. 
 
                                                                                                                                                       
constant capital and the number of their employees as an indication for variable capital. For a detailed 
discussion on constant and variable capital, see, David Harvey, A Companion to Marx’s Capital (New 
York: Verso, 2010), 128-129. 
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The “Making” of China’s Internet Capitalist Class Fraction 
A comprehensive review of the general biographical data of all the 190 Internet 
executives in the sample reveals a complex and even contradictory picture. On the one hand, 
they seemed to have cultivated expansive transnational ties both through corporate board 
membership and overseas schooling. Among the 190 high-ranking managers, almost one-third – 
61 of them – have received education outside mainland China, many of them at elite schools in 
the US. Approximately 62 percent – 118 of them – are sitting on the same board with directors 
from other transnational corporations. Moreover, as more Chinese Internet firms set up overseas 
subsidiaries, no transnational members sitting on their Headquarters’ corporate board does not 
necessarily mean that they lack global connections – those firms might have recruited foreign 
executives in their local branches, as in the case of Huawei, which will be discussed later. If, as 
William Domhoff argues, “schools play a large role in transmitting the class structure,” and 
corporate boards represent the “intersection between corporations and the upper class,”512 a 
considerable portion of China’s Internet elites seemed to have – at least partially – linked with 
other transnational capitalists through education and corporate board associations.  
On the other hand, despite substantial transnational linkages, government connections, 
measured by occupational and organizational affiliations, have also been well-represented in the 
sample. Almost 38 percent – 72 out of 190 – are working, or have previously worked in local or 
central government entities. More than 43 percent – 82 out of them – have participated in local or 
national level party-state organizations. It is worth noting that information on political 
affiliations are not always publicly available. To take a closer look at this issue, I investigated 
                                                
512 Domhoff, Who Rules America. 25, 51.  
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specifically into the 20 chief directors of the companies in question. The results have shown that 
16 out of 20 Chairmen/CEOs of these firms have infiltrated into the party-state apparatus by 
currently or previously serving a position in central or local party-state organizations such as the 
government-run All-China Federation of Industry and Commerce (ACFIC), China Cultural 
Industry Association (CCIA), the People’s Congress (PC) and People’s Political Consultative 
Conference (PPCC) (see Table 5.2).  
 The biographical data seems to provide both supporting and contradictory evidence to 
the proposition that the rise of transnational capital gives rise to a transnational capitalist class.513 
How has China’s Internet capitalist class fraction cultivated and preserved dense connections 
both with the state and with their transnational peers? This seemingly contradictory character 
needs to be understood within China’s unsettled reintegration into global capitalism. As a self-
proclaimed socialist country led by a party that is still – at least on paper – communist and anti-
capitalist, the making of the Chinese capitalist class, including its Internet fraction, presents some 
unique attributes. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
513 Robinson, A Theory of Global Capitalism; Sklair, The Transnational Capitalist Class. 
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Table 5.2: Political connections at 20 major Chinese Internet companies (2015) 
 Company Board Chairman or CEO Party-state affiliation 
1 China Mobile Bing SHANG 2= CPC National Delegate 
2 Alibaba Jack Yun MA ,. Zhejiang Prov. PPCC; CCIA 
 
3 Tencent Pony Huateng MA ,%C NPC; Shenzhen City PC; CCIA 
4 Baidu Robin Yanhong LI ?YR CPPCC 
5 China Telecom Jie YANG IK CPC National Delegate 
6 JD.com Qiangdong LIU F Shanghai City PPCC 
7 China Unicom Xiaochu WANG 4J9 CCP’s Central Committee 
8 Ctrip Jianzhang LIANG L- CPPCC  
9 Netease Lei DING BX Guangdong Prov. PC 
10 Leshi Yueting JIA WNT CCIA 
11 Lenovo Chuanzhi LIU Q#0 CPC National Delegate; NPC 
12 ZTE Weigui HOU U; N/A 
13 VIPshop Eric Ya SHEN <: N/A  
14 Qihoo 360 Hongyi ZHOU $S[ N/A  
15 Sina Charles CHAO VH N/A  
16 Sohu Charles ZHANG @+ ACFIC 
17 Huawei Zhengfei REN &) CPC National Delegate  
18 CEC Xiaowu RUI ZJ> CPC National Delegate  
19 CETC Qunli XIONG D7 NPC  
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 Company Board Chairman or CEO Party-state affiliation 
20 Xiaomi Jun LEI G* NPC  
 
Source: The party-state affiliations are gathered primarily from the annual reports of the companies. 
When official company information is not available, I used information collected from news articles in 
both Chinese and English.  
Note: The abbreviations used in this table: CPPCC (China People's Political Consultative Conference); 
NPC (National People's Congress); ACFIC (All-China Federation of Industry and Commerce); CCIA 
(China Cultural Industry Association); PPCC (People's Political Consultative Conference); PC (People's 
Congress); and CPC (Chinese Communist Party).  
 
On the one hand, although government interventions have always been vital in the 
construction of markets,514 the role of the Chinese state – a self-described socialist one – in the 
making of its domestic capitalist economy deserves particular attention. As Chen An observes, 
since China’s socialist transformation in the 1950s had almost eliminated its private sector, the 
reemergence of capitalist enterprises and private entrepreneurs in the late 1970s was largely an 
“artifact” by the post-Mao state.515 In the words of Lin Chun, “the Chinese novelty lay in the 
phenomenon where the Communist Party enabled private profit seekers to grow from within its 
own ranks and apparatus.”516 This exceptionally omnipresent and contradictory role of the party-
state in the construction of China’s homegrown capitalist class has manifested itself in the 
Internet sector.  
First, China’s state-steered economic privatization in the past three decades – first 
through the development of town and village enterprises under the purview of local governments 
                                                
514 Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time (Boston: 
Beacon Press, 1944). 
515 Chen, “Capitalist Development, Entrepreneurial Class, and Democratization in China,” 405. 
516 Chun Lin, The Transformation of Chinese Socialism (Durham: Duke University Press, 2006), 254. 
Table 5.2 (cont.) 
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in the 1980s and then through the restructuring and privatizing of the state-owned enterprise 
sector in the 1990s – have resulted in a large number of nominally private firms with deep and 
uncut roots in the state sector.517 Due to the conflict-ridden and unfinished nature of this process, 
the ownership structures of many Chinese corporations are often mixed and ambiguous.518 For 
example, private firms may choose to wear “red hats” and claim to be state-owned to take 
advantage of policy support or entrenched managerial elites may take control of and in fact 
privatize previously state-owned enterprises. Among the 20 major Internet companies sampled in 
this chapter, both ZTE and Lenovo can be considered as “mixed ownership”. Lenovo was started 
as a spin-off from the state-owned Chinese Academy of Sciences, and the latter still holds a 36% 
stake of Legend Holdings Ltd., Lenovo’s major shareholder.519 ZTE also retained its status as 
“state owned, privately managed” – meaning the state shareholders, which still control 51% of 
the company, authorize the operational rights to the private shareholders, i.e., the managers.520 
This murky ownership structure and these firms’ state-sector origins have bred a special 
closeness between these corporate elites and the government. For example, Lenovo’s founder 
Liu Chuanzhi, not only has previously worked in the Chinese Academy of Sciences, but also 
maintained these connections ever after – he has been a delegate to the National Congress of 
CCP and a deputy to several sessions of National People’s Congress (NPC) – China’s highest 
legislative body –  at least symbolically.  
                                                
517 David S. G. Goodman, Class in Contemporary China (Malden: Polity Press, 2014), 78-82. 
518 Curtis J. Milhaupt and Wentong Zheng, “Beyond Ownership: State Capitalism and the Chinese Firm,” 
Georgetown Law Journal 103, no. 3 (2015): 665–722.	
519 Juro Osawa and Lorraine Luk, “How Lenovo Built a Chinese Tech Giant,” The Wall Street Journal, 
January 30,2014, http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702303973704579352263128996836. 
520 Milhaupt and Zheng, “Beyond Ownership: State Capitalism and the Chinese Firm”.  
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Second, the influential role of the state has also manifested itself in taking control of the 
“commanding heights” of China’s strategic communication industry, including the Internet 
sector.521 This has translated into the fact that all the three network operators – China Telecom, 
Unicom and Mobile, and two of the large equipment vendors – CEC and CETC – on the list have 
all remained as central State-owned Enterprises (SOEs) and are jointly managed by both the 
National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) and the State-Owned Assets 
Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC). In particular, the state has retained its 
rights of selecting and appointing the leadership team of these companies. This peculiar state-
capital relationship has given rise to a group of bureaucratic managerial elites who are often 
wearing different hats throughout their career development – as corporate executives, 
government officials and party cadres.522 A revolving door for personnel has further strengthened 
their tripartite roles. For example, Shang Bing, the Chairman and Party Secretary of China 
Mobile, has served as a vice minister at China’s Ministry of Industry and Information 
Technology before taking the job at China Mobile.   
Finally, the Chinese state has also extended its arms to the more recently founded Internet 
companies that had no previous roots in the state sector by actively incorporating their leaders 
into the party-state apparatus. One prominent example of this effort is the “three represents” 
doctrine proposed by the then-president Jiang Zemin in 2001. As Yuezhi Zhao argues, through 
this new doctrine, the Chinese Communist Party has repositioned itself from a “working-class 
vanguard to a party of ‘the Chinese people and the Chinese nation,’ including China’s rising 
                                                
521 Yuezhi Zhao, Communication in China: Political Economy, Power, and Conflict (Lanham: Rowman. 
& Littlefield., 2008).   
522 KE Kjeld Erik Brødsgaard, “Politics and Business Group Formation in China: The Party in Control?,” 
The China Quarterly 211 (2012): 624–48. 
	
 
230 
capitalist, technocratic, managerial, and professional strata.”523 This paradoxical reconstruction 
of a supposedly anti-capitalist party into a party that counts capitalists as its primary constituency 
seemed to have received warm welcome from its newly re-emerged business community. By 
2006, about a third of private entrepreneurs were members of the CCP, a significant increase 
from a fifth in 2000.524 It is also reported that at the 2016 National People’s Congress, among 
around 3,000 delegates, there were 114 people – almost 4 percent –  that are on the Hurun list of 
richest Chinese.525 In the Internet sector, as we saw in table 5.2, a weighty group of Chinese 
Internet leaders – regardless of the ownership types of their respective firms – are holding or 
previously held a position in China’s political system. In particular, Jack Ma of Alibaba, Pony 
Ma of Tencent and Robin Li of Baidu – the founders of the three most powerful Internet 
applications and services firms in China – are all involved, or previously involved, in the work of 
national or local organizations of the PC and PPCC.  
On the other hand, as we saw in previous chapters, the rise of China’s Internet industry 
has also been greatly influenced by transnational forces, which in turn has fostered an extensive 
network between domestic Internet elites and other segments of transnational capitalists. 
First, as Dariusz Wojcik and James Camilleri have showed, global financial networks 
have been instrumental in the incorporation and internationalization of China’s “national 
champions”.526 Starting from the late 1990s, the Chinese state has allowed both its “national 
teams,” as well as its private firms, to float –  at least partially –  on overseas stock markets to 
                                                
523 Zhao, Communication in China, 14.  
524 Bruce Dickson, Wealth into Power: The Communist Party’s Embrace of China’s Private Sector (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 70. 
525 Matthias Stepan and Lea Shin, “These Are the Super-Rich People Shaping China,” Fortune, March 3, 
2016, http://fortune.com/2016/03/03/china-national-peoples-congress-alibaba. 
526 Dariusz Wojcik and James Camilleri, “‘Capitalist Tools in Socialist Hands’? China Mobile in Global 
Financial Networks,” Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers 40, no. 4 (2015): 464–78.	
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generate capital inflows. The listing process, which relied almost exclusively on global business 
services firms as auditors, legal advisors and IPO underwriters, has created a dense network 
between Chinese corporate managers and transnational financial elites. A quick survey of the 
corporate boards in the sample confirms that 18 out of 20 companies have at least one senior 
manager or executive on board who has previously worked in transnational financial companies, 
such as Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley. Indeed, a Wall Street Journal article even claims 
that previous senior positions at Goldman Sachs have become the “new qualification for China’s 
tech elite”.527  
Second, for Chinese Internet companies that have built from scratch with the help of 
overseas venture capital – as in the case of many China’s web applications and services 
companies – the different rounds of external fundraising in their business history often means a 
greater involvement of transnational capitalists both in their ownership structure and corporate 
management. As we saw previously in the case of Alibaba, both SoftBank’s Son Masayoshi and 
Yahoo’s Jerry Yang secured executive positions on its board, in exchange for their significant 
capital contribution. Tencent, China’s social media and online gaming giant, likewise reserved 
two positions on its board for senior directors of its major shareholder, Naspers, a South Africa-
based Internet and media group.528 Sometimes, this relationship is reciprocal. For example, 
Alibaba’s Jack Ma also serves as an executive on SoftBank’s board. It is worth noting, however, 
such reciprocal interlocks of boards of directors on a transnational level have been rare in the 
sample surveyed in this study. Apart from Jack Ma, only China Unicom’s CEO Wang Xiaochu 
                                                
527 Wei Gu, “The New Qualification for China’s Tech Elite: Goldman Sachs,” The Wall Street Journal, 
May 3, 2016, http://www.wsj.com/articles/ant-financial-close-to-hiring-former-goldman-sachs-banker-
feagin-1462256460. 
528 For a detailed discussion on Tencent, see Min Tang, “Tencent as a Nexus: The Political Economy of 
China’s Internet Industry” (PhD dissertation, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 2017).	
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keeps a reciprocal board position in Spain’s operator Telefonica, in which Unicom holds a 
minority share. This finding seems to echo what Peter Nolan has observed on China’s rise in 
transnational capitalism, that while transnational firms have deeply entrenched in China, Chinese 
firms have not yet penetrated into the heart of global capitalism – in his words, “’we’ are inside 
‘them,’ but ‘they’ are not inside ‘us’”.529 
Third, the aggressive overseas expansion of China’s Internet industry has also introduced 
new members of transnational capitalists into their corporate management, with an aim to better 
position the firms in the global market. Indeed, recent years have witnessed a growing 
involvement of foreign corporate elites into China’s top Internet firms. For example, in 2011, 
Tencent hired former Goldman Sachs’ senior manager James Mitchell to direct its investment 
strategy.530 In 2014, Baidu recruited Andrew Ng, a former Google executive, to lead its newly 
developed artificial-intelligence arm.531 Alibaba also recently hired Michael Evans, a retired 
Goldman Sachs partner, as its President to oversee the company’s ambitious international 
expansion.532 Even companies with no transnational members on their Headquarters’ Board of 
Directors could be globally connected through overseas offices. It is reported that Huawei, 
despite keeping all the executives in its Shenzhen Headquarter Chinese, has started to enlist local 
political economic elites on board to its overseas subsidiaries –  in 2011, for example, it 
                                                
529 Peter Nolan, Is China Buying the World? (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2012), 141.  
530 Gu, “The New Qualification for China’s Tech Elite: Goldman Sachs”. 
531 Alyssa Abkowitz, “The ‘Crazy’ Pace of Chinese Tech Company Baidu,” The Wall Street Journal, 
June 28, 2016, http://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2016/06/28/the-crazy-pace-of-chinese-tech-company-
baidu. 
532 Michael J. de la Merced, “Alibaba Names Former Goldman Sachs Executive as President,” The New 
York Times, August 5, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/05/business/dealbook/alibaba-names-
former-goldman-sachs-executive-as-president.html. 
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appointed Alexander Downer, the former Foreign Minister of Australia, to the Board of 
Directors of its Australian subsidiary.533  
Apart from transnational board linkage established through cross-border IPOs, foreign 
capital absorption and outward expansion, overseas education has also played a role in 
formulating connections between Chinese tech leaders and transnational capitalists. Although 
widely-shared among leaders in all the 20 major companies, this factor is relatively more 
prominent among the recently emerged tech elites in the web applications and services sector – 
over 37 percent of them were educated overseas. For a given company –  as in the case of Baidu 
–  this percentage could be as high as 70 percent. Overseas schooling has helped cultivate and 
strengthen transnational ties. For example, Sohu’s CEO Charles Zhang, an MIT graduate, 
received his first round of venture capital from Nicolas NegroPonte and Edward Robert, both of 
whom are also professors at MIT.534 
In sum, relying on biographical data of 190 tech leaders in China’s major 20 Internet 
companies, this sector delineates the multifaceted connections between a rising Chinese Internet 
capitalist class fraction both with the Chinese state and with other transnational capitalists. It also 
offers possible explanations to this seemingly contradictory characteristic by situating these 
dense networks at the interplay between China’s domestic political-economic transformation and 
the changing dynamics of global digital capitalism. How have these factors influenced the 
constitution of the Chinese Internet class fraction? Have these Internet elites come to an 
awareness of shared identity and interests with their transnational counterparts, if so, to what 
                                                
533 Liu QingcŤ, “Zhongguo gongsi laile waiguo dongshi,” NıƤ[Foreign board 
members joined Chinese companies],  China Business NewsžǂƆĚþ, December 12, 2014, 
http://www.yicai.com/news/4051273.html. 
534 Sohu, com., “Company Milestones,” http://corp.sohu.com/companymilestones-en.shtml. 
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extent? Based on discursive evidences collected from media reports, the next section looks at the 
issue on a sector-by-sector basis.  
 
China’s Internet Capitalist Class Fraction, the State, and Transnational Capitalists 
Before moving on to a disaggregated analysis within the Internet sector, it is important to 
note that there have been serious outbreaks between this newly emerged Internet capitalist class 
and other segments of capitalist class in China’s policymaking arena. This echoes what previous 
scholars have observed that “different [capitalist class] sectors have their own priorities and 
preference in policy.”535 For example, when the current Chinese leadership, under the influenced 
of its newly emerged Internet power bloc, tried to push out an Internet-based developmental 
strategy, traditional manufacturers raised open concerns toward this policy reorientation – as one 
leading sports good manufacturer claimed that “if there is no real economy, the Internet economy 
is empty”.536  
Recognizing that there are conflicts and divergent aims of different capitalist class 
fractions in China, this section focuses on the Internet sector by zooming in and investigating 
how the connections with state and transnational capital have shaped these capitalists’ behaviors 
in three separate but also deeply entangled industry subsectors – equipment manufacturing, 
network operation, and Internet services and applications. The rationale for disaggregating the 
group is that there are different levels of state power in these subsectors, as we saw in chapter 3, 
                                                
535 Harris, “Outward Bound: Transnational Capitalism in China,”15.  
536 Zhao JingzhuǊ®«, “Ding Shizhong: Meiyou shitijingji de chengzhang, hulianwang yiding shi kong 
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which might disrupt – in varying degrees – the configuration of a transnational class fraction 
around China’s Internet industry. Extensive international linkages notwithstanding, the following 
analysis demonstrates that despite sectoral variance, the territorial logic of the Chinese state has 
still held considerable influence in curbing and interfering with the formation of an Internet-
based transnational capitalist class fraction in China.  
 
Equipment manufacturers  
A quick survey of the biographic data seems to suggest that the managerial elites in 
China’s networking equipment sector have a relatively more intimate relationship to the state 
than to their transnational counterparts. Among all the 73 executives and senior managers in the 
subsector, 17 are sitting on the same board with other transnational capitalists, 12 have received 
overseas education; while 32 have previously worked in government entities and 37 have held 
various affiliations with the party-state. A zoomed-in look at all the five de facto controllers in 
the sample also confirms that four of them – except ZTE’s Hou Weigui – are taking (or have 
previously taken) a seat either at the National People’s Congress or at the CCP’s National 
Congress (see Table 5.2). Hou’s lack of apparent political affiliation, however, does not mean 
that he is detached from the state. As mentioned above, despite being publicly traded, ZTE 
remains its ambiguous status of “state owned, privately managed”. Moreover, Hou might 
purposely choose to keep his political connections informal to ease the national security concerns 
from other foreign states. Indeed, after the US House released a report on ZTE’s government 
background, Hou gave an interview to Forbes, carefully explaining that despite the existence of a 
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Communist party cell in ZTE, “it has no bearing on management,” and Hou himself “isn’t a 
party member and is not on the committee”.537 
As discussed in Chapter 1, among all the three Internet subsectors, network equipment 
manufacturing is the one that was deeply rooted in China’s military and research apparatus. As 
Roselyn Hsueh points out, because of the “complex technologies that run communications 
networks”, networking equipment sector is considered by the state as strategic to its national 
security.538 This strategic importance has manifested itself in the biographic data. Both CEC and 
CETC are still centrally-controlled SOEs and many of their senior managers have previously 
worked or currently hold positions in China’s national defense system. Rui Xiaowu, the 
chairman of CEC, for instance, has previously served as the chief executive at China Aerospace 
Science and Technology Corporation, the main contractor for China’s space program. This 
phenomenon is prominent in private companies as well. For example, Huawei’s founder Ren 
Zhengfei was a former director of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and Lenovo’s founder 
Liu Chuanzhi was also trained as a military engineer in the PLA's Xi’an Communications 
Engineering College.   
Given their extensive and complex linkages with the state apparatus and substantial 
military background, it is probably not surprising to observe a consistent pattern in their public 
discourses – in many case, they have closely associated themselves with the state’s official 
agenda. For example, as discussed in chapter 1, after the 2013 Snowden revelations intensified 
China’s long-standing concerns over its lack of mastery of key Internet technologies (e.g., micro-
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computer chips), the newly inaugurated Xi-Li administration has taken the issue of cyber 
security to the top of agenda. Corporate elites in China’s networking equipment sector have 
applauded this move enthusiastically. Rui Xiaowu, for example, pointed out the responsibility of 
CEC is – exactly – to “build a ‘national team’ for China’s information security industry” and to 
develop “secure and self-controllable networking equipment”.539 Even Lei Jun, whose company 
Xiaomi has so far largely focused on consumer electronics, also submitted a policy proposal to 
the 2014 National People’s Congress, advocating that the state develop a top level initiative for 
Big Data technologies. Part of the aim is to maintain China’s “data sovereignty” by employing 
“safe, controllable large-scale key equipment”.540 
Moreover, China’s socialist experience and its official ideology of nation building, which 
have been closely intertwined throughout its revolutionary history,541 have also played a role in 
shaping these corporate leaders’ political identity and class consciousness. As Yun Wen has 
demonstrated in her case study of Huawei, Maoist thoughts of “self-reliance” (meaning 
developing indigenous technologies) and “encircling the cities from the countryside” (starting 
from rural areas and less-developed countries and then expanding into cities and developed 
countries) have held a profound influence over Ren Zhenfei’s capitalist corporate strategies.542 
Liu Chuanzhi, the founder of Lenovo, similarly, has incorporated nationalist discourses into 
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Lenovo’s “vision statement,” such as “serving the country through industrial development”.543 
Liu reportedly removed this nationalist goal from Lenovo’s official website after its 2005 IBM 
deal, which had significantly internationalized the company’s management team; this sentence, 
however, has remained as the first item in the “vision statement” of its parent company, Legend 
Holdings.544 As might be expected, the Chinese leadership endorses such initiatives. Indeed, after 
Lenovo took over IBM’s PC division in 2005, the then-Premier Wen Jiabao visited the company 
and told its CEO Yang Yuanqing that “you carry the hopes of China on your shoulders.” 545 
The close ties between China’s equipment manufacturers and the state, however, should 
not be overestimated. Despite relatively limited foreign involvement in their corporate 
management – as shown in the biographical data, the revenue structure of these companies has 
been internationally diversified. As discussed in chapter 3, with the continuing outward 
expansion of China’s hardware vendors, the importance of international markets for their profit 
strategies has grown considerably. For these corporate leaders, this means that they are not 
merely national entrepreneurs defined by the state’s territorial logic and influenced by its official 
ideologies, but are also increasingly subject to the pressure of global market and the influence of 
“Western style” corporate practices.  
 First, facing accusations and suspicions from foreign governments of their state military 
background, and probably more importantly, the related foreign market restrictions, Chinese 
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corporate elites in the networking equipment sector have been eager to shed their “Chineseness” 
and to rebrand themselves as global capitalists. The aforementioned case of ZTE’s Hou Weigui 
offers an example. Lenovo’s Yang Yuanqing, featured as “China’s First Global Capitalist” by 
Bloomberg in 2006, was also quoted in saying that “we are not a government-controlled 
company,” and “the Chinese PC market used to be dominated by state-owned enterprises. We 
beat them all.”546 Indeed, Yang was not only keen to transform himself into a truly “global 
capitalist,” but also asked all the Chinese managers at Lenovo to comport themselves in an 
appropriately “globalized” manner by following Western style dress codes and calling each other 
by their given names, in other words, to “think and act like techies in Silicon Valley, Boston, or 
Berlin”.547 
Second, it is also worth noting that under certain circumstances, Chinese equipment 
makers may choose to collaborate with their transnational peers to advance their shared “class 
project of capitalist globalization,”548 sometimes at the expense of a Chinese state-centered 
strategy. The complex battle behind China’s recent national security initiatives offers an 
illumining example in this regard. As previously mentioned, after the Snowden revelations, the 
Xi-Li leadership has put forward a series of information security measures to fend off the threat 
of foreign cyber spying, including a potential data localization provision and the preferred use of 
domestic equipment in key industries.549 Foreign governments and transnational capitalists, as 
might be expected, have lobbied strenuously against these new initiatives, fearing that they will 
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limit opportunities for their own enterprises. China’s networking equipment leaders, surprisingly, 
have also questioned these policies publicly. In an interview with Reuters, Huawei’s rotating 
Chief Executive Eric Xu openly expressed his skepticism, “if the Chinese market is not open, 
then the European market won't be open, other markets won't be open, then what's the result? 
The result is everyone draws a line around their own territory”.550 Xu also pointed out that 
Huawei’s critical view “is recognized by some technical experts in the country”.551 Why did 
corporate leaders at Huawei, the supposedly largest beneficiary of these protective policies, stand 
out and openly question the direction of the Chinese government? One possible reason is that the 
importance of overseas markets has outweighed that of the domestic one in Huawei’s profit 
strategy – indeed, in 2008, Huawei’s overseas revenues accounted for a historical high of 75% of 
its total revenue 552 – and that has provided incentive for, or motivated, managerial elites to 
realign with their transnational counterparts in order to gain or retain access to external markets.  
For all this, however, it might still be premature to conclude that Chinese elites in its 
networking equipment sector have successfully integrated into the transnational capitalist class. 
For one thing, in certain cases, these IT leaders may still turn to their home state for support by 
closely positioning themselves within China’s geopolitical agenda. Indeed, when Huawei was 
labeled as a national security risk by the US House Intelligence Committee, Ren Zhengfei was 
quoted in saying “these actions were driven by the Sino-US competition. What the US tried to 
                                                
550 Gerry Shih, “Huawei CEO says Chinese cybersecurity rules could backfire,” Reuters, April 21, 2015,  
 http://www.reuters.com/article/us-huawei-cybersecurity-idUSKBN0NC1G920150421.  
551 Ibid.  
552 Zhao HejuanǊ<­ and Zhang YuzheÞ³, “Dianxin zhan feizhou,” ŧAõǹņ [The Chinese 
telecommunications war in Africa],  Caixin New CenturyǂĕĕƄ, January 16, 2012, 
http://magazine.caixin.com/2012-01-13/100348416.html. 
	
 
241 
suppress is not Huawei, but China.”553 For another, a nationalist ethos and – to a certain extent – 
also socialist legacies seem to still cast a long shadow over these corporate elites’ political 
consciousness. For example, Yun Wen has shown in her case study that Maoist idea of “self-
criticism” and method of “mass movement” have been deeply incorporated into Huawei’s 
managerial practices.554 In a domestic interview, Ren Zhengfei also claims that his personal 
belief is in “our country”. In the words of Ren, “we once believed that capitalism can greatly 
liberate the productive forces, but then we found out the enlarged social gap also caused 
problems … China is taking the right path … the aim of development is the progress of the entire 
society.” 555 Is this merely a rhetorical veneer that obscures the real and growing alignment 
between a rising capitalist class fraction and the party-state, or, does it also indicate that China’s 
revolutionary past has remained a palpable force in shaping and even containing the formation of 
a capitalist class fraction in its network equipment manufacturing sector? 
 
Network operators  
Among all the Internet capitalists in the sample, corporate executives in China’s network 
operating sector are the ones that are most directly controlled by the state. All the 21 executives 
in this sector are party members and have previously held relatively high ranking positions in 
central or local government entities. For example, Wang Xiaochu, the current Chairman of China 
Unicom, was previously served as the Director General of the Hangzhou Telecommunications 
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Bureau and was elected as an alternative member of 18th CCP’s Central Committee – the 
innermost circle of the policymaking system in China.  
As already noted, despite constant restructuring of China’s telecommunications industry, 
all the three carriers – China Telecom, Mobile and Unicom – have retained their status as central 
SOEs, due to the high strategic importance they possess for China’s political economy. Indeed, 
as network operators, they control the gateway to China’s Internet system and all the other 
players, including both equipment vendors and web applications providers, are dependent on 
them for access to the Chinese digital market. In particular, all the three carriers belong to a 
small group of large companies – around 53 in 2012 – that are central to the existing SOE system, 
over which the state exercises an especially powerful instrument of control over their managerial 
elites: the party's personnel management system.556 Instead of being nominated by their 
respective corporate boards, all the senior managers in the three network operators are appointed, 
promoted and disciplined by the Party’s Organization Department. One manifestation of this 
state power was the reshuffle of chief managers among the three companies in 2004 and most 
recently, also in 2015.557 In other words, all the leaders in this sector are essentially party-state 
bureaucrats – the CEOs are usually the heads of the party’s cells in their respective companies 
and hold ministerial or vice-ministerial status in the government hierarchy, which enables them 
to directly communicate with related ministries and participate in the policymaking process.558  
As an integrated part of the party-state apparatus, in many cases, these executives have 
closely aligned themselves with the strategic objectives of the Chinese state, sometimes even at 
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the expense of the profitability of their respective companies. For example, when the state 
determined to promote its indigenous third generation (3G) networking standard – TD-SCDMA, 
China Mobile was mandated by the MIIT as the single major carrier of this new standard. The 
compulsory assignment was by no means an easy one. For China Mobile, which had already 
adopted the European developed GMS standard in the 2G era, switching to the China-developed 
standard for 3G, instead of upgrading based on the existing system, required it to bear a 
significant transition cost.559 This financial burden notwithstanding, the executives at China 
Mobile still demonstrated their compliance with and even active support for – at least 
rhetorically – the state’s agenda. Wang Jianzhou, then China Mobile’s Chairman, declared 
during the company’s shareholder meeting that “TD-SCDMA is our country’s own 3G 
technology standard” and therefore “China Mobile will take the development of TD-SCDMA as 
our incumbent duty”.560 
Government officials and party cadres, however, do not fully capture the complex roles 
played by these leaders. The economic reform introduced by the state in the late 1980s has – to a 
certain extent – fundamentally transformed the role and mentality of its bureaucratic-managerial 
elites by “shift[ing] their orientation toward profitability”.561 This has become especially 
prominent on a personal level when the salary/compensation and career development of these 
leaders have been increasingly tied up with the profit performance of their respective 
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companies.562 From this perspective, they are no longer merely an extended arm of a 
bureaucratic system, but embedded in an emerging market logic. This contradictory position is 
probably best captured by Xi Guohua, China Mobile’s former Chairman, in his proposal to the 
2016 National People’s Congress: “all the network operators are state-owned enterprises, which 
means we’re responsible for promoting the economic and social development of our country; 
however, [as corporations], we also need to improve efficiency and achieve steady profit 
growth”.563  
In addition, the further “plugging” of these firms into global financial networks through 
overseas listings and the extensive involvement of transnational financial capitalists in the 
“modernization” of their corporate structure also means that the managers are no longer purely 
influenced by domestic market conditions, but also subjected to the pressure of shareholders and 
other financially self-interested organizing actors – though limited – on a transnational scale.564 
China’s Mobile’s former CEO Wang Jianzhou once openly acknowledged that he was 
questioned by Western investment bankers for “overlooking the interests of shareholders” when 
he tried to extend the company’s coverage to rural China in 2006.565 The biographical data 
surveyed in this study also confirm that all the three carriers have recruited non-mainland based 
executives and all the CEOs have received education outside mainland China to adopt “modern” 
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management practices: Both China Mobile’s Shang Bing and China Unicom’s Wang Xiaochu 
got doctorate degrees in business administration from the Hong Kong Polytechnic University, 
and China Telecom’s Yang Jie was trained at the ESC Rennes School of Business in France.  
As party and government cadres as well as corporate executives, Chinese network 
operating capitalists are inherently contradictory entities defined by both the territorial logic of 
the state and the profit-maximization logic of capital. To add more complexity to the picture, the 
Chinese Communist Party, of which all the managers in this sector are still members, has not yet 
shed its socialist and egalitarian pretentions. To maintain its ruling legitimacy, this self-
proclaimed “socialist” party must, in certain cases, intervene and try to restrain the profit 
imperatives of its bureaucratic capitalists. The state’s “Telephone to every village” project in the 
mid-2000s, which forced its network operators to move from more lucrative urban markets to 
poor rural areas, offers a glimpse of this conflict zone.566  
 
Web services and applications providers 
Unlike the bureaucratic capitalists in the network operating sector that are directly 
controlled by the party-state or the corporate elites in the equipment manufacturing sector that 
had deep roots in the military state apparatus, Chinese web application providers seem to be the 
ones that are most closely connected to their transnational counterparts.  
A quick look of the biographical data reveals that transnational corporate board linkages 
are almost ubiquitous in this sector, except the Shenzhen-listed Leshi International. Actually, 
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even the relatively younger company Leshi recently announced that it has hired JD Howard, the 
previous vice president at Lenovo, to direct its overseas activities.567 This means almost all the 
Chinese web leaders are sitting on the same board with capitalists from other transnational 
corporations. Such close ties with transitional capitalists largely originated in the unique 
development path of China’s Internet applications and services sector. As discussed in previous 
chapters, the state’s complex and ambiguous attitude toward FDI in its domestic web application 
market has brought in a large amount of foreign venture capital – as portfolio investments – to 
jump-start its native enterprises. The various rounds of overseas funding raising, and the 
subsequent cross-border IPOs, both enmeshed these corporate elites deeply in transnational 
financial networks and established highly internationalized corporate boards early on.  
On the other hand, growing with China’s opening and reform process, this new group of 
Chinese entrepreneurs is relatively younger and has enjoyed easier access to overseas education 
than its peers in the hardware and network operating sectors. Among all the 96 executives 
studied in this sector, over 37 percent were educated overseas. This percent could be even higher 
for certain firms. For example, among all the 10 mainland directors on Sohu’s board, six 
received education outside of China. Riding the wave of the dot.com fever in the late 1990s, 
many US-educated founders directly copied the Silicon Valley business models and transplanted 
them in China, often with Silicon Valley seed money obtained through their personal 
networks.568 For example, Baidu was co-founded by Robin Li and Eric Xu, both were Chinese 
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nationals trained in the US. In 1999-2000, with $1.2 million from Silicon Valley-based venture 
capital firms Integrity Partners and Peninsula Capital, the two went back to China and launched 
the Chinese-language search engine.569 
These intensive transnational connections have profoundly shaped the class 
consciousness of Chinese web elites. First, compared with hardware manufacturers who still 
wanted to build a “Chinese national enterprise” and only started their outward expansion later on, 
Internet application providers have possessed global aspirations from the very beginning. For 
example, when Jack Ma founded Alibaba.com in 1999, he told his first group of employees that 
the corporate vision of Alibaba was to become an “international” company. A few months later, 
Ma opened up overseas offices in Hong Kong and London, an R&D center in California, and 
planned to expand Alibaba’s service to Japan and Korea by launching localized websites.570 This 
pattern is consistent with that followed by other tech leaders in the sector. For example, in 2000, 
only two years after launching their respective companies, the founders of Sina, Sohu and 
NetEase – the three most important Chinese portals in the early 2000s – had already listed their 
companies on the Nasdaq Stock Market and transformed their firms into “international” assets.  
Second, different from tech leaders in the hardware or network operating sector that has 
still been affected by China’s fading – yet still lingering 
– socialist past, Chinese web elites have become increasingly savvy in adopting a neoliberal 
discourse of free market principles, which has given them a strong resemblance to their 
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transnational counterparts – at least, rhetorically. Alibaba’s Jack Ma offers a prominent example 
in this regard. When New York Times raised questions over Alibaba’s potential political ties with 
some high-level Chinese politicians before its 2014 IPO, Ma firmly responded through the 
company’s Weibo account that “our only background is the (free) market”.571 He also famously 
described his view toward state-business relationship at the 2015 World Economic Forum in 
Davos – “fall in love with the government, but don’t marry them”.572 In domestic interviews, Ma 
insisted that “other Chinese private entrepreneurs want to wear ‘red hats’. Not me. I’m not 
interested in participating in NPC, CPPCC or CCP Congress.”573 It might be true that Ma has 
only served as a representative of ZheJiang Province’s People's Political Consultative 
Conference in 2008 and has never participated in any nation-level PPCC or PC, but he is 
nevertheless well connected with political leaders through other channels, as will be discussed 
shortly.  
Pervasive transnational linkages notwithstanding, relatively less widespread but still 
perhaps critical ties with state entities are also present in the biographical data. Among the 96 
executives, 19 are working, or have previously worked, in government agencies and 24 have 
established various forms of affiliations with the party-state. As aforementioned, Jack Ma, Pony 
Ma and Robin Li – the controllers of the BATs – are all participating (or have previously 
participated) in the work of national or local parliament, which signals both their allegiance to 
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and influence with the Chinese government. Moreover, these conferences are not the only venues 
through which they can exert impact over China’s policymaking process. Indeed, along with the 
growing importance of the Internet in China’s political economy, tech elites have become 
increasingly involved into the inner circle of state power. In 2013, Jack Ma, Pony Ma and JD’s 
Richard Liu were all invited to Beijing to take part at internal conferences held by Premier Li 
Keqiang at Zhongnanhai, the center of political power in China.574    
Why has this globally aspiring and transnationally linked group of Internet capitalists still 
actively cultivated and carefully maintained their relationship with the party-state? The 
qualitative data collected for this study suggest the reasons are threefold.  
First, this extensively internationally connected group is also the one that has – at least so 
far – predominately relied on China’s domestic market for their business development. As shown 
in Chapter 3, in 2014, domestic revenue still accounted for over 90% of the annual revenues of 
Baidu, Tencent and Alibaba – the three most powerful Internet applications companies in 
China.575 The outsized role of the Chinese market in these companies’ profit strategies, in turn, 
has considerably impeded the full integration of their executives into the transnational capitalist 
class, given the fact that they are still dependent on and subject to the territorial power of the 
Chinese state to keep access to their most important revenue district. The aforementioned Alipay 
dispute, during which Jack Ma transferred the powerful online payment service out of Alibaba 
into a company that is fully controlled by Chinese nationals to comply with state regulations and 
elevate his own wealth and power, offers an example. It indicates, that under certain 
circumstances, China’s web elites would offer strong support for state policies, even at the 
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expense of their relationship with other transnational capitalists. Indeed, Ma was even quoted as 
saying “if the country needs, Alipay could be dedicated to the country at any time.”576 
Second, apart from domestic market, they have also benefited from the state’s diplomatic 
power in expanding their reach in the international market. As discussed before, Robin Li 
launched Baidu’s Portuguese version during his visit with President Xi Jinping to Brazil, with an 
opening ceremony attended by both Xi and Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff. 577 Tencent’s 
Pony Ma also submitted a proposal to the 2013 National People’s Congress, calling for 
supportive policies to help Chinese web companies to “go out,” including setting up related 
divisions in China’s embassies and consulates in foreign countries.578 
Finally, the unfinished nature of China’s political economic transformation and the 
party’s not-yet-entirely-discarded socialist pretensions have also forced these recently emerged 
capitalists to both continually seek political protection and request new market openings from a 
nominally anti-capitalist party that still controls the “commanding heights” of China’s digital 
economy.579 In other words, China’s web capitalists still count on state power to offer them 
political legitimacy in a supposedly socialist society and to continually open up state-owned 
sectors for them to enter. A revealing example came in October, 2013. When Jack Ma was 
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invited to a national economic conference in Beijing, he openly called the party-state to put more 
trust on China’s private entrepreneurs in the ongoing economic reform. In the words of Ma, “the 
future of the Chinese economy is largely dependent on the confidence of its entrepreneurs, while 
entrepreneurs, especially private ones, want more trust from the government.”580 It is probably 
not a coincidence, then, to observe the Xi-Li leadership liberalizing market entry into many 
previously highly-regulated sectors, such as banking and finance, for private Internet capital – 
like Alibaba –  to penetrate, as we saw in Chapter 4.  
 Managing a tangled web of relationships with both transnational capitalists and state 
officials, China’s web leaders seem to have become both more international-oriented and –  at 
the same time –  closer to the “inner circle” of the party-state. Recently, with the rising 
importance of the Internet in China’s new strategies of “Internet Plus” and “One Belt One Road,” 
the profit maximization interests of these corporates elites have been increasingly allied and 
associated with the strategic consideration of the state. Indeed, adopting the name from a 2013 
speech given by Pony Ma,581 Premier Li’s “Internet Plus” plan not only promised to deepen links 
between the Internet and almost all the sectors of the Chinese economy, but also committed the 
Government to active support for Chinese Internet companies as they expand their reach in 
global cyberspace – both of which will help China’s web elites continue their capitalist 
expansion in the Chinese and global digital economy.  
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Conclusion 
This chapter examined the rise of an Internet-based capitalist class fraction in China. By 
doing so, it foregrounded a social class dimension in China’s engagement with the global 
Internet. The study was conducted by compiling a sample of 20 major Chinese Internet 
companies in 2015 that analyzed the biographies of a total of 190 mainland-based board 
members and senior managers. I found that these Internet corporate elites have cultivated and 
maintained intensive connections with both the Chinese state and other transnational capitalists. 
This multifaceted network has complicated these leader’s class consciousness and political 
behaviors, which were then discussed on a sector-by-sector basis, relying mainly on discursive 
traces collected from both Chinese- and English-language media reports. 
The major findings of this chapter are twofold. On the one hand, it sheds new light on the 
ongoing debate on the class ramifications of the transnationalization of capital accumulation. 
Drawing on new evidence from China, this chapter argues, if the defining feature of a 
transnational capitalist class is to pursue a shared “class project of capitalist globalization”,582 
then Chinese Internet elites have not yet actually successfully joined this group. Intensive 
connections with their transnational counterparts notwithstanding, the territorial logic of the 
Chinese state, and – to a certain extent – its unfinished metamorphosis into a capitalist one, still 
hold considerable influence in containing the formation of a truly transnational capitalist class 
fraction around its Internet industry. Indeed, as Ellen Wood argues, “capital has always needed 
the support of territorial states; and while the wide-ranging expansion of capitalist appropriation 
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has moved far beyond national borders, the national organization of capitalist economies has 
remained stubbornly persistent”.583 
On the other hand, this chapter also reminds us that neither should we overestimate the 
regulatory and territorial power of the Chinese state. To which extent the state, itself remaining a 
fragmented and contradictory entity, is still in control is a question that requires continued 
attention. Rather, the findings in this chapter suggest that with the rising importance of the 
Internet in both China’s political economy and its international strategies – as exemplified in the 
newly released “Internet Plus” and “One Belt One Road” initiatives, there has been a growing 
alignment between the strategic objectives of the Chinese state and the capitalist imperatives of 
its Internet elites. 
Moreover, as a self-claimed socialist state that has not yet shed its anti-capitalist and anti-
imperialist pretensions, such alignment is by no means a friction-free process. It is precisely the 
contradictory and unfinished nature of China’s reintegration into global digital capitalism and 
the dialectical dynamics between the territorial logical of the state and the expansive logic of 
capital that have animated the construction of this Internet capitalist class fraction in China. 
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CONCLUSION 
Today, popular media stories have largely shaped the conventional wisdom about China’s 
relationship with the Internet. For many, China is building a national “intranet” that is sealed by 
the “Great Firewall,” or a “giant cage” that is unplugged from the international network. This 
conventional wisdom creates a one-dimensional perception that because of the repressive 
Internet censorship practices, China’s Internet only has a domestic facet. Its external dimension 
has received little, if any, attention. 
This dissertation has shown that China’s Internet is not the “giant cage” depicted in so 
many media stories. Based on intensive research into both primary and secondary data sources, 
this study examined the multifaceted interactions between China and the global Internet in the 
past three decades, especially China’s outward cyber expansion, or the “going out” program that 
has gained momentum since the mid-2000s, and explores the changing social class relations that 
accompany and shape this evolution. It offered a political economic analysis of how units of 
Internet capital and state entities in China have impinged on the international Internet system. It 
also investigated both the structure and agency of Chinese Internet capital as they strike further 
into the global digital market. Often perceived only as a repressive authoritarian regime that aims 
at building an inward-looking national “intranet,” China in fact is increasingly projecting power 
outward in this sphere. This process has made the understanding of the interactions between 
China and the global Internet – instead of its domestic one – both urgent and critical for the field 
of communications.  
The major contributions of this dissertation are fourfold. First, it pushes the boundaries of 
China Internet studies by shifting the research focus from the previous concerns with “how the 
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Internet will change China” to “how China will change the global Internet”. Second, it 
specifically contributes to the growing literature on the political economy of the Internet by 
bringing to the forefront the complex interactions between capital and the state in endowing the 
global Internet system with “Chinese characteristics.” Third, it intervenes into the ongoing 
debate on the rise of China – and more generally, of the Global South – by moving beyond the 
well-documented extractive and agricultural sectors to the frontiers of the Internet industry, in 
order to compile new evidence and to assess both the nature and the implications of China’s 
growing participation in transnational capitalism. And finally, it sheds new light on the dynamic 
discussion on the class ramifications of the transnationalization of capital accumulation by 
investigating the rise of the Internet capitalist class fraction in China and its complex relationship 
with both the state and other transnational capitalists. 
It is important to recognize that capitalism and capitalist class relations do not exhaust all 
the social formations in contemporary China. For example, labor of different members of the 
Chinese society, such as labor of peasants and labor of women, may not be directly covered by 
the wage relationship that is central to capitalist class relation, and each of which deserves a rich 
political economic and social analysis. In this regard, this dissertation is a starting point but not 
an ending point. A fuller social history of China’s Internet will take into account these social 
relations. Nevertheless, this study of the overseas development of the Chinese internet and its 
social class implications offers an often-overlooked and thus much-needed window. With all its 
necessary omissions, this dissertation provides a useful and valid simplification of an admittedly 
wider and complicated reality.   
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China and the Internet: The International Dimension 
Previous literature on China’s Internet has addressed many important facets of its 
domestic network, but few pays attention to its external dimension. This dissertation, first and 
foremost, fills this major gap in the existing literature by examining the multifaceted trajectory of 
China’s engagement with the political economy of the global Internet, from its first international 
email in the late 1980s to the more recently minted “Internet Plus” and “One Belt One Road” 
strategies in the mid 2010s.  
Taking an inclusive approach, this dissertation conceptualizes China’s Internet sector as 
an expansive sector that includes not only hardware and equipment manufacturers like Lenovo 
and Huawei, but also network operators like China Telecom, web services and applications 
providers like Baidu, Alibaba and Tencent, and big government and business network users. 
Tracing the historical evolution of these industry segments at the intersection between the 
reconstitution of China’s developmental path and the changing dynamics of transnational 
capitalism, Chapter 1 shows that foreign capital has been instrumental in the construction of the 
digital economy in China, and China’s Internet sector is at the pivot of the restructuring of global 
digital capitalism.  
This heavy involvement of transnational capital in China’s Internet industry, however, 
should not be oversimplified. As we saw, China realized its full connection with the global 
Internet in the early 1990s and has been strategically engaging with transnational capital in the 
development of its domestic Internet industry ever since. For each subsector, the state has set 
various terms of market entry and exercised different forms of regulatory power to both actively 
engage and carefully manage foreign forces. In the more technologically advanced hardware and 
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equipment manufacturing sector, China adopted the “trading market for technology” strategy in 
the 1990s – which resulted in a significant degree of foreign market dominance and 
technological dependence – and then gradually reregulated its domestic market through various 
import substitution interventions, including developing and promoting its homegrown technical 
standards like the 3G TD-SCDMA. In the strategic network operating sector – a sector that 
literally controls the “entry point” of China’s network system – the state exercised strong 
ownership and personnel control through a complex institutional setup while simultaneously 
allowing carriers to list on the overseas stock markets to generate capital inflows. In the web 
services and applications sector, the Chinese state showed a more complex and ambiguous 
attitude toward transnational capital: impeding or even prohibiting foreign-operated Internet 
enterprises but tacitly allowing foreign portfolio investment to jump start its then nascent web 
companies. By the mid of 2010s, a large and diversified Internet industry was built out in China 
– as Chapter 1 has shown – in the context of its strategic engagement, and even encounters, with 
global digital capitalism.  
China’s interpenetration with the global Internet has been further deepened as this    
increasingly powerful industry started to aggressively push its way into global cyberspace. 
Riding the wave of the state’s “going out” policies in the 2000s – with an updated version in the 
“One Belt One Road” plan in the 2010s – China’s hardware manufacturers, network carriers and 
web applications providers have all ventured abroad and conducted large scale cross-border 
mergers and acquisitions. As Chapter 3 has shown, from 2005 to 2015, Chinese Internet 
companies – across all the three subsectors – have initiated a total of 88 large outbound FDI 
projects that had a value of $100 million or above, widely distributed both geographically and 
sectorally. Such large-scale capital projection from its Internet sector, reciprocally, has also 
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strengthened the position of the state – a more proactive and assertive China has started to 
emerge in global cyberspace. Indeed, by the mid of 2010s, China’s Internet has increasingly 
become a crucial actor animating the rhythms of contemporary digital capitalism, without which 
a complete understanding of the global Internet could not be achieved. And as this dissertation 
has shown, without a historical and structural understanding of China’s unfinished integration 
and unsettled position in transnational capitalism, the understanding of China’s Internet also 
remains incomplete. 
 
A Political Economy of China’s External Internet 
Apart from showing an external dimension of the Chinese Internet, this dissertation also 
contributes specifically to the growing literature on the political economy of the Internet by 
bringing to the forefront the complex interactions between capital and the state in the project of 
constructing an International Internet system with “Chinese characteristics.” 584  
Drawing on the critical political economy tradition, this study understands state-capital 
relations as a constantly changing and highly complicated dynamic encompassing both the 
territorial logic of the state and the expansive logic of capitalist accumulation.585  On the one 
hand, the Chinese state, as a territorially defined entity, aims to retain its control over China’s 
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homegrown Internet companies and to keep them in line with the state’s developmental and 
diplomatic agenda. On the other hand, Chinese Internet companies, propelled by the borderless 
logic of capital accumulation, have coordinated an increasingly powerful and expansive 
transnational capital network with an overarching aim of profit-maximization. State objectives 
and business initiatives sometimes collaborate, but are often in tension with each other. To add 
more complexity, neither the “Chinese state” nor “corporate China” is monolithic. Not only has 
the state itself been constrained by inter-department conflicts and center-local tensions, but the 
complex relationship between different units of Chinese Internet capital does not adhere to a 
single template.    
This dissertation unpacks such complex state-capital relations in several cases along with 
China’s growing participation in global cyberspace. Chapter 2 investigates China’s changing 
approach toward the volatile field of governance Internet governance. By tracing how China’s 
stance has evolved during the past three decades, it shows that the characterization of China’s 
policymaking for the global Internet as monolithic and statist – and positioning it in direct 
opposition to the US-centric, market-oriented policy framework – underestimates both the 
growing power of China’s Internet capital and the complex state-capital relations that actually 
have structured China’s engagement. Indeed, as headquartered business units emerged as 
important players and as they are using their access to the state to further their own visions of 
global Internet governance, we cannot discount the possibility of a shared policy vision 
between the US and China in some areas, such as making room for Internet companies based in 
each country to operate transnationally. On the other hand, neither can we dismiss the growing 
conflict between forces within and without China over whose vision should structure the global 
Internet.  
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Chapter 3 looks into this state-capital relation in the context of the “going out” of China’s 
Internet industry. It has demonstrated that China’s Internet companies are not the expansionist 
tools of a monolithic authoritarian state nor do they constitute a unified “corporate China”. The 
complex interaction between different state entities and business units manifested itself across all 
the three sub-industry segments as they venture out into the international Internet. Equipment 
manufacturers, whose business scope and profit strategies have been internationally diversified, 
might choose to distance themselves from the state’s agenda in certain cases in order to keep or 
regain their access to other markets; however, the state has still kept a rein on them through 
generous financial investment and diplomatic support. Network operators, on the other hand, 
have been consistently disciplined by the state through ownership and executive control and in 
most cases, have allied themselves with China’s diplomatic and international objectives. As 
corporate entities, however, they are also subject to market pressure both in and outside of China 
due to their corporate reform and overseas listing, which sometimes pressed them to prioritize 
profit maximization over political aims. Finally, China’s web applications providers, born with 
extensive ties to transnational financial capital, have demonstrated significant proximity to 
transnational forces in their overseas adventures; however, the state has still maintained a 
discernible influence through its tight control over domestic online market, which is crucial 
because of the still-dominant role of the Chinese market in their profit strategies.  
China’s effort of building “an international Internet with Chinese characteristics” is 
therefore, not only political, but also economic. This dissertation documented this political 
economic dimension on both its policy and business fronts, by clarifying how state strategies and 
capital’s imperatives on a transnational level cooperate (or not) with each other in particular 
cases and at specific historical moment.  
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China’s Internet Industry “Goes Out” 
Not only having a large and diversified Internet industry, China now has a group of 
world-class Internet corporations that aggressively set their sights on the international market. 
This both poses new questions about, and provides new resources for engaging with, the ongoing 
debate on the rise of China within the transnational capitalist system. In 2012, Cambridge 
economist Peter Nolan wrote an illuminating book, Is China Buying the World? to counter the 
pervasive anxiety in the popular media about China’s growing number of cross-border 
acquisitions, then mainly by its national oil companies.586 Fast-forward, and today China’s 
growing Internet industry is vigorously expanding globally, empowered by the Xi Jinping-Li 
Keqiang leadership’s flagship “One Belt One Road” roadmap and “Internet Plus” plan – both of 
which centered on expanding China’s presence globally through its booming digital sector – and 
perhaps the time is right to once more pose the question: is China buying the world – now 
through its Internet companies? 
This dissertation intervenes into this longstanding debate by focusing on the “going out” 
of China’s Internet industry. Looking specifically into the large overseas capital projections of 
$100 million or above from China Internet sector in the past ten years, Chapter 3 has shown that 
although growing enormously in quantity, the capitalist expansion of Chinese Internet companies 
in the external market still needs careful specification. Network operators only have a very 
limited market presence outside of China, with China Mobile the only one having a foreign 
market share - in the small Pakistan market. The international market share of web applications 
providers has also been quite limited as domestic market still accounted for over 90% of the 
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annual revenues of Baidu, Tencent and Alibaba – the three most powerful Internet applications 
companies in China – in 2015. Hardware and equipment manufacturers – led by national 
champions like Huawei, ZTE and Lenovo – seem to be the ones that have mostly 
internationalized diversified. But even Huawei, the largest equipment vendor in the world, has 
faced consistent obstacles in the center of today’s digital capitalism, the US, and has been forced 
out of the US market for national security reasons. The global adventures of China’s Internet 
companies, in turn, have offered us a new yardstick for thinking about the obstructions that other 
countries from the global South may continue to face.  
Moreover, as Chapter 4 continues to discuss in its case study of Alibaba, China’s early 
introduction of foreign investment capital into its digital economy has significantly complicated 
the corporate nationality of its web champions. A detailed analysis of Alibaba’s 
internationalization seems to echo what Peter Nolan pointed out four years ago – that China is 
not buying the world. In the case of Alibaba, not only has its international revenue been very 
limited so far, its corporate nationality also presents great ambiguity, as SoftBank of Japan and 
Yahoo of the US have controlled over 50% of its shares. Moreover, Alibaba’s buying spree has 
been subsidized by a complex group of financial funds, relying heavily on transnational capital.  
This pattern is consistent for other Chinese web applications providers. As previous 
chapters have shown, foreign ownership, enabled by a highly convoluted business structure, 
Variable Interest Entity (VIE), in which foreign investors could inject capital into and receive 
interests from Chinese companies operating in the country’s highly regulated strategic industries, 
has been prevalent in China’s web sector. However, as this dissertation has demonstrated, we 
should not underestimate the capacity and determination of the Chinese state. As we saw, the 
state’s tight control over its domestic digital market, though the state-owned network operators 
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that guard the “entry point” of the Chinese web, can be converted into leverage over these 
companies, given the vital importance of the Chinese market in their profit strategies. Indeed, in 
recently years, the state started to implement various regulatory measurements to curb the 
influence of transnational capital in its web sector, such as the newly drafted Foreign Investment 
Law, with results remaining to be seen.  
 
An Internet-Based Capitalist Class Fraction in China 
Finally, this dissertation contributes to our knowledge of a social-class dimension of 
China’s growing engagement with the global Internet by looking at the rise of an Internet-based 
capitalist class fraction in China. Scholars have argued, on a macro level, that the 
transnationalization of capital accumulation has given rise to a transnational capitalist class 
whose class project of profit maximization has increasingly moved beyond the territorial logic of 
the nation-states.587  Studying a sample of all the mainland-based board members and senior 
managers from 20 major Chinese Internet companies across all the three subsectors, this 
dissertation offered new evidence to test this macro-level theorization. By bringing the agency 
aspect to the foreground, it also complements the previous structural analysis of the outward 
expansion of China’s Internet capital.  
As we saw in Chapter 5, one prominent feature of China’s Internet capitalists is that they 
have been both disciplined and courted by a strong party-state which has not yet entirely shed its 
socialist and anti-capitalist pretensions. This has translated into the fact that despite their 
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extensive transnational connections – through corporate broad membership and overseas 
education, two features highlighted in this study – they still have to cultivate and maintain 
intensive connections with the party-state to seek political protection, diplomatic and financial 
support and further entry into the highly regulated domestic market. This two-pronged strategy 
has significantly complicated their class consciousness and political behaviors and contained the 
formation of a truly transnational capitalist class fraction around China’s Internet industry, albeit 
to a varying degree across different industry subsectors. Originating in the state-owned research 
institutions and military apparatus, corporate elites in the equipment marking sector have been 
strongly influenced by China’s nationalist ethos and – to a certain extent – its socialist legacies 
while simultaneously subject to the external market pressure because of their international 
diversified revenue structure. As party and government cadres as well as corporate executives, 
Chinese network operating capitalists are inherently contradictory entities defined by both the 
nationalist and developmental agenda of the state and the profit-maximization logic of capitalist 
accumulation. Web applications leaders, while becoming increasingly savvy in adopting 
neoliberal discourse of free market and enmeshing deeply in the transnational capitalist network, 
have nevertheless need to turn to the state for political protections and market entrances. 
Recently, with the rising importance of the Internet in both China’s political economy and its 
international strategies – as exemplified in the newly released “Internet Plus” and “One Belt One 
Road” initiatives – there has been a growing alignment between the strategic objectives of the 
Chinese state and the capitalist imperatives of its Internet elites. 
The process of constructing an International Internet “with Chinese characteristics” is, 
however, an unfinished process, as the complex interplay between the territorial logic of the state 
and the expansive logic of capitalist accumulation, and between the structure and agency of 
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Chinese Internet capital, continue to create unpredictability and uncertainty. Historical 
contingency and agency matter greatly in this process. As we saw, there were divergent visions 
inside the Chinese political economic elite in terms of how to build an International Internet 
system, as exemplified by the different, sometimes competing, policy initiatives along the 
historical track.  In more recent years, there have also been growing social class struggles and 
collective actions against the corporate and exploitative nature of the existing Internet system 
both in and outside of China. Indeed, when workers at Foxconn who are making the iPhone and 
iPad we are using everyday cried out for a more just and humane working environment, their 
demand posed a serious question for what still claimed to be a socialist state. If, as this 
dissertation has shown, Chinese Internet companies have increasingly elbowed their way into 
transnational capitalism, what may this portend for the overall process of capital accumulation?  
What role, moreover, will the “socialist” and “anti-imperialist” party-state play in shaping the 
future of the international Internet? As transnational capitalist class formation as a historical 
process is by no means finished, what impacts may it entail on both the Chinese and the global 
Internet? Finally, when China and the Internet have increasingly constituted “two poles of 
growth” in today’s crisis-ridden transnational digital capitalism, who will command those poles 
of growth, for whom, and for what purposes? 588 These questions will remain relevant for future 
research not only because the Internet sector is central to China’s developmental scheme but also 
because a complete understanding of the future of the international Internet now cannot be 
realized without taking China into consideration. 
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